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This dissertation reconceives curriculum through an historical approach that 
employs Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.  Curriculum is more than the 
knowledge taught in school.  Curriculum, as I a theorist conceives it, is concerned with 
the broader intellectual and ideological ways a society thinks about education.  Hence, 
the current school curriculum’s focus on specific learning outcomes offers a limited view 
of the knowledge fashioned by a society, thereby offering an intellectual and social 
history that is highly selective.  Wittgenstein’s concept of “language-games” offers 
curricularists a way to re-include some of these stories.  
The concept of curriculum emerges at the end of the Renaissance from Peter 
Ramus’s refinement of the art of dialectic into a pedagogical method of logic.  The 
modern curriculum field arose at the end of the nineteenth century as educators sought 
to further refine the remnants of scholasticism’s pedagogical practices by employing 
“social efficiency” and scientific management to more effectively organize American 
education.  Social efficiency and scientific management became the underlying 
premises of Ralph Tyler’s (1949) rationalization of the school curriculum.  
During the nineteen seventies, curriculum theorists began disrupting Tyler’s 
rational foundations by reconceptualizing curriculum using philosophies and theories 
developed outside of education to alter the language used to describe education.  I use 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to further disrupt the school curriculum’s rational 
underpinnings.  Wittgenstein maintains that knowing does not require some internal or 
external authority, thereby rejecting the empirical and logical foundations of knowledge 
that underlie Western education.  Using a Wittgenstein approach suggests that 
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education is an indirect activity of teaching students the use of words.  Wittgenstein 
suggests that educating students indirectly more closely resemble the kinds of playful 
activities in which children engage in their ordinary lives.  He suggests that learning is a 
synoptic presentation that connects concepts that emerge from our everyday use of 
language in new and interesting ways.  By asking students to see the resemblances 
among concepts synoptically, rather than logically, education cannot be reduced to the 
acquisition of a set of facts, ordered in a sequence of steps.  As such, a Wittgensteinian 




 According to Ralph Tyler, twentieth century America’s best known curricularist, 
the school curriculum is “all learning, which is planned and guided by the school, 
whether or not it is carried on in classes, on the playground, or in other segments of the 
pupils’ lives.”1 The field of curriculum studies, on the other hand, is generally interested 
in the broader study of the cultural, social, and ideological perspectives that influence 
how society thinks about education.  Rather than focusing on schooling alone, 
curriculum studies is concerned with how education generally ”shapes and is shaped by 
ideology and culture.”2  In this sense, curriculum might be considered a form of 
intellectual and social history as it reflects forms of knowledge, habits of thinking, and 
cultural practices that a society considers important enough to pass on to succeeding 
generations. The decisions a society makes about the curriculum it teaches are 
selective, and therefore may be seen to be a partial history.  A curriculum (re)presents a 
society’s past, present and future beliefs about itself—its educational folkways and 
imaginings, some scientific and rational, others mythological, but all in flux, all with a 
story that serves a purpose.  Thus, as historical text, the school curriculum and the field 
of curriculum stories are incomplete stories.  The stories that are not told, like other 
silenced histories, beg to be revealed. 
Historically, the academic fields of curriculum studies and history converge in the 
late nineteenth century with debates over creating the American school curriculum and 
                                                 
1Ralph Tyler, “The Organization of Learning Experiences,” in Curriculum and Evaluation, ed. Arno 
A. Bellack & Herbert M. Kliebard (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1977), 45 (my emphasis).  
Reprinted from, Toward Improved Curriculum Theory, eds. Virgil E. Herrick and Ralph W. Tyler, 
Supplementary Educational Monograph No. 71 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 59-67. 
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debates over creating professional historical practices.  American educators and 
historians attempted to transform both educational and historical practices by adopting 
German methods of pedagogy and research.  In each case, the application of German 
methods and theories was used to reform what could be described as more “native” 
practices of education and history, both of which had arisen from Puritan colonial 
educational and intellectual practices.3 
In this first chapter, I bring forward the connections I make between my 
experiences with history, historicism, and curriculum theory.  I suggest that a more 
complex “ecological”4 approach to history, learning history in various sites and ways, for 
example, as I suggest in my autobiographical vignettes, histories locally situated and 
contextualized, tell different stories than do textbooks.  I suggest that the emergence of 
the field of curriculum studies, in the latter years of the nineteenth century, out of the 
positivist discourses of the “social efficiency” movement and the related concept of 
scientific management has similarities to scientific approaches to historiography arising 
during the same period.  Although social efficiency had been only one of the tenets that 
                                                                                                                                                             
2Petra Munro, “Engendering Curriculum History,” chap. in Curriculum: Toward New Identities, ed. 
William F. Pinar (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998), 285, notes. 
3See John Higham, History: Professional Scholarship in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1989), 11-14; and Herbert Kliebard, The Struggle for an American Curriculum 1893-1958 (New 
York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 30-51.  Higham reports that the American Historical Associations 
(AHA) emerged from the Social Science Association, and was organized by John Eton, who was the 
Commissioner of Education at the time, and Herbert Baxter Adams, who was a professor of history at 
Johns Hopkins (a leading university in the Germanization of higher education in America), and who wrote 
and edited pamphlets on history and the state of American education for the U. S. Bureau of Education.  
William T. Harris was also a charter member of the AHA, further strengthening the connection between 
education and history.  See also, Theodore S. Hamerow, Reflections on History and Historians (Madison: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), and John M. O'Donnell's, The Origins of Behaviorism: 
American Psychology, 1870-1920 (New York: New York University Press, 1985), 25-50, discussion of the 
influence of German experimental psychology on American universities during the end of the nineteenth 
and beginning of the twentieth centuries. 
4What I am calling an ecological approach situates human understanding within a context of 
human “natural” history that is biologically, culturally, and environmentally situated—the complex 
interweaving of the individual, embodied within an ever-changing local, living social and physical ecology.  
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constituted the progressive education reform movement during the first half of the 
twentieth century, it became an underlying premise of Ralph Tyler’s rationalization of 
the school curriculum.  Furthermore, Tyler’s rational curriculum discourse dominated 
much of the curriculum field for most of the second half of the century. 
History as Learning: A Synoptic Autobiography 
As far back as I can remember, I understood my everyday life historically.   In 
part, this has to do with growing up in New Orleans, a city steeped in history.  My 
historical outlook is connected to the fact that my family—at least my maternal side—is 
intimately related to the city’s history, having members who have played key leadership 
roles in the city’s past.  Moreover, one of my earliest recollections of doing schoolwork 
is reading a history textbook.  Interestingly, I have few memories of doing actual 
schoolwork that do not include doing history.  Most of what I remember about learning 
does not take place in school, but in other learning environments.  I have few fond 
memories of life in school.   
As a youth, most of my non-school readings were various kinds of histories, 
whether they were books from the library, or the Golden Book collections my parents 
bought at the grocery store, or stories about various Catholic saints.  Not surprisingly, 
when I finally decided to go to college, I chose to study history.  
Immediately following high school, I had no desire to continue my education and 
joined the Navy.  My decision to go to college occurred after my first year in the Navy in 
the middle of reading T. Harry Williams's biography of Huey Long.  I found the book’s 
blending of social, political, and intellectual history to be very interesting, as well as, the 
author’s use of oral history and everyday material like newspapers and political 
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handbills.  My interest in Russian history began to develop soon after reading Huey 
Long.  One day, while working on a cleaning detail, I found George Vernadsky’s A 
History of Russia.  What I found most interesting, as I read, were some apparent 
similarities between Russian and American history.  Reading these two books 
established a pattern in the kinds of books I have read during those periods in my adult 
life when I was not working on some degree.  My casual readings have mostly been 
various kinds of serious histories covering a variety of times and places.  Consequently, 
one could say that upon entering the field of education, my very concept of learning 
implied an historical approach.   
With this sort of a background, it is not surprising that I have been less interested 
in the present for its own sake and more interested in how the present and past are 
intertwined.  Thus, I was both fascinated and puzzled when I first read Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s statement, “What does history mean to me, mine is the first and only 
world.”5  The notion that history was somehow unimportant to how one lives or that 
each of our lives is a new beginning was confounding.  This is not how I understood 
history.  Nor is it how I grew up.  My extended family talked—I should say the women of 
my family, because they and not the men were the storytellers—about our ancestors as 
if they were still sitting at the dinner table.  Heritage was tacitly presented like a kind of 
                                                 
5In Alan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein’s Vienna (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1973), 243; quoted from Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 1914-1916, 82.  Wittgenstein’s concept of history is 
closely related to his concept of time presented in his Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness, Introduction by Bertrand Russell, paperback 
edition (Atlantic Highlands: NJ: Routledge, Humanities Press International, Inc. 1988), #6.4311.  He 
states, “If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life 
belongs to those who live in the present.”  Wittgenstein’s concept of history (as well as Michel Serres’s, 
discussed below) roughly echoes the philosophy of history presented by Saint Augustine, in The City of 
God, which he used to refute the then prevalent Greco-Roman cyclical concept of history, as well as, the 
Christian idea of progress that had become popular in the early church.  See Norman F. Cantor’s 
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genetics that determined one’s character, like the color of one’s eyes.  For instance, I 
did not realize that the South had lost the Civil War until I was eight or nine years old.  
Nor, like most of the important things about life, did I learn this in school, but from one of 
my friends while building forts for our toy soldiers in a sand pile.  While I was never told 
explicitly that the South had won or lost, neither my family nor the community talked 
about the Civil War as if the South had been defeated.  On the other hand, it was not as 
if the Civil War was a major topic of conversation.  There were no Confederate flags in 
my family’s houses and no sentimentality about the war of Northern aggression.  Stories 
of this war were often intermixed with stories about the more recent ones and were 
mostly about personal (family) experiences.  My grandmother would tell the story about 
sticking her finger in the mini ball hole in her uncle’s leg.  He had been an officer with 
the Washington Artillery.  She would also reminisce about seeing my grandfather off to 
fight Pancho Villa on the Mexican border with General “Black Jack” Pershing.   
 Eventually I came to understand that Wittgenstein’s statement should not be 
understood as a rejection of history out of hand.  Instead, what Wittgenstein is rejecting 
is the concept that history represents an inevitable stream of human progress toward a 
utopian society.6  Wittgenstein states, “Our civilization is characterized by the word 
                                                                                                                                                             
discussion of Augustine’s philosophy of history, in Medieval History: The Life and Death of a Civilization 
(New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), 81-88.   
6Maurice Mandelbaum, in History, Man, and Reason: A Study of Nineteenth-Century Thought, 
paperback edition (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1977), 12 & 41-49, defines this progressive 
notion of history as "historicism," which, in part, was a consequence of the positivist philosophy expressed 
by August Comte and Herbert Spencer.  Comte and Spencer's positivism "was dominated by the view 
that there had taken place, and was taking place, a progressive development of man and society."  It was 
a concept that "was deeply rooted in nineteenth-century thought" and paralleled a belief in the unlimited 
potential of education to change (develop) human beings in a socially desirable direction.  See Immanuel 
Kant’s, Education, and On History. 
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‘progress.’  Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features.”7  
In other words, because of the technological advances that have been brought about by 
science, progress is what Western Civilization has come to assume.  Michel Serres 
(1998) suggests that a progressive view of history is related to a linear understanding of 
time brought about by the scientism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.8 
 Wittgenstein’s is not only suggesting that learning about the past does not 
necessarily lead human society to some utopian end, his statement also suggests that a 
society’s culture has no distinct beginning—no single origin.  Like any attempt at doing 
one’s complete genealogy, as a person looks back upon his or her family tree, one’s 
ancestors eventually become a diffused, voiceless mass, a continual doubling at each 
generation.  Who is to say that it is this ancestor and not some other (probably less 
desirable one) that one most takes after?  Furthermore, Wittgenstein is rejecting the 
nineteenth-century notion that cultures and societies develop organically in the same 
way that an individual human being grows and matures.9  Wittgenstein is not 
suggesting, however, that cultures and societies do not change.  Instead, by stating that 
“mine is the first and only world,” he is suggesting that culture is not about what our 
ancestors did, said, or believed, but what we do, say, and believe today.10  At the same 
time, cultures that exist at different times and different places, like people, are still 
                                                 
7Ludwig Wittgenstein, in Culture and Value, ed. G. H. von Wright, in collaboration with Heikki 
Nyman, trans. Peter Winch (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 7e.  Oswald Spengler’s, 
Decline of the West influenced Wittgenstein’s anti-historicism and anti-progressive perspective.  (In my 
subsequent citations of each of Wittgenstein's works, I will cite them by title only.)  See also Munro’s, 263-
264, similar rejection of historical progress and origins from a “feminist poststructuralist” perspective. 
8Michel Serres with Bruno Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, trans. Roxanne 
Lapidus (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 48-51. 
9See Mandelbaum’s discussion, in chapter 10, “Organicism: Culture and Human Nature,”  
163-191 
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related.  Wittgenstein observes that even when a culture appears over time to remain 
the same, or when the way of speaking appears similar at different times and in different 
places, because of the years that have passed and the distance that has been traveled, 
an entirely different way of behaving and an entirely different use of language is being 
employed so that the activities being performed constitute a new way of living.  Yet, 
even among the many differences, similarities still remain.   
Like Wittgenstein, I have come to believe that the cultural practices that we 
engage in today are a sketch or caricature that only roughly resemble the traditions or 
heritage we believe we follow.  This resemblance is not unlike the resemblances that 
exist among different members of a family.11  Even in our post-post world, past, even 
primitive, ways of behaving and speaking continue to persist.  Wittgenstein suggests 
that much of what we do and say is related to these primitive ways of behaving and 
speaking that remain part of our ordinary lives.  On the other hand, what sometimes 
appears to be our unchanging ways of acting and thinking are our habits of doing, 
speaking, and believing that change along with the constantly altering contexts of our 
everyday lives.  These changes are unrecognizable because our as ordinary ways of 
living change, the context of our surroundings continuously changes as well.  
Eventually, these new habits become our conventions because there is no fixed 
backdrop, or foreground against which changes can be recognized.   
 Serres suggests that time, rather than being a linear stream of unfolding human 
progress, exists as a chaotic enfolding, a turbulent twisting or percolating of human 
                                                                                                                                                             
10The notion that culture is what one does rather than our supposed heritage is also suggested by 
Cameron McCarthy, in “The Uses of Culture: Canon Formation, Postcolonial Literature, and the 
Multicultural Project,” chap. in Curriculum: Toward New Identities, 253-262.  
11Culture and Value, 14e.  
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activities.  He uses the metaphor of the crumpled handkerchief to present his non-linear 
concept of time—a chaotic labyrinth of intersecting diversity collapsing upon a single 
point in space.12   As such, not unlike Wittgenstein’s concept of an eternal present, 
Serres maintains that our present human practices exist as a historical bouquet in which 
primitive and recent practices, as well as, our future imaginings converge.  Using this 
non-linear concepts of time, what we call the past, the present, and the future can be 
understood as a nexus that forms a temporal knot—the entangled threads of human 
concepts and practices that constitute our everyday lives.  
 Yet, if learning history does not lead to the creation of an ever better society, 
then, one might ask: “Why study history?  What can one learn from it?”  What can be 
learned from history is that the knowledge that makes up the school curriculum is not 
some isolated or static body of information that just suddenly appears in a textbook.  
Instead, by studying history a student could begin to learn that knowledge is historically 
and, thereby, socially situated.  It is constructed by the ways in which other human 
beings relate to the world, as well as, the ways they relate with each other.13  
Knowledge is the way people talk (write) to one another about themselves and about 
the world in which they lived.  As such, the knowledge we learn in school presents us 
with a form of life that reveals people’s practices of living along with their hopes and 
fears for the future.  In so doing, understanding the historical and social context from 
                                                 
12Michel Serres, in Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy, ed. Josue V. Harari & David F. Bell 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 75, and Serres/Latour, 57-62.  Serres was 
influenced by the Austrian physicist, Ludwig Boltzmann’s concept of time as a kind of bouquet that 
enfolds back upon itself.  It is very likely that Wittgenstein would have been familiar with Boltzmann’s 
concept of time.  William Doll, in A Post-Modern Perspective on Curriculum (New York: Teachers College 
Press, 1993), 177-178, suggests a concept of learning as a process of chaotic recursion that is derived 
from Serres and Boltzmann’s notions of time. 
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which knowledge emerges, while not telling us where society is inevitably progressing, 
can help us understand something about our current forms of life and why we act and 
believe the things we do.   
An historical approach does not require employing historicism’s methodology of 
using the past to affirm the present and, thereby, the future.  Nor does it mean that 
history becomes the Romantic practice of studying the past in an attempt to understand 
it for itself, alone, as if it were some "natural" or “pure” lost age.  Instead, an historical 
approach can be understood, as Serres suggests, as "a struggle against forgetting."14  
Rationalism’s method, designed to produce certainty, and positivism’s scientistic drive 
toward utopian social progress depend upon the human tendency “to forget.”  Forgetting 
allows for the creation of the rigid distinctions required for categorical stereotypes and 
for establishing some essential order.  Instead, history becomes an interrelated 
temporal nexus that offers the possibility of bringing the past into the present moment.  
In other words, studying history enables us to expand the present moment by re-
engaging past discourses that have either been ignored or purposefully left out because 
they do not adhere to progressivism’s modern imagine of the future.15  
The current school curriculum presents us with an entanglement of our 
educational past, present, and future—a nexus of educational concepts and practices of 
teaching and learning situated within an even larger social tangle.  Because any one 
thread gets its meaning from the nexus of all the others, it serves no purpose to find 
either the beginning or the end of any one thread.  To do so would require that it be 
                                                                                                                                                             
13Dwayne Huebner, “Religious Metaphors and the Language of Education,” in Lure of the 
Transcendent: Collected Essays by Dwayne E. Huebner, ed. Vikki Hillis, collected and introduced by 
William F. Pinar (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1999), 368-370. 
14Serres/Latour, 53 
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completely removed from its knot, thereby changing its meaning.  The historical 
approach I pursue in this dissertation is not to untie but to unravel the temporal knot 
called curriculum just enough so that we may study aspects of its various threads.  
Some of the threads are part of the current educational discourse found either in the 
school curriculum or in the curriculum studies field.  Other threads are those of the 
ancestors’ voices, curriculum’s pedagogical and philosophical forbearers, which have 
not often been heard in current conversations concerning curriculum. 
Much of the time researching and writing this dissertation was spent trying to 
articulate a language that would expresses my tacit understandings of what it means to 
teach and learn.  While this endeavor has given my tacit understandings a voice, it has 
also altered my understanding of the meaning of teaching and learning.  At times the 
journey has been slow and difficult; it has also been interesting and enlightening.  My 
investigations have led me into unexpected and fascinating areas of research.  As I 
began understanding one situation, new questions would emerge.  The hardest part has 
been approaching the complexity of the knot, trying to make it understandable without 
oversimplifying it.  My historical task, therefore, has been to preserve the knot, while 
loosening, acknowledging, and exploring the past threads of various educational ideas 
that comprise our understanding of curriculum.  I am endeavoring to offer another way 
of understanding curriculum by reconceiving the role language plays in teaching and 
learning, historically, pedagogically, and philosophically.  In so doing, I am reconceiving 
curriculum.  Instead of the practice of simplifying mature knowledge to make it easier to 
demonstrate to youthful minds, I am suggesting that curriculum be reconceived as an 
                                                                                                                                                             
15Serres/Latour, 51-55. 
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indirect activity that allows students to engage in the multiple uses of various languages 
that emerge as students and teachers engage in complex learning activities.   
Synopsis of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into six chapters.  Following this introductory chapter, I 
discuss in chapter two the emergence of the curriculum field, in the latter years of the 
nineteenth century, out of the positivist discourses of the “social efficiency” movement 
and the related concept of scientific management.  Although social efficiency had been 
only one of the tenets that constituted the progressive education reform movement 
during the first half of the twentieth century, it became an underlying premise of Ralph 
Tyler’s rationalization of the school curriculum.  Furthermore, Tyler’s rational curriculum 
discourse dominated much of the curriculum field for most of second half of the century.  
In response to Tyler’s rational discourse and scientific management approach to 
curriculum development, new theorists entered the curriculum field during the mid-
nineteen seventies and began disrupting Tyler’s rational efficiency frame.  These 
theorists began reconceptualizing curriculum by applying new philosophical and 
theoretical discourses to education.  Three of these theorists, Dwayne Huebner, William 
Pinar, and Madeline Grumet, reconceptualized the field by using these new 
philosophies and theories to alter the language used to describe and analyze 
educational practices.   
A reconceptualized view of curriculum returns education to a conversational form 
of discourse that includes a variety of voices.  As such, knowing no longer exists as pre-
set and static knowledge, but is revitalized as a living and generative educational 
activity.  Huebner critiques education’s dependence upon the positivist languages of 
 11
learning employed by the social sciences.  He observes that these technical languages 
inadequately describe what it means to become an educated human being. 16  Pinar 
and Grumet reconceptualize curriculum as currere.  Rather than focusing on curriculum 
as a pre-determined set of content standards, educational objectives, and assessment 
procedures, currere reconceptualizes curriculum as the teacher’s and students’ 
individual encounters with the objects of education.  Pinar and Grumet apply 
psychoanalytical and phenomenological methods to aid teachers’ and students’ 
inquiries into their educational experiences.17  By applying these alternative 
perspectives, teachers and students are better able to investigate both their own 
subjectivities and the ways in which their social situations effect their beliefs and 
attitudes about their immediate educational experiences.  
Chapter three discusses one of those stories that, for the most part, have not 
been included in our studies of curriculum.  Much of the history of the American 
curriculum begins with the late nineteenth-century debates over adopting a school 
curriculum.  Moreover, curriculum theorists typically begin their philosophical critique 
with Rene Descartes’s rational method of mind, or, at the earliest, Francis Bacon’s 
development of a new, empirical method.  The Dark and later Middle Ages, however, 
have remained relatively unilluminated by the light of curriculum theory.  In a small way, 
this dissertation attempts a beginning at changing this situation.   
The chapter discusses how the concept of curriculum was a sixteenth-century 
invention that emerged from medieval scholasticism’s revival of learning and its efforts 
to bring order and certainty to its practices of teaching medieval liberal arts courses.  
                                                 
16See Huebner, “Religious Metaphors and the Language of Education.” 
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The concept of curriculum as well as our current classroom practices slowly evolved 
from scholasticism’s refinement of the medieval art of dialectic.  The Renaissance 
pedagogue and University of Paris Arts Master, Peter Ramus, would eventually 
transform the art of dialectical reasoning into a pedagogical method of textual analysis.  
Following Ramus’s early death, European book publishers and schoolmasters adopted 
Ramus’s pedagogical method as the model for curriculum development.   
In addition, chapter three briefly discusses the Puritans' adoption of Ramus’s 
pedagogical method as well as his art of dialectic as a method of logic.  Ramism not 
only influenced the development of educational institutions in colonial New England but 
also continues to influence the American curriculum through today.  Furthermore, the 
chapter briefly discusses the relationship between Ramus’s refinement of method and 
the emergence of new methodologies, in particular, those developed by Bacon and 
Descartes, during the seventeenth century. 
Chapter four presents the philosophical thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein.  
Although Wittgenstein is recognized as one of the twentieth century's most influential 
philosophers, his ideas have only marginally influenced the field of curriculum.  
However, his later philosophy has been described as being thoroughly pedagogical.18  
In his later works, Wittgenstein uses situations of teaching and learning to offer a radical 
approach to human thinking and understanding.  In so doing, he moves beyond the 
Cartesian epistemology that underlies the concept of curriculum presented by Tyler's 
Rationale.  In this chapter, I am suggesting that Wittgenstein's later philosophy, in 
                                                                                                                                                             
17William F. Pinar and Madeleine Grumet, Towards a Poor Curriculum (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt 
Publishing Co., 1976). 
18Michael Peters and James Marshall, Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Postmodernism, Pedagogy 
(Westport, CN: Bergin & Garvey, 1999), 175. 
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particular his concepts of “language-games” and “forms of life,” could be used to further 
enhance reconceptualized notions of curriculum.  Wittgenstein’s later philosophy 
suggests that knowing does not require some internal or external authority.  As such, he 
is suggesting that the empirical and logical foundations of knowledge that underlie 
Western thought are not essential to our ability to know.   
In addition to situating Wittgenstein's thoughts pedagogically, the chapter also 
situates his philosophy historically, both within the Anglo-American empirical school of 
analytical philosophy, and the Vienna Circle's logical-positivist philosophy.  Through 
these philosophical schools, the entirety of Wittgenstein's philosophical thought is seen 
to grow out of scholasticism's dialectical tradition as well.  
Chapter five further situates Wittgenstein historically within Vienna's fin-de-siecle 
and the post World War One milieu.  This chapter discusses Viennese culture and 
society, as well as, a history of the Wittgenstein family and its relationship to Vienna's 
fin-de-siecle society.  In addition, the chapter presents Wittgenstein biographically both 
as a child growing up in one of the wealthiest families in Europe and his experiences as 
an elementary school teacher in rural Austria following his return from the First World 
War.  In so doing, the chapter discusses how Wittgenstein's own informal childhood 
learning activities and his teaching experience may offer insights to the pedagogical 
nature of his later philosophy. 
This chapter additionally discusses the ways in which some curriculum theorists 
and educational philosophers have recently begun using Wittgenstein's later philosophy 
to address issues facing education.  David Jardine (1992) uses Wittgenstein's concepts 
of language-games and family resemblances within a phenomenological framework to 
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reconceptualize the relationship between human beings, knowledge, and the world.19  
C. J. B. MacMillan (1998), uses the concept of language-games to help educators better 
understand why students sometimes fail to learn.20  M. Jayne Fleener, Andy Carter and 
Stacey Reeder (2001), similar to MacMillan, use Wittgenstein's notions of games, to 
investigate the levels of "language play" between teacher and students and among 
students in a fourth-grade math classroom.21 
Chapter six concludes by suggesting that, following Wittgenstein's later 
philosophical concepts, teaching should be understood as an indirect activity in which 
students are helped to understand the multiple conceptual resemblances that exist 
among the multifarious “language-games” that are part of their everyday lives.  To do 
this, students need to be shown how to “see” the world “synoptically” rather than 
logically.  In other words, a student’s ability to understand these various resemblances 
calls upon him or her to “see” these concepts metaphorically, what Wittgenstein 
describes as “seeing-as,” rather than methodologically.  As an act of “seeing 
synoptically,” teaching and learning can no longer be understood as a linear, cause-
effect, method for analyzing and synthesizing knowledge.   Instead, teaching and 
learning are better understood as practices of pointing to the various resemblances that 
exist among concepts, which adhere to the multiple languages used in the classroom.    
Although experiential learning activities have played an important role in various 
attempts to resituate teaching and learning practices as an indirect activity, 
                                                 
19David Jardine, Speaking with a Boneless Tongue (Bragg Creek, Alberta: Makyo Press, 1992). 
20C. J. B. MacMillan, “How Not to Learn: Reflections on Wittgenstein and Learning,” in Philosophy 
of Education: Accepting Wittgenstein’s Challenge, ed. Paul Smeyers and James Marshall (Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995). 
21M. Jayne Fleener, Andy Carter and Stacey Reed, “Language-Games in the Mathematics 
Classroom: Learning a Way of Life,” in Journal of Curriculum Theorizing (Pending). 
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Wittgenstein’s later philosophy suggests that it is through a varied use of multiple 
languages, rather than activities alone, that is crucial to opening up the practice of 
teaching as an indirect activity.  As an indirect language activity, teaching and learning 
are transformed from a representational process to a presentation activity that allows 
teachers and students to express the conceptual relationships they discover among the 
varied languages-games emerging from the classroom.  In so doing, teaching and 
learning practices may be understood as more closely resembling the kinds of playful 
activities in which children engage in their ordinary lives.   
I originally intended to include a chapter discussing the possible historical and 
philosophical relationship between Wittgenstein’s work and the connectionist or Parallel 
Distributive Processing model of cognition.  In the end, I decided that including this third 
aspect would make the dissertation too unwieldy.  The interplay of curriculum and 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought is complex enough on its own.  However, my 
research has further convinced me that the various psychological research activities 
that influenced the development of connectionism also influenced Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy.22  As such, this is an area for further research in the future. 
Finally, because the dissertation touches upon the numerous areas of 
scholarship that impact the curriculum field, it raises more questions than can be 
answered in a single work.  Because of the constraints of the dissertation, I have been 
able to address only some of the questions my research has raised.  Thus, many areas 
of further research not addressed in this dissertation are possible.  My hope is that the 
                                                 
23Of all of Wittgenstein’s later works, Zettel, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Berkeley: University of 




                                                
ideas and concepts discussed here will elicit more questions and point to areas of future 
research from the reader. 
Of the questions for additional study that are raised, I would like to briefly 
mention one area that I believe has important curriculum implications.  While the 
dissertation follows the position that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was significantly 
influenced by his teacher training and experiences teaching elementary school, I report 
in a number of footnotes that there appear to be some intriguing similarities between the 
anthropological aspects of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and the social psychological 
concepts suggested in Fredric Bartlett’s works, The Psychology of Primitive Cultures 
(1923) and Remembering (1932).  Both Wittgenstein and Bartlett were students in 
Cambridge’s Trinity College from February 1912 until the outbreak of The Great War.  In 
addition, both were members of the all important Moral Science Club.  I am not 
suggesting that Wittgenstein and Bartlett directly influenced each other’s ideas.  On the 
other hand, the source of their philosophical and psychological concepts more than 
likely emerged from the same sources, namely their studies with Trinity’s eminent 
scholars: philosophers Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and the psychologist C. S. 
Myers, to name a few.23  Further investigations into these similarities could be 
educationally significant considering the importance of Bartlett’s ideas on schema for 
the reading curriculum as well as its impact on cognitive psychology. 
 
23See Brian McGuinness’s, Wittgenstein: A Life, Young Ludwig 1889-1921 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1988), 94-97 & 125-128, discussion about the Trinity class of 1912 and Wittgenstein’s 




The field of curriculum studies, as a distinct area of educational research, 
emerged in the 1920s.  From its inception, the field was strongly influenced by social 
scientific methodologies used to underpin education as a pedagogical science.  In the 
1960s, educational scholars, such as Dwayne Huebner, Paul Klohr, and James 
MacDonald began questioning the use of these social science metaphors to justify the 
way in which the American curriculum was being structured.1  By questioning these 
metaphors as well as the practices and procedures they were generating, these 
scholars were critiquing the field’s intellectual and philosophical foundations.  The 
purpose of their critique, along with their students, has been to interrupt the accepted 
practices of all those engaging in education—students, teachers, and administrators.  In 
so doing, these scholars, identified as curriculum theorists, have been 
“reconceptualizing” the school curriculum by borrowing a variety of theoretical 
approaches from other academic disciplines, thereby intending to re-form American 
education.  
Curriculum theorists maintain that the field has become firmly entombed within a 
narrowly defined rational methodology used to organize education.  Ralph Tyler’s (1949) 
Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction epitomized this rational methodology.  
Influenced by Tyler’s thoughts, during the last fifty years the purpose and objectives of 
American school education, along with the corresponding organization of classroom 
activities, have been determined by an increasingly nationalized educational 
bureaucracy.  As we begin the new millennium, the curriculum has become defined in 
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terms of national “standards” and “benchmarks.”  Students’ successful attainment of 
these standards are now assessed using “high stakes” testing, which are further used to 
evaluate the capabilities of the teacher and the school.  Even more importantly, by 
adhering to these “standards,” the curriculum is removed from the local context of 
students’ and teachers’ everyday activities that are situated within a culturally pluralistic 
society.  Rather than motivating educational excellence, standards and the 
accompanying high-stakes exams limit the act of studying as a transformative activity 
compelling teachers to “teach to the test.”  As such, a curriculum organized in this way 
presents a limited notion of education, one that subjugates a depth of understanding to 
an accounting procedure for identifying and cataloguing a knowledge inventory.  In so 
doing, standards become little more than the lowest behavioral and intellectual 
denominators common to a culturally, ecologically, and economically diverse 
population.2   
Instead of being interested in the personal transformation of students, a 
“nationalized” curriculum continues to move America toward a limited understanding of 
national purpose.  This was the case following Sputnik when educational bureaucracies 
from outside the local educational situation implemented a new, nationally oriented 
curriculum, promoted by national politicians and developed by university experts in the 
scientific disciplines.3  As Joseph Schwab (1970) warned in his declaration of 
curriculum’s morbidity, a curriculum with such limited educative purposes serves to 
                                                                                                                                                             
1William F. Pinar, ed., Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists (Berkeley: McCutchan 
Publishing Co., 1975). 
2See Maxine Greene’s comments on the educational problems and limitations raised by “Goals 
2000: The Educate America Act,” in Releasing the Imagination (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 
1995), 122-129. 
3William F. Pinar and Madeleine Grumet, Towards a Poor Curriculum (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt 
Publishing Co., 1976). 
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narrow schooling’s interests,4 which in turn leads, as Huebner (1976) further warned, to 
the curriculum’s ultimate intellectual death.5  Despite continuous state and national 
efforts at educational reform, the “reconceptualized” critique appears even more 
applicable today then at any time in the last twenty-five years. 
The education establishment in the United States has generally accepted the 
social sciences (rational) concept of curriculum and its narrow understanding of 
learning.  This has resulted in the belief by the general population that learning is a 
consequence of a student’s ability to acquire a curriculum's pre-set educational 
objectives, and that successful learning is measured by the student’s ability to replicate 
prescribed patterns of intellectual behavior.  From this viewpoint, American education 
continues to maintain a didactic pattern of instruction with its logical methodology for 
teaching bureaucratically determined knowledge.  As Herbert Kliebard (1977) observed 
over two decades ago, “Tyler's Rationale put the capstone on the current epoch of 
curriculum inquiry, a new epoch is long overdue.”6 
Foundations of the Curriculum Field 
From its inception in the early decades of the twentieth century, the curriculum 
field looked to business’s use of “scientific management” methods to rationalize 
American industry as the guiding principles for modernizing American education.  
William Pinar (1981) observes that during the first half of the twentieth century school 
administrators developed the field of curriculum studies by adopting bureaucratic 
                                                 
4Joseph Schwab, “The Practical: A Language for Curriculum,” in Science, Curriculum, and Liberal 
Education: Selected Essays, ed. Ian Westbury and Neil J. Wilkof (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1978), 287. 
5Dwayne Huebner, “The Moribund Curriculum Field: Its Wake and Our Work,” in The Lure of the 
Transcendent, 248-250. 
6Herbert Kliebard, “The Tyler Rationale,” in Curriculum and Evaluation, ed. Arno A. Bellack and 
Herbert M. Kliebard (Berkeley, CA: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1977), 65. 
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techniques used to manage American corporations.7 Most school administrators 
appeared to believe that “our schools are, in a sense, factories in which (children) are 
the raw products to be shaped and fashioned to meet the various demands of life.”8 
Franklin Bobbitt suggests:  
Education is ‘rather backward’ compared to industry, but this is understandable 
because our educational system was of ‘very recent growth’ whereas the 
development of business organization began in the Middle Ages.  Therefore, it 
was natural that education should borrow from business.9 
 
 By investigating the curriculum scientifically, administrators sought to establish 
the optimum procedures for successfully coordinating school activities. As such, school 
administrators’ initial interest in curriculum studies was primarily a material management 
process.  Throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, school administrators and 
curriculum planners have continued to search for operating methods that would enable 
them to anticipate and solve the behavioral and intellectual problems involved in mass 
schooling.  Furthermore, they pursued classroom methods that would ensure the 
smooth operation of the school as well as instruction with the same practical efficiency 
that scientific management has provided business and industry.10  
                                                 
7William F. Pinar, “The Reconceptualization of Curriculum Studies,” in Curriculum and Instruction: 
Alternatives in Education, ed. Henry A. Giroux, Anthony N. Penna, and William F. Pinar (Berkeley: 
McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1981), 89.  Pinar was a student of Paul Klohr, and has been strongly 
influenced by both Huebner and MacDonald.  See also, William F. Pinar, William M. Reynolds, Patrick 
Slattery, and Peter M. Taubman, Understanding Curriculum: An Introduction to the Study of Historical and 
Contemporary Curriculum Discourses (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 93-102; and Raymond E. Callahan, 
Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of the Social Forces that have Shaped the Administration of 
the Public Schools (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
8Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public School Administration (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,  
1916), 338. 
9Callahan, 80.  As discussed in Chapter Two, below, Bobbitt appears to present this in reverse.  
Instead, business may well have borrowed its methodology from education. 
10Callahan, 11-13, suggests that there appears to be a close connection between American 
industry's interest in German methods of industrial organization and American interest in German methods 
of education at both higher and lower levels of education.  This interest appears to go well beyond the 
short lived Herbartian movement that advocated the scientific pedagogical methodology of Johann 
Herbart.  See also, Kliebard, The Struggle for an American Curriculum, 18-20 & 33-34. 
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By following American business’s rational managerial approach, the curriculum 
field evolved as an extension of Frederick Taylor’s research into the scientific 
management of American industry.  Under Taylor the individual worker became the 
object of intense investigation, but only “within the context of increased production.”11  
His primary purpose had been increasing the industrial productivity of American industry 
by compelling workers to work more efficiently. Taylor measured this increase in 
productivity, and thereby increased profits, by the amount of money saved.  To achieve 
this end, Taylor believed that “scientific principles" needed to be used to research the 
“abilities and limitations” workers possessed as well as by analyzing the specific jobs 
that had to be performed.  In this way, Taylor argued that each activity could be reduced 
to its most essential components.  Once this was accomplished, then both the job and 
the worker could be reorganized to function as efficiently as possible.12 
 It is out of this scientific milieu, with “its emphasis on sheer practical efficiency,” 
that curriculum studies emerged as a distinct research project.  In addition, Callahan 
observes that the notion of efficiency had become part of the “bloodstream of American 
Life” through the widespread attacks on the waste of monopolistic capitalism in the 
popular press at the turn of the century.13  By marrying schooling to scientific 
management, school administrators began organizing the school curriculum to 
“successfully” educate students by making the job of teaching “simpler.”  For much of 
the twentieth century, traditional curriculum research was preoccupied with bureaucratic 
procedures as well as with public (visible) objects of schooling: curriculum design, its 
                                                 
11Herbert Kliebard, “Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory,” in Curriculum and Evaluation, 614. 
12Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1911), 43-45.  See also, Kliebard, “Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory,” 609-611; and Doll, A 
Post-Modern Perspective, 40-42. 
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sequencing, evaluation, behavior, and materials.  In so doing, it generally ignored the 
learner’s experience with these objects.  As the educational philosopher, Maxine 
Greene (1977) has explained, the traditional curriculum represents “little more than an 
arrangement of subjects; a structure of socially prescribed knowledge”14 situated within 
a prescribed, didactic method.  Following social efficiency’s methodology, rather than 
providing students with the possibility for creative and generative intellectual activity, the 
traditional curriculum has focused on making the labors of the teacher, school, and, 
thereby, the learner as efficient as possible.15 
Tyler's Rationalization of the Curriculum 
In his Principles of Curriculum and Instruction, Ralph Tyler (1949) presents a 
four-step "Rationale" for developing and evaluating curriculum objectives and activities 
that has provided American educators with the essential methodology for managing the 
many facets of contemporary schooling.  Tyler proposes that the curriculum should be 
organized by first determining the "educational purposes schools should seek to attain." 
 He presents educational purposes as a set of behavioral outcomes derived through the 
“scientific study” of both the “learner” and “contemporary life.”  Second, the curriculum 
must determine the “educational experiences” that will “likely attain these purposes."  
Tyler maintains that “learning activities” have to be analyzed in order to determine those 
that are “critical” in helping the learner achieve the pre-selected outcomes.  Third, once 
the critical learning activities have been identified, curriculum developers then have to 
                                                                                                                                                             
13Kliebard, “Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory,” 609; and Callahan, 5. 
14Maxine Greene, “Curriculum and Consciousness,” in Curriculum and Evaluation, 237. 
15Pinar et al., 93, observe that Edward L Thorndike’s psychological research in education paved 
the way for the adoption of Taylor’s method of scientific management. Kliebard, “Bureaucracy and 
Curriculum Theory,” 609, describes this as the “bureaucratic model” of curriculum, while James B. 
Macdonald, in “Curriculum, Consciousness, and Social Change,” Contemporary Curriculum Discourses, 
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“effectively organize these educational experiences."  Tyler proposes that to ensure that 
the selected learning activities will produce the curriculum’s objectives in each student 
they must be put into the proper (logical) sequence.  In the fourth and final step, the 
learner’s ability to achieve the curriculum’s pre-established objectives must be 
“scientifically analyzed” to ensure that the learned behaviors match the curriculum's 
objectives.16  
In developing these principles, Tyler assumes that education’s sole purpose is 
the “changing of the behavior patterns of people.”17  He suggests that the curriculum 
can accomplish this only by changing a learner’s basic habits, ways of thinking, skills, 
attitudes, and interests.  Changing these behaviors, however, requires a considerable 
amount of time as well as continuous attention on a large number of learning 
experiences that focus upon a single outcome.  Hence, he proposes that the 
curriculum’s objectives and activities should represent only the particular changes 
desired by the society as a whole.  While Tyler believes that the way to “intelligently” 
determine these changes would be to scientifically analyze the differences between the 
learner and the society, he adds that in order for the identified differences to be 
considered educational outcomes they first have to be “screened” by a set of “socially 
acceptable norms.”18 
Tyler stresses that, while the objectives and activities chosen for the curriculum 
are a “matter of choice,” these judgments must be made within a “comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                                             
ed. William F. Pinar (Scottsdale, AR: Gorsuch Scarisbrick, Publishers, 1988), 165, further describes this 
curriculum model as “technological rationality.” 
16Ralph W. Tyler, Principles of Curriculum and Instruction (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1949, paperback edition, 1969), 1.  See also, Doll’s, 30-31, 51-52 & 115, observation that Tyler’s 
four-step rationale “is a variation on Rene Descartes’s [rational] method for rightly conducting reason.” 
17Tyler, 6, states that he is using the term “behavior in the broad sense to include thinking and 
feeling as well as overt action." 
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philosophy” explicitly expressing the society’s values.  By accepting these norms as 
standards for judging the educational appropriateness of outcomes, these norms 
become the “values . . . aimed at in the educational program of the school.”  In this way, 
society’s comprehensive philosophy will serve as a screen used by the school to  
eliminate the objectives and activities that are deemed “unimportant” or contradictory.”19 
Tyler proposes that, as the society’s educational philosophy, “the values deemed 
essential to a satisfying and effective life” provide the essential definition of what it 
means to live in a good society.  He further suggests that a democratic society’s 
educational philosophy should emphasize important democratic values.  One of these 
values calls upon a democratic society to maintain a “faith in intelligence as a method of 
dealing with important problems”20 offering the society a framework for working through 
any problems presented by its others values.  Kliebard, however, criticizes Tyler 
suggesting that, while objectives and learning activities are to be drawn from a variety of 
social and intellectual sources, the apparent "democracy" of Tyler's approach is just 
"window dressing."  Kliebard argues that Tyler leaves us "in the dark about how one 
arrives at a philosophical" screen, and he does not explicitly describe how schools 
should engage in this screening process.21   
It appears, however, that Tyler does reveal a great deal about the philosophical 
outlook a society should use to determine the selection, organization, and evaluation of 
a school’s objectives and activities.  Throughout the first chapter, in which he presents 
                                                                                                                                                             
18Tyler, 6 (my emphasis). 
19Tyler, 32-34. 
20Tyler, 34 (my emphasis), democratic values include: the importance of every individual; the 
opportunity to fully participate in all of society’s activities; and the “encouragement of various 
personalities.” 
21Kliebard, “The Tyler Rationale,” 62. 
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his Rationale for determining educational outcomes, Tyler roughly equates the terms 
"science," "intelligence," “method,” and "analysis."  As already stated above, not only 
does he propose that the scientific method is the most intelligent way to determine the 
needs of learners, but he also proposes that intelligence (i.e., science) should be the 
philosophical “method” used by a democratic society to screen the appropriateness of 
these outcomes.  Tyler explains that educational objectives and activities should be 
identified and organized using scientific management's practical logic developed for 
analyzing the essential activities a worker performs on a job.  To explain this point, Tyler 
describes how, at the beginning of the First World War, the traditional apprenticeship 
system for training workers was considered too slow in providing for the ever increasing 
demands for skilled workers by American industry.  Consequently, in order to teach new 
workers the required job skills more rapidly, job training was moved from the factory to 
the classroom.  In order to create and organize these new training programs, curriculum 
developers were required to “analyze the activities carried on by the workers in a 
particular field.”  Tyler’s Rationale proposes that a “similar ‘logic’” should be used to 
develop a school's educational objectives and activities.  He further adds, "Almost all of 
the methods of social investigation can be used in studying the learner's needs."22 
Hence, by arguing that the “needs” of the learner and of contemporary society be 
investigated scientifically and that the educational value of these outcomes is further 
analyzed using the same method, Tyler has provided schooling with a single method for 
                                                 
22Tyler, 12 & 17-20.  The methodology Tyler utilizes to organize the school curriculum can already 
be recognized as important in the report by The National Society for the Study of Education, in The 
Foundations and Technique Curriculum-Construction: Twenty-sixth Yearbook of the National Society for 
the Study of Education, ed. G. M. Whipple (Bloomington, IL: Public School Publishing Company, 1927).  
Pinar et al., 150, observe that “the great social efficiency curricularist,” W. W. Charters, was one of Tyler’s 
professors and had a significant influence upon his carreer. 
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ordering the curriculum, which also acts as the society’s comprehensive philosophy.  By 
structuring the classroom’s objectives and activities into a sequence of linear steps, 
rather than being primarily concerned with how human beings come to know, Tyler is 
centering the curriculum within a philosophical outlook of pedagogical expediency that 
arranges learning activities in the curriculum for the purpose of practical efficiency.23  
 Kliebard observes that centering the curriculum on the presumed certainty of a 
mechanistic metaphor ignores that “the most significant dimensions of an educational 
activity, or any activity, are those that are completely unplanned and wholly 
unanticipated.”24  Tyler’s rational method of learning fundamentally differs from students’ 
everyday learning experiences, which, as Dewey observes, are informal and incidental. 
 According to Dewey, everyday learning is incidental because our daily associations are 
not formally organized to educate us in any direct way.  Dewey argues that, while this 
kind of “incidental education is natural and important," formal schooling is also 
necessary in a “complex [industrial] society.”  However, echoing his contemporary, 
Alfred N. Whitehead (1929), Dewey cautions that formal education can “easily become 
remote and dead.”  For Dewey and Whitehead, education is not merely the procedures 
for pouring knowledge into learners to fill the “gaps” in their behavior, or for directly 
leading the learner in a step-by-step fashion from what they know to what they don’t 
know.  Instead, learning or knowing is an active, creative process in which the student 
                                                 
23Tyler, 16-17.  As we will see in Chapter Two, below, the rational philosophical framework Tyler 
uses to organize the curriculum is not something new within the tradition of Western European education. 
24Kliebard, “The Tyler Rationale,” 64. 
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must “wrestle with a problem first hand, finding his or her own way out,” thereby making 
the ideas implied by the problem the student’s own. 25 
Kliebard suggests that Tyler’s Rationale presents the curriculum field with the 
problem:  How can learning experiences, understood from Dewey as an “interaction 
between a student and environment” be pre-determined by the teacher or the 
curriculum?  If learning “is essentially a consequence of the perceptions, interest, and 
previous experience of the student,” then should it be within the power of those 
designing and implementing the curriculum to determine explicitly what a student will 
actually learn?  Tyler assumes this by tacitly centering the curriculum on the school 
bureaucracy’s ability and right to establish learning objectives.  As the school organizes 
and manipulates the student within the tightly constrained environment of the classroom 
and establishes activities to meet behavioral objectives, then it acquires the tacit right to 
invoke the kind of behavior the curricular objectives require.   
Tyler proposes that curriculum developers can only ensure that learners have 
learned the planned outcomes by scientifically evaluating their behaviors, making 
certain that nothing had been omitted from the pre-established sequence of activities.  
Consequently, Tyler’s purpose in evaluating student’s behavior is not to analyze 
whether the pre-set objectives are appropriate educational goals, but to evaluate 
whether the experiences are implemented correctly.  Learning experiences are judged 
to be correctly designed and sequenced depending upon the students’ ability to attain 
these pre-set objectives.  This ensures that, if a student fails to learn the desired 
behavioral objective, it is not the fault of the curriculum or the teacher.  Instead, the 
                                                 
25Dewey, 4-8 & 150-160; and Alfred North Whitehead, “The Aims of Education,” in The Aims of 
Education and Other Essays (New York: The Free Press, 1929; The Free Press, 1967), 2. 
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student has not adapted to the design set. As Doll suggests, “the linear nature of the 
sequence” of Tyler’s organizing principles de-contextualizes the learning process which 
“allows the goals or ends to exist apart from the means of implementation and 
evaluation, with the evaluation referring only to the success of the implementation, not 
to the question of the appropriateness” of the educational outcomes.26 
Tyler’s curriculum appeals to a practical common sense of efficiency that 
continues to fortify the scientific management model used by American business and 
industry.27  The corporate management model and the rationally organized curriculum 
appear to merge in the examples Tyler uses to describe schooling’s educative purpose 
as fulfilling schooling’s and industrial society's shared “need” of educating its youth for 
an economically productive career.28  As such, what Tyler ultimately provides the 
American curriculum is a systematic procedure for ordering classroom activities in an 
attempt to guarantee that all students will grow up to serve economically useful roles. 
Teacher as a Decision Maker 
The logic that structures Tyler’s curriculum methodology is similar to the 
framework that underpins the "Teacher as a Decision Maker" model of teacher 
education.  This model for “effective teaching,” presented by James M. Cooper (1999), 
provides a three-stage procedure for “the instructional process: planning, 
implementation, and evaluation.”  The planning stage collapses Tyler’s first three 
principles into a single process, “requiring that teachers make decisions about the 
student’s needs,” the “most appropriate objectives to meet these needs,” the “content to  
                                                 
26Doll, 53. 
27Kliebard, “The Tyler Rationale,” 64-65. 
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be taught,” and select and organize the “teaching strategies” and “learning activities” 
best “suited to attain these objectives.”29  
Following the planning stage, the “decision maker” model expands Tyler’s fourth 
principle for determining whether students attain the prescribed educational outcomes 
by dividing it into the implementation and evaluation stages.  The implementation stage 
“requires teachers” to evaluate their on-going instruction in order “to make adjustments 
to their plans based on student” feedback during the lesson.  During the evaluation 
stage, teachers are required to decide “on the suitability of chosen objectives, the 
teaching strategies keyed to those objectives and whether students achieved the 
intended outcomes.”  Asking teachers to evaluate the lesson’s objectives may, at first, 
appear to be a significant revision of Tyler’s fourth principle, which was not intended to 
evaluate the educational objectives.  However, the model’s primary purpose for having 
teachers evaluate the lesson’s planned objectives is to ensure that these objectives 
match the objectives that are used to evaluate student achievement. Hence, as with 
Tyler’s Rationale, assessment goals continue to drive the development of learning 
objectives.  
In the “decision maker” model, educational purposes and activities are no longer 
determined using Tyler’s scientific studies.  Instead, the teacher is now required only to 
“deliberate” among the various options for objectives and activities selected by an 
education bureaucracy.  In current school curricula, a lesson’s particular objectives are 
                                                                                                                                                             
28Ralph Tyler, “Specific Approaches to Curriculum Development,” in Curriculum and Instruction, 
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29However, as one of my interns ironically observed in her reflection on this model, in the school 
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required to follow the curriculum predetermined by the school administration with the single goal of 
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required to fit within a framework of educational outcomes, in the guise of benchmarks 
and content standards, already delineated by the state or local school district.  This is 
not a rejection of Tyler’s Rationale, but is a contemporary implementation of his four 
principles.  In particular, it appears to be the fulfillment of the scientific management 
philosophy promoted by his Rationale with a strong emphasis on measured 
achievement as the criteria for an educated student, as well as advancement of the 
economic purpose for education.  As such, the “effective” teacher’s curriculum 
responsibilities have become limited to a kind of judgement based upon a set of 
analytical practices that arranges the complexities of classroom teaching for the singular 
(pedagogically expedient) purpose of “bringing about intended learning outcomes.”30  As 
with Tyler’s Rationale, it is not the teacher’s role to determine whether  
the outcomes are appropriate, but only whether the objectives and activities used to 
enable students to achieve these outcomes function properly. 
Reconceptualizing Curriculum 
 Pinar and Madeleine Grumet (1988) propose that by reconceptualizing the 
curriculum field, curriculum theorists hope to disrupt the accepted theory-practice 
relationship, which suggests that theory exists only to serve the practical effectiveness 
of classroom teachers.  Instead, curriculum theorists have the responsibility to inform 
everyone engaging in education (students, practitioners, and administrators) that the 
practices traditionally associated with efficiently implementing bureaucratically 
determined educational objectives and activities are not the only possible curriculum 
                                                                                                                                                             
ensuring that students meet the state and school district’s standards by passing the “high stakes” exam 
(my emphasis).  
30James M. Cooper, “The Teacher as a Decision Maker,” chap. in Classroom Teaching Skills, ed. 
James M. Cooper (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1999), 7-9. 
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practices.31  In doing so, curriculum theorists are attempting to restore thoughtful or 
critical inquiry to classroom activities.  They want to enable teachers and students to 
begin questioning the kinds of underlying organizing structures presented by Tyler’s 
curriculum principles, which “practical activity silences.”  In so doing, curriculum 
theorists ask educators to question not only the activities in which teachers engage, but 
the very nature of knowledge as discreet objectives, outcomes, and purposes ordered 
for the effective transmission of the school curriculum.  By questioning the accepted 
practices and beliefs of those engaging in education, teachers and students are no 
longer compelled to succumb to the evident demands of schooling’s institutional 
situation. 32 
For example, a graduate student, who has been teaching first grade for eleven 
years, recently described how, at the end of this past school year, the local school 
district required all of its elementary teachers to complete a “curriculum map addressing 
the district’s benchmarks” for the system’s “Curriculum Coordinator.”  The map needed 
to include “all the objectives and activities the teachers would be using in language arts 
and mathematics for each month of the [next] year at their grade level.”  They were 
given this task during the busy last two weeks of the school year, being provided with 
only about ninety minutes of actual planning time in which to finish the map.  The 
teachers were “told that the function of the curriculum map was to ensure that every 
student at a given grade level will be on the same page on any given day, across the 
entire school system.” 
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As this example suggests, the primary purpose of most curriculum research 
continues to focus on making schooling more efficient.  In so doing, it promotes 
“effective teaching” by ensuring that teachers will be able to make quick, practical 
decisions within the classroom setting by facilitating the implementation of pre-
established educational procedures of a bureaucratically imposed curriculum.  Pinar 
observes that most traditional curriculum researchers and developers are former 
schoolteachers who continue to maintain their intellectual and practical connections to 
their own classroom experiences.  Hence, their research interests tend to focus on the 
entrenched habits and pre-conceived realities that structure classroom practices as well 
as the existing school culture.  These researchers share a common institutional theme 
in their endeavor to “serve the practitioners.”33  They show little interest in studying and 
understanding how new theoretical perspectives that emerge from a variety of academic 
disciplines might be used to reconceptualize classroom practices 
as an activity to serve teachers’ and students' broader intellectual transformation. 
Critiquing Curricular Language 
Theorists reconceptualizing curriculum maintain that schooling has become 
increasingly separated from the everyday lives of teachers and students. In the mid-
seventies, curriculum theorists began their criticism of schooling by rejecting the 
behavioral theories underpinning social efficiency’s methods of traditional quantitative 
and statistical educational research.  An important aspect of their critique was the 
rejection of the social sciences’ theories of learning that situated learning activities 
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within a Pavlovian frame.34  Dwayne Huebner, one of the founders of curriculum 
theory,35 believes that the school curriculum’s theories of learning are embedded in a 
technical-rational language that is not adequate for transforming students' lives.  He 
maintains that the technical language upon which schooling has been built continues to 
search for universal laws for governing human behavior.36  Huebner’s critique of the 
language of learning focuses on the scientism of the social science disciplines, their 
tendency to transform knowledge into a technological discourse, and their dependence 
upon educational psychologists’ positivist understanding of how and what humans come 
to know.  As he explains: 
Making content present for or accessible to students is primarily a matter for 
educational technology.  The various sciences now associated with education 
such as learning theory, child development, and cognitive psychology are most 
appropriately seen as technical tools for making content available, not for 
reaching great truths about being human.37 
 
Huebner suggests that in psychologists’ attempts to explain the learning process 
they appropriated the scientific belief that maintains that change occurs as a direct 
result of a cause-effect relationship “between two events at different times.”  He 
believes that this kind of learning does not resemble education.38  As Dewey observes, 
“We never educate directly, but indirectly by means of the environment.”39  Huebner 
emphasizes that in their attempt to acquire scientific status, behavioral psychologists 
adopted a technical language to explain learning which subsumes human activity under 
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37Huebner, “The Moribund Curriculum Field,” 250-254. 
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the metaphors devised for explaining experiments on animal conditioning.  Huebner 
insists that this form of technical discourse cannot “describe what we do when we 
educate” human beings.40 
These technological cause-effect structures presume that a “universal knowledge 
can be produced which will fit general situations.”  This has led educational psychologists 
to believe that their research would lead to a universal theory of learning that could 
methodologically solve all the problems teachers face in the classroom.  In time, this led 
curriculum researchers to believe that a “theory of teaching” could be found that would 
do the same thing.41  Throughout the twentieth century, curriculum researchers have 
adapted technological advances to school's traditional didactic methodology in their 
attempt to ensure that all students would learn the curriculum’s pre-set educational 
objectives. 
Huebner has attempted to refocus education upon its potential as a “journey of 
the self,”42 encouraging students to study “for their own transformation, a way of working 
on . . . [the] loosening of old binds and discovering a new self.”43  Education’s focus on 
achieving technical skills destroys the importance of the student’s act of studying. Rather 
than simply being willing to accept the curriculum’s already established, technical 
knowledge, Huebner believes that education should become a “protest” against these 
forms of knowledge, offering students and teachers a way to protest against society’s 
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idealized and never questioned conventions.  As he describes, “Most of my professional 
career has been a search for more adequate and powerful ways to describe education.”  
Once we accept the point of view that education is a protest, then as students we are 
called upon to constantly renew and transform our traditions.  
According to Huebner, equating education with the acquisition of schooling’s 
procedural “objectives,” “is a paltry response to humankind’s” full participation in life’s 
transformative potential.  We can be educated—drawn beyond our present 
experience—only if we recognize the transcendent possibility in our lives.  Huebner 
declares, “Education is the lure of the transcendent,” bringing hope to our “forms of 
life.”44  It is a transcendence that exists both within us and within the midst of our 
relationships with others.  Because we are always in relationship, the transcendent 
emerges from the new possibilities that are embodied in the differences and 
opportunities created by our relationships with others.  In this way, the transcendent 
opens us to the future, enabling us to become more than the sedimentary 
accumulations of our past experiences.  The transcendent ignites the creative spark that 
stimulates students and teachers to continually transform who they are.45  
Huebner believes that these disruptions in our everyday life call upon us to 
“reach out beyond ourselves,” beyond our accumulated experiences, and enter into the 
lives around us.  However, while education occurs in community, contrary to schooling's 
current theories of learning, an education is not something that can be forced upon 
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others.  Instead an education is something that we do only for ourselves.46  Rather than 
being considered learning, the human act of becoming aware of the world around us 
would be better understood as a way of knowing that constantly re-weaves our various 
relationships with others and the world, thus continuously recreating the fabric of our 
lives.   
The encounters of teachers and students with the school community, its people 
and academic content, offer them the means to go beyond the school’s bureaucratic 
structures and pre-set technological knowledge.  By continuing to depend upon 
technical-rationality’s idealized discourse, Huebner warns that our education comes to 
an end because we no longer remain open to the freshness of life.  Without this  
approach humans would be “incapable of the continuous education which seems to be 
theirs.”47  
Theorizing Curriculum as Autobiography 
As an alternative to the traditional concept of curriculum, Pinar and Grumet began 
reconceptualizing curriculum in the mid-nineteen seventies by incorporating new 
theoretical perspectives from phenomenology, existentialism, and psychoanalysis that 
challenge the learning theories espoused by the mainstream curriculum field.  Pinar 
observes that education research has become almost indistinguishable from social 
science research, which manages learning as a linear, mechanized, neurophysiological 
reflex.48  Both Pinar and Grumet believe that by refocusing education research toward 
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the individual experiences of teachers and students the curriculum can begin to bridge 
the Cartesian divide between people’s inner, cognitive world of thought and the outer 
“psycho-social” world of human experience.  They have identified this reconceptualized 
curriculum as currere, transforming the school curriculum from a simple, pre-determined 
course that students must endure, into a complex, personally situated, autobiographical 
experience.49 
Currere comes from the same root word as curriculum, which in Latin means to 
run a course.  Advocates of currere believe that curriculum should embody more than 
an institutionalized, bureaucratic methodology of study that the individual student has 
little control over.  According to Pinar and Grumet’s reconceptualized perspective, not 
unlike Huebner’s, what the field of curriculum must recognize as vital to educating 
human beings, is not the replication of an imposed didactic course of knowledge, but 
the different ways each teacher or student runs the course established by schooling’s 
pre-established structures.  It is this personal, idiosyncratic notion of curriculum that 
currere emphasizes.  Currere attempts to revive the dialectical independence and 
dialogical freedom lost in the transformation of medieval scholasticism into a modern 
pedagogical science.  Rather than determining classroom practice, Pinar and Grumet 
propose that currere permits theory and practice to play off one another by using theory 
to expose the limitations inherent in schooling’s practical methodology, thereby opening 
the possibilities for expanding educational practices.  Currere presents teachers and 
students with a renewed dialectical approach to learning that offers them an existential 
activity, which personalizes their encounters with the curriculum.  As Pinar and Grumet 
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suggest, teachers and students must first recognize what they do not know, and then 
study and search, remaining open to their “experiences, open to others, and being 
willing to abandon” what they believe “in the face of what they see.”50  Through this 
dialectical activity, currere offers education a way to return its focus on the multiple 
ways teachers and students can be transformed by the interactive nature inherent in all 
human activity. 
  As Pinar observes, while “the track around which I run may be inalterably 
forced, the rate and quality of the running and my body moving through space and time 
are my creations; they are my responsibilities.”51  No matter what the social or 
institutional contexts the track might represent, because it is still the individual teacher 
or student who is running the track, what is taught or learned is an individual response 
to the course.  Currere offers those engaged in education with the potential for an 
autobiographical self-awareness that connects their autonomous thoughts: dreams, 
fantasies, or daydreaming—creative thinking that occurs tangential to their immediate 
activities, which are often fragmentary and idiosyncratic—back to the educational 
situations in which they become engaged. Instead, Grumet maintains that today’s 
bureaucratically imposed curriculum continues to be more concerned with whether or 
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not teachers and students are conditioned by their myopic focus on a didactic process 
that seeks to reproduce narrowly defined educational objectives.52 
Pinar and Grumet use phenomenology's philosophical perspective to liberate 
teachers and students from their unconscious immersion in schooling’s bureaucratic 
language.  As a phenomenological process currere attempts to transform education into 
a curriculum that investigates educational experiences by returning them back to “things 
in themselves,” Husserl’s “pre-conceptual realm in which experience has yet to be 
shaped by language.”53  Currere offers the curriculum field a new way of seeing through 
Husserl’s phenomenological method of the “epoche.”54  Husserl’s epoche enables us to 
“automatically bracket the causalism of the natural attitude and other theoretical 
impositions on immediate experience.”55  Grumet maintains that phenomenological 
bracketing “requires that we distance ourselves from our experiences in order to come 
closer to them.”56   
By using phenomenological bracketing, curriculum theory has sought to restore 
the contemplative moment with which students interrupt their taken-for-granted 
understandings enabling them to ask the questions practical activity silences.  According 
to Grumet, currere’s phenomenological perspective removes teachers and students from 
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their practical and unexamined orientation toward the curriculum by giving them the 
ability to “bracket” their ordinary classroom understandings.  By bracketing their 
experiences teachers and students are able to re-envision the ordinary as strange, 
thereby transforming themselves biographically and seeing ordinary situations anew.  In 
this way, bracketing sets apart our understandings, “cleansing” them of the 
“irrelevancies” that clutter our field of consciousness.  By reducing the clutter, we are left 
with only the essential recurring forms, “revealing not any particular truth of its facticity, 
but its general truth as it emerges in a community of multiple subjectivities.”57   
Pinar further suggests that by adopting Husserl’s epoche, currere offers teachers 
and students the ability to bracket the flux of schooling’s experiences, stabilizing and 
then ordering them in the freshness and immediacy of the bracketed encounter.58  In so 
doing, they are able to escape their conceptual memories.  This allows teachers and 
students to examine independently their experiences and to see the connections to their  
psychological, physical, and biographic situation—to “one’s form of life” as lived 
experience.59  
Currere not only allows teachers and students to inspect their own bracketed 
subjectivity, it also offers them a way to investigate the effect that their social milieu has 
upon them.  By reconceptualizing the curriculum, theorists reposition the context of the 
field to reveal the ways in which schooling is embedded within the social and cultural 
situation of its surroundings.  In so doing, currere, as do the existential 
phenomenologists, "recognizes culture as the given situation, through which the 
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individual [teacher and student] experiences his or her subjectivity, embodied in acts in 
the world.”60  Grumet maintains, “Whenever we speak of education, we are speaking of 
human experience in the world.  Despite the unique specificity of each person’s 
perspective, . . . he or she exists always in context.”61   
Grumet additionally describes how currere uses phenomenology to provide a new 
metaphor for learning as “a reflexive cycle in which thought bends back upon itself and 
thus recovers its volition.”62  By critically reflecting upon their educational experiences, 
students are allowed to wander back into their past, freely associating current curriculum 
content with these experiences.  As students recall remembrances of life experiences 
they can disclose these experiences back to themselves helping them to understand 
more clearly how these experiences impact their intellectual development.  Students 
learn as they mark the connections they find between the present and the past.   
Grumet further suggests that through currere’s autobiographical methodology, 
teachers and students are able to reclaim lost experiences, allowing them to 
reconceptualize the curriculum as they reconstruct their remembrances of the past.  As 
students autobiographically reconstruct the curriculum they are also learning by 
reconstructing their experiences along with the essential recurring academic forms of 
“literature, or mathematics, or science.”  In other words, currere enables students to 
learn by providing them a way to understand how the academic disciplines contribute to 
their general development.63 
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Currere’s importance as a method of research and of learning is connected to its 
role in helping students explore their psyche.  Freud, according to Pinar, has taught that 
our experiences as infants and children remain “hidden” from our view.  This hidden 
psyche is “the accumulations of experience, layers of sedimentation” that form our 
memories and our various categories of thought.  The psyche, according to Pinar, is the 
source of our outward activity; it is the integrative center, from which hidden 
experiences reveal themselves as our given beliefs.  Hence, currere's autobiographical 
method relies upon psychoanalysis’ use of regression to uncover the underlying 
structures of our beliefs.  As autobiography, the teacher or student's psyche become the 
source for both the curriculum and educational research, as well as the source for his or 
her own transformation.  
Currere offers teachers and students a way to bracket their everyday school 
experiences by using psychoanalysis' method of reflective regression.64  According to 
Pinar, currere provides teachers and students a way to autobiographically capture their 
past “as it hovers over the present.”  By asking them to look into their past lives 
psychoanalytically, teachers and students attempt to “retrieve sensory experience,” so 
that their past is “not portrayed from the point of view of the present.”65  Pinar contends 
that the traditional curriculum compels us to dwell, both cognitively and subjectively, in 
the present, thereby acting out our sensory past within the context of our present 
situation.  By combining bracketing and regression, he suggests that currere enables 
teachers and students to retrace their lived experiences in school, as well as other 
aspects of their life stories.  This process makes it possible for them to intensify their 
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intellectual development in a way that hopefully transforms not only their teaching 
practice, but also their lives.  With our deepening self-awareness, Pinar argues, “comes 
the freedom to comprehend the nature of our involvement in the academic disciplines, 
and with teaching and learning.”66   
Pinar reminds us that even though experiences remain hidden from our 
consciousness, their presence continues to impact our thinking.67  Our hidden memories 
emerge as the source of autonomous, unconscious, and spontaneous thoughts, 
indirectly influencing what we come to know.  While the environment does not directly 
activate these autonomous thoughts, they are born indirectly from our experiences that 
occur within an environmental and cultural context.  These hidden memories are the 
means by which teachers and students go beyond being mere products of their 
environment.  As Grumet further observes, although currere’s autobiographical method 
enables us to excavate what has been hidden in our memory, our regular ways of 
thinking are also impacted by those experiences that remain hidden, without having to 
make them explicit.68  
Once regressive psychoanalysis is used to recover our curriculum past, currere 
then uses existential imagination to initiate the next stage of its method by moving the 
curriculum towards our undetermined, autobiographical future.  Currere’s progression 
calls upon teachers and students to use their capacity to imagine what a curriculum 
could become, but is not yet present.  In so doing, like the past, one’s conception of the 
                                                 
66Pinar and Grumet, Towards a Poor Curriculum, vii, xi, 8-9 & 19; and Pinar et al., 515. 
67Pinar, “Autobiography and an Architecture of Self,” 202; and “Time, Place, and Voice: 
Curriculum Theory and the Historical Moment,” in Contemporary Curriculum Discourses, 272. 
68Grumet, in “Bodyreading,” 459, argues that reading is more like thinking than is writing because 
through reading we seek what is hidden within our psyche without explicating it, while the purpose of 
writing is to explicate our thoughts. 
 44
future can also be employed to construct one's present by freely associating the 
possibilities that our imaginations create out of the current context of our lives.  By 
calling upon students to use their imagination, currere also helps students to discern the 
direction their intellectual development could evolve, not only rationally or linearly, but 
also imaginatively and multi-dimensionally.69  Without imagination it becomes difficult for 
students to bring past meanings forward into the present.  This limits their ability to 
recover, recall, and relive their own biography.  By restricting their history they limit the 
past, which they use to learn by recreating their present meanings.  Otherwise, 
for many students, knowledge becomes static and stale, or, as Alfred North Whitehead 
states, it becomes “dead” and “inert.”70 
 As a process of imagination, currere becomes an act of self-transformation, what 
Pinar describes as a “biographic situation.”  As currere, the curriculum is 
reconceptualized to embody the student’s emerging biographical transformation, the 
imagined and spontaneous forms a human life can take between birth and death.  
Without this sort of biographic movement, Pinar believes that a student’s intellectual 
development cannot occur and the student’s ability to learn is restricted.  As existential, 
imaginative, lived activity, currere fundamentally changes the curriculum from the 
narrow, bureaucratically centered didactic methodology that students are asked to 
mimic.  The problem with the bureaucratized curriculum is its unimaginative focus that is 
not concerned with how the teacher or students exist as individuals.  Instead, Pinar 
suggests that our intellectual development should parallel how individuals function 
biographically, rather than mechanically.  According to John Dewey, the traditional 
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curriculum anchors the student in the purely mechanical aspects of the educational 
activity that “leads to methods, which reduce much instruction to an unimaginative 
acquiring of specialized skill and amassing of a load of information.”71  As Dewey 
emphasizes, using our imagination is what moves learning beyond being a direct 
physical response to the environment.  “Experience itself primarily consists of the active 
relation . . . between human beings and their natural and social surroundings,” hence, 
Dewey declares, “we never educate directly, but indirectly by means of the 
environment.”  As he observes:  
Were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no road 
from a direct activity to representative knowledge; for it is by imagination that 
symbols are translated over into a direct meaning and integrated with a narrower 
activity so as to expand and enrich it.72  
  
It is the imagination, what Dewey calls, “our mind-wandering and wayward fancy . . . cut 
loose from concern,” our autonomous, tangential thoughts, our dreams and day-
dreams, that are the connecting fabric between our historical reconstruction and 
projections of possible futures, which make up what we have come to know.73 
 Pinar observes that at any given moment a person lives within a “biographic 
situation.”  It provides a structure of meaning that embraces the whole context of one’s 
existence, the present, remembrances of our past, and imagined expectations of 
possible futures.  Our biographic situation, Pinar maintains, provides”coherence,” a 
structure of meaning that “surrounds” each present event, not simply logically, but lived 
and felt as the embodiment of our existential experience.  Pinar’s “biographic 
                                                 
71Dewey, 236-237. 
72Dewey., 9, 236, & 274. 
73Greene, in “Curriculum and Consciousness,” 239, also appears to echo Dewey’s use of 
imagination as a way of going beyond the purely mechanical aspects of activity to bring new meanings 
into being.  See also, Greene's treatment of Dewey and imagination in, Releasing the Imagination, 17-22. 
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coherence” further suggests a more radical way of understanding individual existence 
because it also provides a process through which we are able to give meaning to 
contradictory or paradoxical experiences as well as those experiences that are not fully 
articulated.  Biographic “coherence” does not require experiences to be complete or 
whole.74  Instead, biographic “coherence” can be distributed across the fragmentary, 
isolated, and disjointed moments that make up our lives, enabling us to give meaning to 
the immediate situations we encounter. 
A reconceptualized view of curriculum can be understood as an attempt to return 
to a conversational form of discourse that raises questions about our underlying beliefs. 
 As a process that seeks to include multiple voices, learning once again becomes a 
continuous and dynamic re-constitution of our experiences that the didactic curriculum 
cannot provide.75  It is no longer the learner who is being studied.  Instead, the learner is 
again the one who studies” not objects at some distance as does the scientist, spy, or 
voyeur, but as one who is in an intimate relationship, generating new meanings and 
discerning the potentialities that emerge from the relationship.  As a relationship among 
individuals, the curriculum no longer needs to dissect contemporary society in order to 
unveil its objects of limited consensus, like so many ribs.  Instead, as a dialogical 
relationship, contemporary life becomes transformed into a living community—a 
dynamic ecology of living, social, and environmental relationships.  These are 
relationships that go beyond static, idealized categories; they also include differences.  
When taken seriously, differences compel us to re-weave our understanding with new 
threads of meaning formed by the reciprocal relationship between the stranger and the 
                                                 
74Pinar and Grumet, Toward a Poor Curriculum, 52; and Pinar et al., 520. 
75Pinar and Grumet, Toward a Poor Curriculum, 35. 
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knower.  Finally, knowledge is no longer a pre-set object that determines what activities 
we experience and how, but a living, generative learning activity that gives students the 
freedom to constantly reconstruct who they are through the dynamic relationship 
between the living learner and a living community.  As Grumet suggests, it is a “form of 
experience” that is idiosyncratic and depends upon context, offering an innate sense of 
freedom in choice and self-direction, that moves both outward and inward 
simultaneously—the fabric of existence woven into form with the cross threads of 
oppositions and tensions of the individual's on-going engagement in their given life-
world.76 
While the bureaucratic educational institutions in America shine no light on, and 
provide no protest of the school curriculum, neither is this curriculum simply a victim of 
the discourse of scientific management and social efficiency.  As Doll (1993) has 
shown, American education’s present bureaucratic forms are not a recent modern 
construction.  Instead, they represent the continuation of a Cartesian rationalism, which 
Tyler’s Rationale carried forward into the late twentieth century.   
When Descartes exorcised our mind from our material body, he provided the 
rational underpinnings that helped to launch modernity and the scientific transformation 
of the academic disciplines.  As such, Descartes’s rational method has strongly 
influenced educational research by establishing the theoretical foundations for both 
behaviorism's theories of learning and Tyler’s curriculum rationale.  As Raymond 
Fancher (1979) observes, it was Descartes who “laid the ‘cornerstone’ of American 
psychology’s behaviorist movement, especially its mechanistic stimulus-response theory 
                                                 
76Pinar and Grumet, Toward a Poor Curriculum, 35 (my emphasis). 
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. . . and linear chains of communication.”77  As curriculum theorists have shown, 
Descartes’s rationalism has guided twentieth-century educational practices, along with 
schooling’s modern understanding of the theory-practice relationship.78  Descartes’s 
rationalism, however, should be understood as the best expression of a general 
agitation for a single methodology during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  As 
such, Descartes’s rationalism is a continuation of Renaissance humanism’s search for 
method led by the sixteenth-century dialectician and pedagogue, Peter Ramus.79  
Ramus’s pedagogical method of mapping knowledge into logical diagrams, helped 
establish the concept of curriculum.  Ramism both influenced and was influenced by the 
rapidly developing Renaissance printing industry, which led to a uniformly certain 
concept of knowledge.  Ramus and his followers dominated the production of classroom 
textbooks.  As the typographical representations presented in these textbooks became 
established, Ramus’s knowledge diagrams evolved into the formalized curriculum.80 
According to David Hamilton (1990), well before the word “curriculum” first 
appeared as a description of Ramus’s method for teaching, John Calvin preached that 
human existence was a “vitae curriculum,” an obstacle course true believers endured on 
their way to salvation.81  It does not take a great leap of imagination to recognize the 
properly ordered structures of present day schooling—books, buildings, desks, 
overheads, lesson plans, standardized tests, etc.—as a latter day obstacle course that 
students are asked to overcome.  Doll states that this sense of curriculum, which these 
                                                 
77Doll, 114.  See also Raymond E. Fancher, Pioneers of Psychology (New York: Norton,  
1979), 40. 
78Pinar and Grumet, “Socratic Caesura,” 98. 
79Walter J. Ong, S.J., Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of 
Expression and Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), 83-186. 
80David Hamilton, Curriculum History (Geelong, Victoria: Deakin University Press, 1990), 27. 
81Hamilton, 27. 
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Calvinist educators provided, has become a cultural artifact upon which American 
education has been built.82 
Huebner’s attempt to find a new (spiritual) language for describing education 
could also be understood as an attempt to transform Calvin’s methodized language of 
spiritual enlightenment as much as an attempt to transcend the limited understanding of 
what it means to know provided by the positivism of the social sciences.  Dewey was 
not only advocating a new experiential frame for curriculum in which knowing relies as 
much upon human imagination as upon outside environmental stimuli, he also objected 
to the rigid discourse used to teach the Ramist oriented, didactic curriculum of 
nineteenth-century America, as well as to the scientism of the dominant psychological 
(developmental) theories of learning.  Tyler’s curriculum principles tacitly rationalize the 
didactic and the scientistic discourses into a single method of curriculum.  The extent to 
which Tyler was successful in accomplishing his goal suggests that the traditional 
Ramist curriculum and the new psychologically based curricula developed at the 
beginning of the twentieth century may not have been as different from one another as 
has been argued by progressive educators like Tyler.  Aside from this interesting issue, 
Kliebard, Huebner, Greene, Pinar, and Grumet, following in Dewey's footsteps, have 
found Tyler’s rational language of methodizing curriculum to be inadequate for 
education. 
In a similar spirit, I suggest that the concept of curriculum can be further 
reconceived using the later philosophical ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, in which he 
attempts to offer a new language for philosophical investigations.  While not generally 
                                                 
82William Doll, assisted by Al Alcazar, “Curriculum and Concepts of Control,” in Curriculum: 
Toward New Identity. 
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cited by those searching for alternatives to Ramus’s and Tyler’s methodized approach 
to curriculum, I believe that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy complements the curricular 
alternatives that have been proposed by the aforementioned authors.  More 
significantly, however, Wittgenstein’s offering of a new way to use language when doing 
philosophy presents its own radical sense of curriculum, especially found in his rejection 
of what we have traditionally called method. 
CHAPTER 3 
PETER RAMUS AND THE REFINEMENT OF METHOD  
 
The pedagogic procedure that requires classroom learning activities to be broken 
down into simple tasks that are then methodologically arranged into a step-by-step 
progression to train students in a pre-established knowledge did not begin with the 
social science revolution of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  As curriculum 
theorists Dwayne Huebner (1976) and William Doll (1993) observe, what appears to 
shackle education to the chains of a technological method of reasoning are the 
mechanisms of Rene Descartes’s seventeenth-century mathematical rationality, 
facilitating the practical and scientific transmission of knowledge.1  These mechanisms, 
however, did not just suddenly materialize out of Descartes’s genius, nor has their 
application to classroom learning been a pedagogical afterthought to an Enlightenment 
philosophy of utopian progress.  Instead, the mechanisms for a formalized rational 
method were fabricated by medieval scholasticism’s search for a practical and efficient 
way of teaching that would guarantee the logically certain transfer of knowledge. 
Medieval scholasticism’s primary intellectual focus, around which the early 
cathedral and monastic schools as well as the early universities were organized, 
encompassed the educational practices used to teach its liberal arts courses.  The first 
three of these arts courses: grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, known as the trivium, were 
taught to young boys between the ages of eight and twelve by just slightly older boys or 
young men (many of them still in their teens).  As such, the interplay of scholasticism’s 
intellectual forces took place in a pedagogical tradition that focused on the “the large-
scale, organized teaching of the trivium to generation after generation of schoolboys . . . 
                                                 
1Huebner "The Moribund Curriculum Field," 248-249; and Doll, A Post-Modern  
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[which] was a venture destined”2 to eventually produce a new framework for 
understanding the universe.  The new framework that emerged from the teaching 
practices of the scholastic classroom was a single rational method used to organize 
one's thinking in a series of ordered steps, thereby producing an efficient, routine, and 
distinct procedure for organizing all knowledge. 
Walter Ong (1958) contends that, while over the centuries successive 
generations of educators have continuously re-evaluated the educational literature in an 
attempt to demystify the educational process by introducing new theories of thinking 
and learning, classroom teaching has steadily adhered to practices that arose to teach 
scholasticism's liberal arts courses.  Thus, our modern concept of a rational method of 
teaching developed from these loosely assembled schoolroom activities rather than 
from some speculative theory or reflective philosophy.  Ong suggests that the 
pedagogical reality presented by scholasticism’s teaching of the trivium and in particular 
the art of dialectic played a fundamental role in the fabrication of the “sinews and bones 
of modern civilization.”  He further suggests that the ideas and practices found in 
scholasticism’s pedagogical literature played a more significant role in the development 
of modern thought than all of humanism's noble ideals found in the entirety of the 
monumental literature of the Western Canon.3 
This chapter will discuss how the refinement of method into a formal step-by-step 
procedure emerged from medieval teaching practices used to teach the Latin language 
                                                                                                                                                             
Perspective, 1-5. 
2Walter J. Ong, S.J., Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of  
Discourse to the Art of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 131. 
3Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 9 & 171.  See also, Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 120-124, 
169, & 188-189; and Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1974), 17. 
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as well as the Renaissance pedagogical practices used to teach students a simplified 
classroom logic for analyzing texts.  The development of a simple method of logic, 
however, did not proceed along a single line of thinking.  Instead, the conception and 
use of method, as the one right procedure for arranging how one should think, arose 
from the complex and sometimes discontinuous practices used to teach the art of 
dialectic throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.4  Ong, in his comprehensive 
work, Ramus, Method, and The Decay of Dialogue, provides an extensive discussion of 
the close relationship between the refinement of method and attempts by successive 
generations of scholastic arts masters and Renaissance schoolmasters to make the 
teaching and learning of the art of dialectic more effective.5 
Ong observes that because the use of logical reasoning emerged from the oral 
tradition of ancient Greece, throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages logic was less 
concerned with the private operations of thought.  The use of logic was closely allied 
with the use of dialectic and rhetoric to organize oral performance.6  Ong further 
suggests that the on-going refinement of the medieval practices used to teach both arts 
courses played a fundamental role in “unintentionally” transforming European 
intellectual discourses from the ambiguous oral-aural relationship of sound into a 
distinct, visually oriented framework that situated words, like objects, in physical space.  
This transformation resulted in the vague and locally situated meanings of words found 
                                                 
4Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 171– 172; Friedrich Heer, The Medieval World: Europe 1100-1350, 
trans. Janet Sondheimer (New York: New American Library, 1962), 104; and Cantor, 535. 
5Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 30.  See also, Catherine M. Dunn, Introduction to The Logike of the 
Most Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr, trans. Roland MacIlmaine, 1574, ed. Catherine M. Dunn 
(Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1969), xvii-xxii. 
6Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 4-5, suggests that logic did not become associated 
with the art of thinking until after the invention of the printing press and the mass production of printed 
books.  Jardine, 19-20, points out that Aristotle defines dialectic as the study of the use of language rather 
than the stuffy of mental concepts and thought processes.  
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in an oral society becoming fixed within the certainty of a formalized methodological 
structure.  Current ideas on teaching, learning, method, and the school curriculum 
continue to be influenced by the pedagogical alterations to ancient notions of education 
fostered over the centuries by both medieval and Renaissance humanists 
transformations in the use of language. 
The Trivium's Influence on Medieval Logic 
Beginning in the early Middle Ages, the trivium’s arts courses were taught as the 
“tripartite” training of young boys in the practical use of the Latin language for both 
classroom disputations and for continuing their studies of the remaining liberal arts 
courses that composed the quadrivium.  The close relationship that existed between the 
trivium and scholastic education is enhanced by Ong’s observation that during both the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance the term, learning, was used to refer only to the 
study of Latin.  Medieval scholasticism adopted the ancient Greek and Roman belief 
that all human intellectual activity is conducted verbally, maintaining the belief that both 
dialectic and rhetoric were the arts used to study any and all subjects.  Hence, the rules 
that governed the use of Latin taught by the trivium's arts courses were fundamental to 
all knowledge.7 
The trivium’s techniques for the proper use of Latin further reinforced an 
important ancient philosophical concept.  Scholastic arts masters maintained the 
ancient belief that a direct correspondence exists between the logical structures of a 
                                                 
7Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 119-120; and Jardine, 17-20.  According to Ong, 
during the Middle Ages, learning did not refer to becoming literate in one’s vernacular.  In order to enter a 
school, a young boy already had to know how to read and write in his native language.  The purpose for 
teaching Latin was to enable students to read the treatises that composed the quadrivium: arithmetic, 
geometry, astronomy, and music.  Ong further observes that Latin remained the language of learning well 
into the eighteenth century. 
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discourse and the structures of the mental and physical worlds.8  As such, the trivium 
not only trained medieval students in Latin, but also presented them with the verbal 
structures that were believed to be essential for engaging in any reasoned discourse.  
Thus, scholasticism’s need to teach young boys Latin effectively aligned the practices 
used to teach the trivium with the structures and rules of logic.  Arts masters made little 
distinction between the trivium's arts courses and use of logic.  The trivium’s role in 
training students how to compose a reasoned discourse was typically presented as an 
architectural metaphor.  First, students had to be taught how to form the verbal bricks 
needed to build a discourse.  The medieval art of grammar trained young arts students 
how to fabricate the well-formed linguistic units required for presenting arguments in 
Latin.  The art of dialectic taught students the technical skills needed to assemble these 
verbal bricks into a discursive edifice.  Once a reasoned edifice was completed, the art 
of rhetoric taught students how to adorn the exterior of their discursive structure with the 
Latin figures of speech used to persuade others into action.9 
While the medieval teaching of Latin required the construction of a distinct 
scholastic art of grammar, the arts of rhetoric and dialectic generally followed the older 
Aristotelian pattern.  With the invention of script the Greeks began “technologizing” oral 
performance.  In so doing, they transformed oral performance into techne, thereby 
converting rhetoric and dialectic into the first arts.10  By technologizing language, the 
                                                 
8Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 67-68.  See also Timothy J. Reiss’s discussion of this 
relationship in The Discourse of Modernism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 208-211. 
9Jardine, 4 & 18-19.  See also, Ong's, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 5, suggestion that 
Cicero defined dialectical reasoning as the art of discourse (ars disserendi).  In addition, Ong explains that 
logic's association with the less verbal and more solipsistic concept of thought implied by "the art of 
thinking" did not come into use until after the invention of the printing press.  See Wilbur Samuel Howell's 
discussion of Cicero's influence on English logic and rhetoric, in Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 
(New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1961). 
10Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 5. 
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Greeks made it possible to "systematically inquire" into the "practices and habits" of any 
subject.11  Aristotle describes the art of dialectic as having several functions.  Dialectic 
was employed when one desired to inquire critically into complex and uncertain 
questions; to enhance the intellect; and to deliberate over how best to act for the good 
of the community.  After using dialectical reasoning to come to a probable conclusion on 
a topic, an individual uses rhetoric to persuade the public of the correctness of this 
conclusion.  In other words, dialectic provides an individual with the means to gather 
evidence for an argument, whereas rhetoric, as the art of persuasion, supplies the most 
effective way to demonstrate the worth of the evidence.12 
Medieval arts masters, however, did not derive the arts of dialectic and rhetoric 
directly from Aristotle.  Instead, the trivium was generally based upon Roman treatises 
on Aristotle’s Topics compiled by Cicero and, to a lesser extent, by Quintilian.  While 
Aristotle maintained that rhetoric was the counterpart to dialectic, he did not consider 
the two arts equivalent.  As he further asserts, the art of rhetoric is derived from 
dialectic.13  The Roman treatises, however, blended the arts of dialectic and rhetoric into 
a single art of discourse and surreptitiously presented rhetoric as the more intellectually 
                                                 
11Aristotle, Rhetoric, in Great Books Of the Western World, vol. 9, 593. 
12Aristotle, Topics, in Great Books of Western Civilization, vol. 8, 143-144; and Rhetoric, 593-594. 
 In the Topics, Aristotle maintains a philosophical distinction between the formal, logic used for 
demonstrating (scientific) knowledge and the logic used for dialectical reasoning.  He asserts that the 
reasoning used for demonstration begins with invariable knowledge, which is “when the premises from 
which reasoning starts are true and primary.”  Aristotle defines the art of rhetoric as the “faculty for 
observing in any case the various means of persuasion available” to an orator.  See also, Posterior 
Analytic, in Great Books of Western World, vol. 8, 97, where Aristotle maintains that while rhetoric 
employs the enthymeme (a syllogism in which the middle term is implied) “the persuasion exerted by 
rhetorical arguments is in principle the same" as the logic used to demonstrate (scientific) knowledge.  For 
all certain knowledge is "scientific."  Today we use scientific in a quite different empirical/experiential 
sense. 
13Aristotle, Rhetoric, 596, proposes that while rhetoric deals exclusively with the enthymeme, the 
“business of dialectic is the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, including the enthymeme.”  Dunn, in 
her Introduction to The Logike of P. Ramus, xiii-xvi, observes that England’s first logician, Alcuin of York 
(c.794), used Zeno’s metaphor of the closed hand for dialectic and the open hand for rhetoric to describe 
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important art.  Thus, Cicero’s art of discoursing well more closely bound medieval 
dialectic to the rhetorical art of persuasion than originally presented by Aristotle. 
While the practices used to teach the trivium varied depending upon the 
emphasis arts masters placed upon the teaching of its arts courses, the pattern used to 
teach the trivium remained fairly consistent.  Because the trivium’s “practical” purpose 
was to teach Latin, students were first taught the art of grammar.  Unlike the 
architectural model presented above, however, the art of rhetoric was the second 
course taught to medieval students.  One reason offered for teaching rhetoric 
immediately after grammar was the arts masters’s belief that rhetoric’s rules of 
operation were simpler than those used to operate dialectic, thereby making rhetoric 
more conducive to the minds of young boys.  Thus, an arts student’s training in Latin 
culminated with the art of dialectic.  While there were occasional attempts to reverse 
this pattern by teaching dialectic before rhetoric, largely because dialectical reasoning 
was believed to be critical to an arts student’s ability to become an arts master by 
completing his studies of the quadrivium, efforts to teach dialectic before rhetoric never 
proved to be viable.14 
As early as the eleventh century, the art of dialectic was being taught, not so 
much as the practice of critical inquiry for understanding the truth of an argument, but as 
the technical skill students needed to analyze and classify the various propositions, 
terms, and forms of inference used in an argument.  In other words, for Aristotle the end 
of constructing an argument was to persuade the public of its worth.  For medieval arts 
masters, fabricating and analyzing an argument became an end in itself.  As such, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the distinction.  See Howell’s, 14-15, discussion of Zeno’s metaphor. 
14Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 276. 
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medieval art of dialectic became a technical tool to breakdown and convert a disputation 
into a form of ratiocination.  However, the technicization of the trivium, which began with 
the teaching of the rules of grammar, continued and even became more institutionalized 
within the university right up to the beginning of the Renaissance.  During the 
Renaissance this practice of splitting and converting arguments into distinct propositions 
was extended to written compositions, due in part to the rise of the printing press and 
the use of the art of dialectic in life beyond the classroom. 
Beginning with the Renaissance, scholars reformed university educational 
practices by requiring students to engage in written composition rather than maintaining 
the medieval tradition of strictly oral disputations.  As such, Renaissance arts masters 
used the art of dialectic to teach students the logical rules for sifting, identifying, and 
classifying information expressed in written discourse.  As the use of written 
compositions became increasingly accepted, the art of dialectic began to dominate the 
program of Latin learning even more.  By the end of the fifteenth century, the study of 
grammar was being taught less as an independent arts course, equal to rhetoric and 
dialectic, but as a prerequisite to the study of dialectic that introduced students to nearly 
all of the technical terminology essential in the use of dialectic.  In other words, 
grammar became the template within which all other arts and sciences were organized, 
a procedure further refined and popularized by Peter Ramus during the mid 1500s.  The 
educational necessity of teaching young boys the proper use of dialectical reasoning 
compelled youthful arts masters to continuously simplify their classroom practices from 
a dialectical dialogue between student and master, into an arts master’s presentation of 
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a didactic argument.  The simplification of these practices, in turn, led to the 
development of a simpler dialectical logic.15 
The Renaissance reform of using written composition precipitated a realignment 
of the medieval arts courses that divided the liberal arts.  Not unlike the medieval 
pattern, Latin grammar and rhetoric continued to be studied first, but without the art of 
dialectic.  Instead, the art of dialectic was included in a program of philosophical study 
that blended it with studies in Aristotelian physics, which represented a highly 
mechanistic natural science.16  Ong suggests that, while the ancient world’s rhetorical 
tradition remained alive until the age of Romanticism, by the mid-sixteenth century 
Renaissance scholasticism’s emphasis on written expression and the invention of the 
printing press had separated the arts of rhetoric and dialectic, remaking rhetoric into a 
kind of “grammar” of persuasion, which, like the art of grammar, was taught as a 
supplement to dialectic.17  Thus, the Renaissance art of dialectic took on the primary 
responsibility for training students in the technical tools required for analyzing what were 
believed to be the “natural” (logical) relationships embodied within a written discourse.  
By linking the art of dialectic even more closely to Aristotelian physics, Renaissance arts 
masters believed that the use of dialectical analysis provided students with the tools 
they needed to manipulate written discourse in order to gain insights into the “natural” 
world. 
Another reason for scholasticism’s tendency to continually technologize the art of 
the dialectic was that successive generations of its arts masters had a limited access to 
Aristotle's works through Cicero’s treatises, scholasticism's truer intellectual patron.  As 
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such, Aristotle’s formal reasoning for the demonstration of scientific knowledge found in 
his Posterior Analytic had not been available to the early medieval arts masters.  
According to Aristotle, scientific knowledge was knowledge that was invariable and 
certain and not arrived at through dialectical reasoning.  Instead, arts masters employed 
Aristotle’s rhetorical persuasion as a tool to demonstrate their conclusions as a form of 
invariable knowledge rather than as the culmination of probable understandings. 
Even after Aristotle’s complete corpus was introduced to the scholastic world, 
medieval arts masters continued to understand logic as a fusion of scientific and 
dialectical reasoning without recognizing the differences between the two.18  Moreover, 
by asserting that “all instruction . . . proceeds from pre-existent knowledge,” Aristotle 
equates the act of teaching with his scientific forms of demonstration.  In other words, 
instruction does not use dialectical reasoning.  Instead, is an act of logical 
demonstration more closely connected to a didactic argument.19 
Aristotle further maintains that because teaching begins with what is already 
known, then only certain and invariable knowledge is capable of being taught.  This has 
far-reaching implications, because it suggests that teaching can begin only with 
invariable knowledge (i.e., scientific), which further suggests that the very nature of 
scientific knowledge is that it can be taught.  Thus, once something is taught, thereby 
demonstrated, then even the most speculative concept would by definition become 
scientifically invariable knowledge.  This consequently suggests that the medieval 
practice of using rhetorical persuasion to teach (demonstrate) the art of dialectic silently 
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transformed the art of dialectic from an idiosyncratic use of reason for critically inquiring 
into and to aid one in understanding complex and uncertain problems, towards the 
apparent certainty inherent in the use of formal logic—a certainty prized by the medieval 
schoolmen. 
In time, the teaching practices used to train students in the art of dialectic 
established a systematized set of rules for a “science” of dialectical reasoning that was 
further refined by a Renaissance art of discourse used for composing written 
arguments.  The art of dialectic, as the bringing into being the true use of reason to 
produce right judgment, became scholasticism’s primary intellectual tool that arts 
masters fused with Aristotle’s scientific forms of demonstration and refined into the 
method of teaching used to demonstrate any and all knowledge.  In other words, the art 
of dialectic became the ultimate practical form used to understand and order all 
knowledge.  For thousands of medieval and Renaissance arts teachers, the idea of the 
“practical” came to represent “pedagogical expediency”—what is sometimes referred to 
today as “praxis.”  Within this intellectual milieu emerged the pedagogical method 
developed by the Renaissance arts teacher Peter Ramus, whose primary purpose for 
refining method was to simplify even further the art of dialectic to make teaching more 
practical, more responsive to the needs of expediency. 
While the transformation of the art of dialectic from the capacity to reason from 
opinion into a method for demonstrating scientific knowledge is generally considered a 
pedagogical rather than a philosophical reform, this belief implies that the scholastic 
teaching and scholastic study of philosophy existed as distinct intellectual practices.  
However, within scholasticism’s complex intellectual milieu these two activities were 
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“fused” together by the teaching practices found in the medieval classroom.  Because 
medieval philosophy, under the guise of the trivium, was a subject learned only at 
school, the dominant pattern found in scholasticism’s liberal arts courses was the 
consistent subordination of philosophy to teaching practices, via the role the art of 
dialectic played in each.  Ong asserts that the very “term ‘scholastic philosophy’ offers 
the prima-facie evidence for this” subordination.  In both medieval and Renaissance 
Latin, the term schola was used primarily to designate a “classroom.”  As such, 
“scholasticism [and scholastic philosophy] was understood as a kind of classroom-
ism.”20  Thus, the art of dialectic, as the bringing into being the true use of reason to 
produce right judgment, was scholasticism’s primary intellectual tool, which arts masters 
amalgamated with scientific forms of demonstration and refined into the method of 
teaching used to demonstrate any and all knowledge. 
Over the centuries, philosophy, like the other modern academic disciplines, has 
established itself in its own right—in many ways filling the void left by theology as the 
“queen of the sciences.”  On the other hand, educational philosophy (similar to 
educational theory) has consistently retained a close kinship with, and has remained 
subservient to, classroom practice. 
Medieval Dialectic and the Growth of Learning 
The medieval brand of dialectic had evolved in the cathedral and monastic 
schools founded across Northern Europe during the early Middle Ages.  Believing that 
using dialectical reasoning brought humanity closer to God, early medieval 
                                                 
20Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 150.  This fusing together of medieval pedagogy and philosophy can 
also be found in Bacon’s and Descartes’s critique of “the schoolmen” and “their philosophy.”  Descartes, in 
Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Book I, in Great Books of the Western World, vol. 31, 2-3, goes to 
great pains to explain how his mathematical science is not philosophy, or at least, not philosophy in the 
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schoolmasters revived learning by first reforming the study of dialectic.21  Thus, the 
rapid development of these schools was closely associated with the development of a 
medieval art of dialectic and the pedagogical practice of disputation used to teach 
Christian theology.  Gerbert (d.1008), the schoolmaster and later archbishop at Rheims, 
reformed the study of dialectic by replacing the cruder and superficial texts produced 
during the Carolingian period with Boethius’s sixth-century dialectical manual, On the 
Different Kinds of Topics (De Differentiis Topicis).  Boethius’s manual remained the 
primary manual for teaching dialectic until the mid-thirteenth century, thereby playing a 
major role in the continuous evolution of dialectic during the next four centuries.22  
Clerics, like Berenger of Tours (d. 1088) taught that reasoning was a gift bestowed by 
God.  Clarembald of Charters (d. c1170) declared, “To theologize is to philosophize.”  
Clarembald, who taught, “By exercising the most powerful resources of the intellect, 
everything is knowable,” further expressed the principle that shaped the teaching 
practices of these schools.  Therefore, by using ones reason, “God is also knowable.”23 
The growth and success of these early medieval schools relied heavily upon the 
teaching prowess and personality of the individual teachers.  Christopher Brooke (1969) 
observes that medieval students wandered across Europe searching for the best 
teachers.  Furthermore, these adolescent boys were “looking for adventures of mind as 
                                                                                                                                                             
manner of the schoolmen.  See also, Bacon, iv, 1-12. 
21Robert S. Hoyt, Europe in the Middle Ages (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), 
316-320; Cantor, 351-353; and Christopher Brooke, The Twelfth Century Renaissance (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1970), 30-34. 
22Hoyt, 316-317; Brooke, 23 & 35; and Cantor, 67-68 & 351-353.  Many of the leading 
schoolmasters became influential priors, abbots, and bishops of the Middle Ages.  Some, like Gerbert of 
Rheims, even became Pope.  Boethius’s work presents three original treatises on dialectic entitled The 
Consolidation of Philosophy; Cicero’s Topics; Porphyry’s Isagoge (Introduction); and two of Aristotle's’ 
treatises from his Organon on Categories and Interpretations. 
23Heer, 116-126.  See also, Hoyt’s, 316-319, summarization of perhaps early scholasticism best 
use of dialectic to prove the existence of God by Anselm of Canterbury. 
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well as body,” which they found by moving freely “from place to place and from teacher 
to teacher, searching for the best techniques at the most lively schools.”24  Perhaps the 
greatest of these wandering students and teachers was Peter Abelard.  Abelard 
instinctively followed his own thoughts declaring that in time, “I rapidly surpassed my 
masters in disputation and so won their envy.”25  Abelard used dialectical reasoning to 
investigate and teach theological problems by posing questions and, then answering 
each question with qualified arguments supporting each side of the problem.  Inherent 
in his qualified conclusions was a sense of uncertainty that Abelard believed, while 
complicating the issues being presented, helped students attain a more complete 
understanding of the problems being deliberated.26  Abelard’s successful use of 
dialectic in disputation inspired him to write his famous, Sic et non, (Yes and No), in 
which he laid out sets of problems and conflicting conclusions, many of them from his 
former teachers.  He believed that, by working to resolve the apparent contradictions 
found in these conclusions, students were compelled to begin thinking on their own, just 
as he had.  Abelard did not try to teach his students by directly demonstrating 
predetermined truths.  Instead, he gave them the opportunity to deliberate and 
understand the nuances of the various arguments used to dispute important problems in 
the past.27   
                                                 
24Brooke, 26 & 28; and Charles Homer Haskins, The Rise of Universities (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1965), 39.  See also, Heer, 109-120 & 262-263, who observes that the pursuit of 
knowledge was taken up by both young men, and later young women, who were all “eager to know more, 
to find out more, experience more, to love, and even suffer more.”  In addition, Heer depicts the most 






While his ability as a logician and a master of rhetoric and disputation made 
Abelard one of the most popular teachers of the twelfth century, Norman Cantor (1969) 
asserts that an equally “important aspect of Abelard’s work was his rediscovery of 
personality.”  Abelard’s rediscovery of personality not only disrupted the early medieval 
patristic philosophical tradition, it also helped fuse scholastic teaching practices to the 
use and development of the art of dialectic.  Underlying the Platonic idealism of patristic 
Christian belief was the Augustinian vision of the ideal (i.e., real) Christian person.  This 
ideal Christian was represented as an abstract individual devoid of a unique personality. 
 Cantor observed that after Augustine wrote his Confessions: 
Autobiography disappeared entirely, because literate people found their lives 
significant only to the extent that they conformed to ideal [Christian] patterns.  
The description of personal idiosyncrasies would have been regarded as proud, 
sinful arrogance.28 
 
Biographical literature written during the early Middle Ages presented its subjects as 
“plaster statues” forcing them to fit within preconceived ideal forms of behavior.  The 
ideal Christian strove not for knowledge (intellect) by way of reason, but the wisdom 
attained from illumination through Divine revelation.  Abelard, however, did not portray 
human intellect as having to fit within an ideal or universal form, but as the particular 
and unique aspects of one's personality.  Cantor suggests that Abelard’s autobiography, 
The History of My Calamities, can be understood not only as a rejection of Augustine’s 
                                                 
28Cantor, 362-363, suggests that “Augustine’s Confessions was the last autobiography written 
before the twelfth century.  Cantor adds, “When a person’s individual personality did come forth in these 
biographies, it was due to the failure of the writer to maintain the idealized pattern.”  Also, Ernst H. 
Gombrich, Art and Illusion (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), 146-147, presents a similar argument 
about teaching the visual arts during the Middle Ages.  He suggests that “image making” required the artist 
to use a logical formula to imitate reality.  This logic provided a basic “canon,” which Gombrich describes a 
“schema,” that had to be taught.  This canon represented a basic vocabulary or grammar of geometrical 
relationships for constructing “plausible figures.”  In what Gombrich calls the “pathology of portrayal,” any 
idiosyncratic alterations made by copyists or artists in the formal design would not have been seen as 
variations in style, but were, instead, recognized as mistakes of form by students who did not learn their 
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concept of ideal Christian behavior, but as a direct attack upon the existing philosophical 
absorption with the nature of universals as pre-existing ideal, Platonic forms, the 
principle theological issue of the early Middle Ages.29 
It was Abelard's own flamboyant personality along with his masterful intellect and 
teaching performances using dialectical disputation that opened the way for a personal 
search for understanding.   All these were crucial factors in the rapid rise of Paris as the 
medieval center for the study of dialectic.  Charles Haskins (1965) observes: 
From the period of the university’s origin we get a fairly clear impression of 
Abelard as a teacher and ‘class-room entertainer,’ bold, original, lucid, sharply  
polemical, always fresh and stimulating, and ‘able to move to laughter the minds 
of serious men.’30 
 
Brooke suggests, “It was the outrageous brilliance of Abelard’s teaching, which made 
students flock to Paris from every part of Western Christendom.”31  Haskins suggests 
that, after Abelard, traveling to Paris in pursuit of learning became a matter of habit.  It 
was out of this mass of students that the medieval university seemed to spring forth.32 
Some of Abelard’s contemporaries, like the Augustinian logician Hugh of St. 
Victor and the Christian mystic Bernard of Clairveaux, who was Abelard’s primary 
intellectual and theological antagonist, opposed the use of dialectic to study theological 
questions, believing that dialectic’s use of reason and intellect to inquire critically into 
issues of faith neither helped one achieve personal salvation nor offered a better way to 
understand Divine revelation.  Many of those who opposed the use of dialectic believed 
                                                                                                                                                             
lessons well. 
29Cantor, 63-67 & 364, suggests that Abelard’s rediscovery of personality can be associated with 
the urban lifestyle of the schools, particularly for the teachers and students in Paris, and the notion that 
“city air made men free.” 
30Haskins, 40. 
31Brooke, 38. 
32Haskins, 4 & 14.  See also Hoyt, 316 & 325, who describes going to school “beyond mere 
reading and writing” as a kind of “fad.” 
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that Aristotelian philosophy, in addition to the new knowledge then entering Northern 
Europe from the Islamic world, posed a significant threat to traditional patristic Christian 
teaching.  In response to the problems posed by dialectical reasoning, Hugh proposed 
that the art of dialectic should not be used to study theological issues; its use should be 
restricted to teaching and investigating the physical world. 
A century later, the followers of another Christian mystic, Francis of Assisi, 
adopted arguments similar to those presented by Hugh of St. Victor.  In reaction to the 
introduction of the remainder of Aristotle’s works and the rise of heretical theologies 
during the early thirteenth century, Franciscan theologians and philosophers, led by 
Bonaventure at Paris and Duns Scotus at Oxford, maintained that it was improper to 
use dialectical reasoning to study theology and should be limited to organizing one's 
teaching practices and to investigate God’s creations.  However, the Dominican 
scholastics, led by Albert the Great and his student, Thomas Aquinas, opposed the 
Franciscan position.33  Aquinas’s Summa Theologica is considered one of the best 
examples of the use of Aristotelian philosophy to explain the beliefs of Christian 
theology.  By providing arguments on both sides of a problem, Aquinas presented the 
Summa using a pattern similar to the one used by Abelard in Sic et Non.  However, 
unlike Abelard, Aquinas ended each discussion of a question with a concluding 
argument that demonstrated Christian truth using Aristotle’s formal logic found in the 
Posterior Analytic.   In this way, Aquinas avoided Abelard’s error by not allowing readers 
to draw their own conclusions.  However, because Aquinas used Aristotle’s dialectical 
and scientific forms of reason, similar to Abelard, the Church condemned much of his 
                                                 
33Hoyt, 321.  See also, Heer, 109, 114-115 & 119-120.  Other important Franciscan philosophers 
were Roger Bacon, who taught at Oxford with Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham.  Albert was the first 
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theological works.  A century later, however, Aquinas’s works were rehabilitated and 
continue to remain the official philosophy/theology of the Roman Catholic Church. 
What the pattern of logical demonstration used by Aquinas in his Summa 
represents is that medieval arts masters did not follow the pattern of presenting 
probable conclusions to questions to teach the art of dialectic used by Abelard in Sic et 
Non.  Furthermore, while Aquinas’s work is representative of the way scholastic 
theologians used Aristotle’s scientific logic, which had only recently become available, 
the teaching of the liberal arts courses at the rapidly developing Northern European 
schools and universities continued to be dominated by the art of dialectic’s manual 
tradition as represented by Boethius’s sixth-century textbook.  For the ever-increasing 
number of young bachelors of arts being produced by the expanding universities 
responsible for teaching Latin to young boys, the art of dialectic was not intended to 
give students an opportunity to reason through complex problems, such as the nature of 
universals or theological questions, but to simply train them in the basic technical skills 
required for the construction of a convincing argument.34  As Porphyry states in the 
Isagoge: 
As to genera and species, whether they actually exist or are present merely in 
thought or if existing, whether they are corporal or incorporeal . . . I cannot 
answer here in an elementary work.  This being a lofty topic requiring further 
investigation.35 
 
During the late thirteenth century, Boethius’s text began to be replaced with a 
new dialectical manual, the Summulae Logicales, written by Peter of Spain.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
arts master at Paris to write treatises on all of Aristotle’s works. 
34Jardine, 19-21. 
35Porphyry, Isagoge, quoted in Hoyt, 317.  According to Hoyt, “This passage is an allusion to the 
metaphysical problem of universals, a problem that both Porphyry and Boethius recognized as 
inappropriate for discussion in an elementary treatise on logic.” 
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Summulae was an introductory textbook written to familiarize youthful arts students with 
the rudimentary concepts related to Aristotle’s dialectical treatises.  Peter of Spain’s 
dialectical manual was a further refinement of works found in Boethius’s De Differentiis 
Topicis including Porphyry’s Isagoge to Aristotle’s Organon and Aristotle’s treatises on 
dialectical reasoning.  Excluded from the Summulae was any discussion of the formal 
logic used for demonstrating scientific knowledge found in Aristotle’s Analytics.36 
Peter of Spain maintained that his further simplification of dialectic was 
necessary to make it easier for the many young bachelors of arts to learn and teach 
more easily the art of dialectic to young boys.  While similar manuals were produced 
during this period, the Summulae was the primary textbook used to teach dialectic for 
the next three hundred years.  According to the prominent, late medieval logician and 
dean of the dialectical arts masters at Paris, John Major, for the vast majority of 
medieval arts students the Summulae Logicales had been the “door to all logic.”37 
While the Summulae roughly parallels Aristotle’s Topics, it does not adhere to the 
distinctions Aristotle maintains between dialectical reasoning and the formal logic 
required for scientific demonstration.  Ong claims that Peter of Spain’s treatises had the 
effect of “blurring the question of whether dialectic was an instrument of scientific 
certainty, or mere probability, or of both together.”  The Summulae’s opening sentence 
declares, “Dialectic is the art of arts and the science of sciences, possessing the way 
                                                 
36Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 55.  While many of the points Ong raises about Peter of Spain’s 
manual are intriguing, my purpose is not to provide an in-depth discussion on the subtleties surrounding 
the relationships between ancient, medieval, and modern logic.  My purpose is only to relay the 
pedagogical role that the manual tradition played in bringing about Ramus’s method. 
37Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 57.  Ong maintains that Peter’s manual was the most important, since, 
if for no other reason, it was the most widely used.  Other manuals included John of Salisbury's, 
Metalogicon, and Vincent of Beauvais’s, Speculum Majus.  See also, Jardine, 19-23; and Dunn, xiv.  
Interestingly, in Howell’s Logic and Rhetoric in England, Peter of Spain plays no role in his discussion of 
the development of English logic. 
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(methodorum) to the principles of all disciplines.”38  Its next sentence adds that “dialectic 
alone disputes with probability concerning the principles of all the arts, and thus, 
dialectic must be the first science acquired.”  With these statements, Peter of Spain 
initially situated the art of dialectic within Aristotle’s topical reasoning that enabled one to 
“move from a question through probable argument to a probable conclusion.”  However, 
later in the text the issue of what style of reasoning Peter of Spain was attempting to 
apply to the art of dialectic became confused when he asserted, “dialectic alone deals 
with scientific certainty.”  Ong claims that with this statement Peter of Spain effectively 
upgraded dialectical reasoning away from the uncertainty of opinion and inquiry, toward 
the absolute certainty of the Posterior Analytic’s scientific logic for demonstrating 
absolute knowledge.39 
In other words, Peter of Spain moved the art of dialectic away from a reasoning 
that moved from probable opinions to a probable conclusion.  Instead, he presents the 
art of dialectic as the reasoning used to move from opinion to an invariable conclusion 
that represents absolute truth.  Peter of Spain accomplished this by focusing dialectical 
discourse on the use of conviction (i.e. rhetorical persuasion).  He maintains that 
uncertainty exists only with the opening question.  Uncertainty is eliminated once a 
conclusion has been proven. By so doing, the use of the art of dialectic to teach an arts 
                                                 
38Jardine, 5, and Ong, in Decay of Dialogue, 56 & 332.  I have used Jardine’s translation of Peter 
of Spain’s statement, rather than Ong’s because Jardine translates the last phrase in Peter’s statement, 
“methodorum principia viam habems,” as “possessing the way to the principles of all disciplines,” while 
Ong translates it as “possessing the way to the curriculum subjects” (my emphasis).  I believe that Ong’s 
use of the term “curriculum” clouds the issues surrounding medieval education because, according to 
Hamilton, the term “curriculum,” does not appear until the Protestant Reformation. 
39Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 60; and Jardine, 19-24, & 48.  Ong observes that Peter of Spain’s 
notion of the topics or loci (places), like Cicero’s, situated the place (locus) as ‘the seat of an argument,” 
using it to infer a conclusion, and thereby “creating a conviction in a doubtful matter.”  Ong suggests that 
aiming at conviction or persuasion (fides), situated Peter of Spain’s treatise on the topics within the 
Aristotelian dialectical tradition.  See also, John C. Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature 
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course became less a dialogical practice between the teacher and the student and more 
of a didactic argument used to prove the conclusions drawn by the arts master. 
The Summulae Logicales also includes several additional tracts known 
collectively as the Little Logicals (Parva Logicalia) that deal with the properties of 
various terms, chief among them being “supposition.”  Ong suggests that supposition 
and its associated terms “produced a highly quantitative, non-Aristotelian, medieval 
logic,” similar to modern forms of mathematical or symbolic logic.40  In what appears to 
be a critical point to the future refinement of the art of dialectic into a single method for 
ordering one’s thinking, Ong stresses that Peter of Spain’s use of supposition theory 
had the effect of reducing both the natural and discursive worlds to a set of simply 
defined terms.  This simplification had the further effect of reducing “the epistemological 
field” to a simple-fiction of a segmented structure for both physical and mental reality.  
Derived primarily from Cicero, this segmented or corpuscular framework “saw both the 
real and mental worlds as an agglomeration [a cluster] of discrete items or things.”  This 
presented medieval schoolboys with an “epistemological and psychological atomism” 
that represented reality, not in terms of interrelated concepts, but as simple and distinct 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 190-193. 
40Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 53-61.  In addition to supposition, the tracts included: relative terms, 
extension, appellation, restriction, distribution, and exponibles.  Ong suggests that the Little Logicals 
treatment of the theory of “supposition” (which treats terms as substituting or standing for individual 
existents) and its related terms, presented a quantitative logic that closely corresponds to the present day 
mathematical logic of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead.  Although Ong does 
not discuss it, there appears to be an even closer relationship between Peter of Spain’s Parva Logicalia 
and Bertrand Russell's description of the formal philosophical logic of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
found in Russell's Introduction that will be discussed in Chapter Three.  See also, Sharon Kaye’s 
discussion of the suppositional relationship between Bertrand Russell and William of Ockham, in “Russell, 
Strawson, and William of Ockham,” in Paideia, (Internet), http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/MediKaye.htm. 
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units.  Ong maintains that in so doing, the Summulae unintentionally laid the 
groundwork for Ramus’s eventual refinement of the art of dialectic into method.41 
Additionally, the late medieval and Renaissance courses of study involved the 
most protracted and extensive study of Aristotelian physics than at any time during the 
Middle Ages.  This increased emphasis on the study of Aristotle’s highly mechanistic 
physics was coupled with Peter of Spain’s quantitatively structured scholastic dialectic.  
Ong contends that because most scholastic arts masters learned dialectic from Peter of 
Spain’s textbook, they became preoccupied with his simplistic logical formalism.  
Greatly influenced by its atomistic and quantitative analogies, later medieval scholastics 
were generally “not able to focus on something as elusive as [Aristotle’s] probable 
argumentation.”42 
By the time of the Renaissance, humanist scholars were no longer teaching the 
art of dialectic as part of the trivium, but aligned it with Aristotelian physics as the art of 
philosophical discourse.  However, they continued to maintain the ancient connection 
between verbal activity and intellect by insisting that “to discourse” was the same as 
using “ones reason (ratione uti).”  By continuing to link discourse with reasoning, 
Renaissance arts philosophers were able to begin applying the art of dialectic to the 
functions of the entire human mental apparatus.  Furthermore, by linking reasoning with 
physics (and its close relationship with medieval medicine) the Renaissance art of 
dialectic became little more than the practice of “marshalling and maneuvering 
                                                 
41Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 61, suggests that the key difference is that medieval logicians used 
simple Latin statements for what modern symbolic logicians express in propositional calculus. 
42Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 60.  Jardine, 18, observes that while dialectic was one of the medieval 
liberal arts, it was also one of the three aspects of ancient philosophy, including physics and ethics. Thus, 
it was in dialectic (logic) that the ancient and medieval worlds most closely converged. 
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corresponding little chunks of mind-stuff” in the form of words.  It is out of this discursive 
practice that Ramus’s simplified pedagogical method of logic would emerge.43 
The scholastic tradition of associating intellect with the study and use of 
discourse and physics further suggests that the practices and activities involved in 
teaching, rather than the modern concept of thought, largely controlled how the use of 
reason (ratio) was understood.  By declaring: “Dialectic is the art of arts and the science 
of sciences leading the way to all disciplines" (i.e. learning), Peter of Spain effectively 
subsumed the concepts of reason, art, science, and method within the activity of 
teaching.  Ong contends, “In the rough-and-tumble everyday activities of the [scholastic] 
arts course the fine psychological distinction that may have been expressed in 
Aristotle’s works between these terms could not be sustained.”44  Thus, the teaching of 
Peter of Spain’s art of dialectic had, over several centuries, the effect of simplifying and 
formalizing dialectical reasoning.  Ramus would eventually refine Peter of Spain’s 
dialectic into a method for demonstrating knowledge by transposing the dialectical 
practices used to teach an arts course that had become embedded within a “cluster of 
mental habits” possessed by scholastic arts masters.  Ramus’s method of 
demonstration came to dominate late Renaissance and early modern intellectual 
practices; its influence continues to be strongly felt in the current school curriculum. 
Ramus Dialectic 
In his Dialectic, Ramus further refined Rudolph Agricola’s fifteenth century 
revision of Peter of Spain’s Summulae Logicales into an even simpler reasoning 
                                                 
43Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 142-144, observes that the close relationship between medieval 
medicine and physics is evident in our continued use of “physician” to describe a medical doctor. 
44Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 56, and further asserts (on page 8), “The speculative and theoretical 
aspects of scholasticism’s university heritage have too often been exaggerated.” 
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process.  In so doing, Ramus joined Renaissance humanist intellectuals like Agricola, 
John Strum, Desiderius Erasmus, Phillip Melanchthon, and Thomas More in a general 
critique of the medieval (and what they believed to be the Aristotelian) biases found in 
Peter of Spain’s dialectical training manual.  Agricola had refined the primary dialectical 
manual of the Middle Ages for the purpose of serving the practical educational reforms 
advocated by the Renaissance reformers.  The medieval universities that followed the 
Paris model had been organized as guilds for teachers.  Consequently, their primary 
pedagogical responsibility was to train new teachers to teach liberal arts courses.  As 
such, Peter of Spain’s textbook was closely associated with the training of scholastic 
arts students for the profession of teaching. 
The most significant and lasting impact the Renaissance reforms had on 
education can be found in the transformation of scholasticism’s liberal arts education 
into the preparation of students for life in general rather than preparing students merely 
to become teachers.  Ong observes, however, that the Renaissance belief in a student-
centered education, rather than weakening scholastic pedagogical practices, had the 
effect of reinforcing the central scholastic tradition that organized teaching of the art of 
dialectic.  Despite the success of these humanist educational reforms, the teaching 
practices of the Renaissance universities continued to be organized around the original 
pedagogical purpose of training professional teachers.  Thus, the repositioning of the 
purpose of the art of dialectic toward preparing students to engage in all human 
endeavors did not mean that dialectical reasoning would be freed from the classroom.  
Instead, it meant that the world outside the classroom began to be made more efficient 
by the practical application of an art of dialectical reasoning.  In time, this would mean 
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that everyday life would become simplified and segmented according to a methodized 
art of dialectic.  It is this intrusion of a pedagogical methodology into everyday human 
existence that appears to underscore Western Civilization’s transformation from the 
medieval to the modern. 
Agricola’s version of dialectic was an integral ingredient in the Renaissance 
educational reforms.  According to Wilbur S. Howell (1956), the significance of 
Agricola’s dialectic is that it “was instrumental in inducing logicians of the sixteenth 
century to adopt Aristotle’s Topics” rather than the more formal logical treatises of his 
Organon.45  Agricola's revision of dialectic continued the medieval practice, following 
Cicero's adaptation of Aristotle's Topics, of dividing the art of dialectic into the books of 
invention and judgement.  As the first book of the art of dialectic, “dialectical invention” 
presents a student with the procedures one follows when having to analyze a text when 
looking for something to say in an argument.  The second book on "dialectical 
judgement” provides the procedure one uses to arrange the evidence that has been 
invented when composing an argument. 
The Renaissance arts master and humanist reformer Johannes Sturm was the 
first arts master to introduce Agricola’s dialectic in 1526 at the University of Paris.  Once 
introduced to Paris, Agricola’s dialectic quickly replaced Peter of Spain’s Summulae as 
the primary textbook for teaching the art of dialectic at universities across Europe.   
While Agricola’s manual provided a detailed discussion of the procedures to be used 
when inventing an argument, he did not revise the procedures used for judging or 
arranging the evidence one had gathered.  Renaissance reformers generally, and 
                                                 
45Howell, 16.  For example, Jardine observes that Francis Bacon studied Agricola's dialectic at 
Oxford, which had a profound influence on the development of his empirical method. 
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Ramus in particular, thus viewed Agricola’s dialectic to be incomplete.  Ramus’s 
Dialectic not only further refined Agricola’s Dialectical Invention, but by clarifying the 
procedures one uses to arrange dialectical judgments, was intended as its completion.  
Moreover, Ramus followed Agricola by placing the procedures for inventing evidence 
prior to those needed to judge their disposition.  Ramus insisted that this order is the 
more natural procedure.  He taught that one must “first find the topics of an argument 
before one could order and arrange them.”46 
Ramus’s refinement of the art of dialectic began by attempting to firm up any of 
the vague notions that remained in Agricola’s text.  To accomplish this Ramus 
eliminated what he regarded as the redundant and indecisive aspects that remained 
from the medieval arts of dialectic and rhetoric.  In addition, any feature shared by the 
two arts courses was placed exclusively in either dialectic or rhetoric.  In so doing, he 
separated the arts of dialectic and rhetoric into two distinct practices.  Thus, by refining 
dialectic, Ramus was also refining the art of rhetoric.47 
Next, Ramus refined dialectical reasoning even further by dividing it into three 
steps or developmental stages: natural dialectic, the art of dialectic, and the exercise of 
dialectic.  He described “natural” dialectic as the natural use of dialectical reasoning.  
The second stage, the art of dialectic, was described as the dialectical procedures one 
was taught in school.  Finally, Ramus described the third and final stage, the 
“exercising" of dialectic, as the proper use of the art of dialectic in the life one lives 
outside the classroom. 
                                                 
46Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 62, observes that Agricola’s Dialectical Invention 
was probably completed around 1479, but was not printed until after his death.  See also, Jardine, 25, 29-
35 & 41; and Dunn, xv & 61. 
47Dunn, xvii, suggests that by making these distinctions and clarifications, “Ramus was attempting 
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Ramus explained that the natural use of dialectical reasoning is similar to how a 
child learns about the everyday world.  He believed that a child initially acquires 
knowledge of the immediate surroundings by discovering particular things about the 
world.  As such, the things most known to the child are particular experiences about the 
immediate environment.  However, Ramus maintained that from these experiential 
activities the child uses natural (inductive) reasoning to quickly ascend “‘like an eagle to 
the sun’ . . . one by one through higher species to the [more] general" understanding.  
Ramus further asserts, "Thanks to this quick assent, universals suddenly become better 
known.”48   
Ramus's second stage is the art of dialectic taught in school.   He claims, “Any 
art, including dialectic, is by definition the systematization of natural operations.”  Thus, 
the practices used to teach the art of dialectic gives an art its structure.  As such the art 
of dialectic is related to natural dialectic in the same way that medieval arts masters use 
diagrams (schematics) of physical phenomena to teach physics.  These diagrams 
provide the natural world a structure that is simple and easy to understand.  Lisa 
Jardine (1974) suggests that Ramus’s stages provide an explanation for how the art of 
dialectic helps students develop their “natural” use of language, which Ramus believes 
simulates the “actual operations of the mind.”  Ramus adds, “The field of dialectic is 
discourse, and the origin of discourse is natural reason; hence [the art of] dialectic 
systematizes natural reason.”49  For Ramus, it is through classroom teaching practices 
that “natural” dialectic is systematized and made to serve pedagogical purposes.  
                                                                                                                                                             
. . . to make dialectic the chief instrument of communication.” 
48Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 255-257.  Today, the use of what is called a "set induction" to open a 
lesson echoes Ramus's description of how a child learns using "natural dialectic."  
49Jardine, 41-42. 
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Whether or not a student becomes a teacher, his use of dialectic continued to adhere  
to scholastic teaching practices.  Thus an individual’s everyday world was made 
practical by being organized according to pedagogically structured knowledge.50 
Hence, it was only because an art could be taught that it was made to serve a 
“practical” purpose in the exercise of living one’s life—the third stage of dialectic.  By 
exercising the art of dialectic, the structure it provided could be practically and 
methodically applied to the rest of the world not already organized into knowledge by 
teaching.   This meant that the application of the art of dialectic beyond the classroom 
was closely related to the Renaissance humanists’ goal of reforming scholasticism by 
transforming it from the professional training of teachers to preparing students to live 
life. 
Moreover, Ramus hoped to bring greater certainty to the art of dialectic by giving 
it a fresh humanist face.  In doing so, he employed the Renaissance pedagogical 
reforms to scholastic teaching practices by employing the use of written composition 
along with the more pedagogically expedient use of didactic teaching.  By insisting that 
dialectic should not merely govern what goes on in the classroom, but “should govern 
all life,”51 Ramus’s refinement of the art of dialectic becomes the primary vehicle by 
which the Renaissance educational reform begins to be fully realized. 
Additionally, in time, Ramus's dialectical stages unintentionally and anonymously 
alter the purpose the university serves.  From the Renaissance onward, as the 
university begins to study as well as teach almost every aspect of human existence, 
everyday life slowly begins to be increasingly reframed within pedagogical terms, 
                                                 
50Jardine, 4-5; and Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 162, 176-77, & 180. 
51Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 167 & 178; and Jardine, 5 & 25. 
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thereby giving everyday life a “methodological” organization.  In this way, the intellectual 
endeavor of the modern university begins to construct clear theoretical distinctions 
between the various arts and sciences.  Ong suggests that such clear-cut divisions of 
knowledge do not function successfully in terms of distinct scientific theories, but are 
better understood, both “historically and psychologically,” as distinctions constructed to 
serve the practical pedagogical purposes of classroom teaching.52  In other words, the 
pedagogical demands of the classroom that led medieval teachers to give up the 
dialogical practices of the ancients for the expediency of didactic classroom practices 
will lead Ramus to refine his highly systematized art of dialectical reasoning into a single 
method for arranging all knowledge, thereby transforming the exercising of one’s reason 
into a single way of thinking.53 
The Teaching Method of Galen the Physician 
While Peter of Spain uses the term methodus in the opening statement of his 
Summulae, he has little else to say about method throughout the remainder of the text.  
Hence, the concept of method played virtually no role in the medieval art of dialectic.  
On the other hand, method was closely associated with the teaching of the medieval art 
of medicine.  The use of method by medieval masters of the art of medicine generally 
followed the way the term methodus had been employed in the works of Galen the 
                                                 
52Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 156-166, adds that a theoretical discourse can also be understood as a 
way of teaching rather than a way of thinking.  See also, Reiss, 328-331, who, in his chapter on “Gulliver’s 
Critique of Euclid,” observes that the “analytico-referential” nature of modern, “theory-laden,” “discourses 
of knowledge,” while representing distinct, but parallel interpretations, all depend upon “just one right 
method in which the conceptual order, sense perception, and world order correspond: referred to in short 
hand as ‘Euclideanism’” (my emphasis).  Ong’s, chapters: “Swift on the Mind: Satire in a Closed Field” and 
“Psyche and the Geometers: Associationist Critical Theory,” in Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 212-
236, provide a discussion very similar to Reiss’s. 
53Interestingly, Greta G. Morine-Dershimer, in "Instructional Planning," chap. in Classroom 
Teaching Skills, 19-33, uses a procedure very similar to Ramus's three steps, including "concept 
mapping," to teach student teaching candidates how to plan lessons. 
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Physician.  Medieval physicians applied the term methodus to the conversation they 
would have with a patient to understand his or her symptoms.  In addition, methodus 
was used to refer to any idiosyncratic practice in which a physician engaged to cure 
these symptoms. 
Despite this association of method with a physician’s highly individualized habit of 
diagnosing and curing a patient’s illness, master physicians additionally employed the 
term methodus when demonstrating to their students that their prescription, rather than 
some natural occurrence, was responsible for curing the patient.54  In so doing, a 
master physician set out the patient’s symptoms to demonstrate in a systematic fashion 
how his remedies eliminated each symptom.  This use of method to correlate a 
sequence of remedies with a set of symptoms parallels the step-by-step procedure 
established by Galen for dissecting a cadaver that master physicians used to instruct 
students in the names of internal organs.  During a dissection, the master would remove 
the organs one after the other, showing it to the students, and then stating its name. 
Jardine suggests that Renaissance reformers came to understand Galen’s 
method of dissection as the procedures to employ when ordering an inquiry and 
demonstrating what one had learned.  Understood in this context, the medieval 
physician’s use of method to demonstrate the effectiveness of personal remedies was 
employed by Renaissance arts masters "as a way for laying out material for the purpose 
of teaching."  Thus, to Renaissance arts students, the physician’s “method for laying out 
symptoms" appeared to be identical to the method used for discovering the causes of 
an illness.  By invoking Galen’s methodological tradition, Renaissance dialecticians 
confused the specialized teaching practices of the medical arts with the general 
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dialectical practices used for inquiring into unknown principles.55   Following this line of 
reasoning, the humanist schoolmaster, Phillip Melanchthon declares: 
Method is an acquired habit establishing a way by means of reason.  That is to 
say, method is a habit that is, a science or an art, which makes a pathway by 
means of a certain consideration (certa ratione), opening a way . . . through the 
confusion of things, and ranging in order the things pertaining to the matter 
proposed.56 
 
Moreover, by adhering to the procedural order suggested by Galen for dissecting a 
cadaver, Melanchthon asserts: 
Dialectic is the art or way [methodus] of teaching correctly, perspicuously, and in 
an orderly fashion, [which] is achieved by correctly defining, dividing, and linking 
true statements, and unraveling and refuting inconsistent or false ones.57 
 
The efforts of Renaissance humanists like Erasmus, Melanchthon, and More to 
reform scholasticism’s medieval teaching practices by adapting the method used by the 
medical arts to make teaching and learning more effective were aided by the close 
relationship that already existed between the medieval arts of physics and medicine.  
The increased importance of physics during the Renaissance, which forced a 
realignment of the trivium and quadrivium by pairing dialectic with physics, further 
influenced arts masters to adopt the art of medicine’s use of method for the practices 
used to teach the liberal arts courses.  For instance, Jardine observes that Melanchthon 
“confuses Galen’s teaching methods” with the geometric procedures employed in an 
axiomatic proof.”  In so doing, Melanchthon helped place method on a trajectory that 
closely coupled it with geometry’s formal procedures.  Furthermore, because the art of 
                                                                                                                                                             
54Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 174. 
55Jardine, 40. For instance, Peter of Spain is better known as the physician to Pope Gregory X, 
rather than as a dialectician. 
56Melanchthon, Eerotemata dialectices, lib. 1, in Opera, vol. 13, col. 573, cited by both Ong, 
Decay of Dialogue, 177; and Jardine, 35 (my emphasis). 
57Jardine, 40.  Ramus believed that this was the logical procedure used to first form each of the 
various arts and is similar to Galen’s method of synthesis. 
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dialectic continued to be understood as the basis for teaching all arts courses, this 
coupling of the physician’s use of method as a form of demonstration with geometry 
merged the future refinement of method with the quantitative bias found in the 
suppositional logic presented in Peter of Spain’s dialectical teaching manual.  A 
generation after Melanchthon, Ramus will insist that teaching should adhere to the 
conceptual order or sequence presented by Galen’s procedures for investigating 
(dissecting) a subject.  While attempting to revise the medieval dialectic of Peter of 
Spain, Ramus actually reinforces the quantitative bias found in the medieval dialectic.58 
Ramus's Refinement of Method 
Ramus's refinement of dialectic into a single method evolves out of his attempts 
to complete Agricola’s Dialectical Invention by defining the procedures for rightly judging 
the disposition of an argument.  However, as Ramus refines method into a procedure 
that lead one to reason to a definite rather than a probable conclusion, Ramus's 
dialectic slowly blurs the traditional distinction between invention and judgement that 
dialecticians had made throughout the centuries.  In effect, Ramus’s development of 
method collapses dialectical invention into judgment, thereby transforming the 
dispositions of an argument into a method for demonstrating knowledge (i.e. 
instruction). 
Simply defined (in good Ramist fashion), method is a disposition or arrangement 
of an argument that places first that proposition, which among many "is absolutely most 
clear."  It places second the proposition that is next, continually proceeding in an 
unbroken progression.  Ramus defines a proposition as a disposition that consists of an 
                                                 
58Howell, 154, observes that Ramus believed that after Galen “the true love of wisdom ceased, 
and the servile love of Aristotle began.” 
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"antecedent" and a "consequent."  He adds that method “proceeds from the antecedent 
more absolutely known to prove the consequent which is not so manifestly known."  He 
concludes, "This is the only method which Aristotle did observe."59 
By stating that method is the disposition of a proposition, Ramus simplifies the art 
of dialectic by fabricating a new logical structure that he believed effectively eliminates 
the need for Aristotle’s formal logic for demonstrating scientific (proven) knowledge.  
While the traditional purpose of dialectical invention and judgement had been to identify 
and arrange the syllogisms used in an argument, Ramus claims that the art of dialectic 
did not teach a student how to organize propositions that had already been proven and, 
thus, are not in dispute.  He insists that dialectical reasoning considers only those 
propositions that are in question.  Nor does dialectic teach one how to arrange 
propositions that are already known, but have been set forth in a confusing manner and 
are not immediately clear to the auditor.  In either case, students have no need of either 
dialectical invention or judgment because the propositions have already been 
discovered and judgments have already been inferred from syllogisms.  Instead, Ramus 
proposes, “Only method remains . . . to recreate and refresh the auditor.”  Using 
method, the student is able to set forth plainly the propositions by "knitting and joining 
together . . . the end of every declaration with the beginning of the next.”  Once this has 
been completed the student should “use some familiar example” to make the fore-going 
                                                 
59The Logike of P. Ramus, 41 & 54-55.  See also Gombrich, 150-152, who shows that by the 
Renaissance, the “logic of image making” had evolved from a general canon of geometric shapes to a 
step-by-step procedure that produced images from a generalized “geometric schematic” diagram that 
moved the artist through increasingly specific images until the intended image is achieved.  In this 
procedure, each sketch represents a distinct “unit” within the movement from the general to the specific 
image that presents a close conceptual relationship between this geometric logic for drawing visual 
images, teaching practices, and Ramus’s method of demonstration. 
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“more easily understood.”60 In other words, method is the stringing together the 
antecedents and consequences of propositions into a cause-effect logical structure.61 
Howell observes that by refining dialectic, Ramus went beyond Agricola’s art of 
dialectic by “fortifying his art of dialectic with three general laws” that Ramus derived 
from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytic.  In English these laws came to be known as the laws 
of truth, justice, and wisdom.62  The three laws allowed Ramus to remove any 
proposition that was not proven to be true or did not pertain to the art or science being 
studied.  Of the three laws, however, the law of wisdom was the more important to 
Ramus’s method because it enabled him to organize any subject in a clear and distinct 
arrangement. 
Because of its significance in establishing the procedures for Ramus’s method, 
the law of wisdom requires further discussion.  Although the term, “law of wisdom,” 
appears somewhat cryptic, it pertains to the Aristotelian concept of “philosophical 
wisdom,” which combines the intellectual virtues of intuitive reasoning and scientific 
demonstration used to contemplate the higher virtues.  The Latin term Ramus uses to 
refer to the law of Wisdom is “lex sapientiae.”  In the French version of his Dialectic 
Ramus translates lex sapientiae as “universel premierement,” which in English 
translates as “universal in the first instance.”  Hence, because it is derived from 
Aristotle’s concept of intuitive reasoning, the law of wisdom is Ramus’s attempt at 
                                                 
60The Logike of P. Ramus, 55-56.  Dudley Fenner, The Arte of Logike (Middleburg, The 
Netherlands: Richard Schilders, 1584), in Four Tudor Books on Education, introduced by Robert D. 
Pepper (Gainesville, FL: Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints, 1966), 167, defines method as the arrangement 
of “numerous and divers axioms [propositions] framed according to the properties of an axiom perfectly 
and exactly judged.” 
61Howell, 152-156.  Fenner, 167, interprets Ramus’s use of an axiom as determining truth, a 
syllogism as determining necessity (thereby eliminating its use in probable reasoning), and “method as the 
best and perfect way to handle a troublesome matter.” 
62Roland MacIlmaine, “The Epistle to the Reader,” to The Logike of P. Ramus, 7. 
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applying “first principles.”  As such, by beginning with that proposition which is first, 
Ramus’s method begins its chain of steps for demonstrating knowledge with what he 
believes to be first principles, which Descartes will put to effective use eighty years later 
in his Discourse on the Method of Reason.  In time, the basic procedures Ramus sets 
forth as his “one and only” method will become the single logical order for 
demonstrating all knowledge.63 
Ramus initially describes his method of disposition as “natural” method because 
it is the “natural” means for demonstrating any subject when teaching an arts course.  
Ramus defines this form of disposition as the “the orderly pedagogical presentations on 
any subject by reputedly scientific descent,“ meaning logical deduction.  In other words, 
Ramus understands a disposition to be the “natural” way of teaching the “natural” order 
of things.  He adds that his “natural” method provides the absolute order of knowledge 
by means of a definition, followed by the division of all related arguments. Thus the 
more natural method of distribution proceeds in step-by-step fashion that continuously 
divides propositions in an unbroken progression into their integral parts.  In this way, 
Ramus believes that method provides the procedure that covers all the available 
material so that nothing would be omitted.64  Ramus’s drive toward method as an 
alternative form of demonstration is precipitated by his desire to reform the practices 
used in teaching the liberal arts, and, in particular, the trivium, in order to effectively 
instruct young students in the use of Latin.65 
                                                 
63Howell, 149-152; and Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 258-262, observes that prior to Howell’s 
establishing the connection between Ramus’s three laws of method and Aristotle’s Posterior Analytic, 
“recent studies have commonly proceeded as though the laws were entirely Ramus’s.” 
64The Logike of P. Ramus, 55.  See also, Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 30.  
65See Frank Pierrepont Graves, Peter Ramus and the Educational Reformation of the Sixteenth 
Century (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919), 120-159. 
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In the early versions of his Dialectic, this drive to establish more effective 
teaching practices also leads Ramus to propose a second method called the “method of 
prudence” (also known as “cryptic” method) that was to be used only when teaching 
recalcitrant, ignorant, and ill-disposed students.  This second method proceeds by 
induction from particulars, thereby inverting the steps used in his "natural" method, 
while maintaining the organizational arrangement of moving from antecedent to 
consequence in a continuous progression.66  By his final 1569 edition of his Dialectic, 
however, the method of prudence no longer remains a distinct procedure.  Ong 
suggests that under pressure from his critics, Ramus continued to modify dialectical 
judgement until the two procedures became merged into a single method of 
demonstration either ascending from particulars by way of induction or descending from 
generals using deduction.67 
While revolutionary in appearance, Ramus’s method closely adheres to the 
parceling pattern already established by the medieval dialectical tradition that he and 
the Renaissance humanists were attempting to revise.  Moreover, Ramism projects the 
liberal arts courses further along the didactic path originating at the heart of the 
university tradition.  Ong asserts that, in the end, Ramus’s quest for certainty led him to 
reject Aristotle’s use of dialectical reasoning leading to probable conclusions.  However, 
by adapting those aspects that Ramus found useful to his own project, he adopts the 
                                                 
66The Logike of P. Ramus, 58.  According to Dunn, 93-94, MacIlmaine severely curtailed Ramus’s 
chapter on the method of prudence, focusing instead, only on natural method.  She further suggests that 
by treating cryptic method so negatively, “MacIlmaine is misrepresenting Ramus, thereby lending support 
to the notion, which eventually predominates England, that Ramus only advocated the use of natural 
method.”  Because Ramus’s method of prudence is a method of systematic induction, its development has 
been attributed to Francis Bacon.  See also, Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 175; and Howell, 
160-164.  Ong asserts that Ramus was “at a loss to convincingly explain the reasons for using it 
[prudential method] at all.”  Howell suggests that prudential method was just as important to Ramus’s 
theory of method as was his natural method.” 
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quantitative certainty of Peter of Spain’s medieval dialectic the Renaissance reformers 
were attempting to supplant.68  Furthermore, Ramus’s refinement of method out of the 
procedures used to arrange the disposition of an argument provides historical context 
for the recent (and yet old) shift in teacher education toward associating teacher’s 
dispositions the correct or acceptable methods employed in a classroom.69 
In the end, method culminates Ramus’s three stage dialectical process of nature, 
classroom, and practical exercise of life.  By adhering to the Ancient Greek belief that 
dialectic is to be used in the pursuit of any subject, Ramus’s steps establish the stages 
for modernity's pursuit of knowledge of the natural world, rationally ordered by a logical 
method, and made to serve the practical utility of improving the human estate. 
Ramus's Invention of Curriculum 
As a pedagogical activity, Ramus believed that his “one and only” method 
provided students the single mechanism they needed for acquiring knowledge.  In 
particular, method assisted students in the scholastic practice of analyzing the complex 
                                                                                                                                                             
67Fenner, 167, does not make a distinction between natural and prudential method. 
68Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 145-146.  While geometry was generally recognized as the perfect 
science, Ramus, along with his medieval predecessors as well as those who follow him, uses the art of 
grammar when discussing an art or science in detail, which makes grammar and not geometry the science 
par excellence.  As Jardine, 4, points out, the “medieval grammar handbook contained important 
philosophical discussions that corresponded the structures of language with the mental and physical 
worlds.  See also, Charles Lamb “The Old and the New Schoolmaster,” The Essays to Elia, with an 
Introduction by Augustine Birrell (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 911), 60, who provides a sense of the 
extent to which the study of grammar alone equates learning:  “Those fine old Pedagogues, since extinct . 
. . believed that all learning was contained in the grammar they taught and despised every other 
acquirement as superficial and useless.” 
69This connection or collapsing of dispositions into the notion of method is greatly emphasized and 
rationalized in the stated standards and objectives of the largest teacher education accreditation agency.  
See the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education, Professional Standards: Accreditation of 
Schools, Colleges, and Departments of Education, 2002 edition (Internet) 
http://www.ncate.org/2000/unit_stnds_2002.pdf.  For additional discussions on the relationship between 
dispositions and education, see Harvey Siegel, in "What (Good) Are Thinking Dispositions?" Educational 
Theory, 49, no. 2 (1999): 221, who offers a rather Ramist answer to the question of what good are 
dispositions, stating that "thinking dispositions are good to the extent that they cause or bring about good 
thinking;” and Christine L. McCarthy, in "What is "Critical Thinking"? Is it Generalizable?" Educational 
Theory, 46, no. 2 (1996): 218, who suggests that "the development of dispositions" is an appropriate 
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arguments found in ancient and medieval texts when having to compose these 
arguments into a written exercise.  In the Ramus classroom, written exercises were little 
more than logical operations on a text.  As such, method was an analytical procedure 
that trained students how to retrieve all “matters” relevant to the subject being taught.  
Because method enabled students to mark off and properly order those passages 
pertinent to the art or science being learned, it became the primary strategy used in the 
classroom practice of textual analysis.  Method’s significance was that it provided the 
essential structure for demonstrating the knowledge that one had acquired.70 
Ramus presented method as “a kind of hunting expedition” that reduced the text 
to a collection of distinct statements “written out on little slips of paper.”  Students would 
then arrange these slips of paper for whatever purpose that was at hand.  As such, 
learning became a practice of literary empiricism in which method was used to break 
down the text.  Once a text had been broken down, the various statements on a subject 
one retrieved could be used continuously by manipulating them into new discourses that 
served whatever situation was at hand.  Ramus maintained that “composing a 
continuous discourse” was merely a matter of arranging analyzed statements into 
dichotomized diagrams.  He believed that because it mapped knowledge into clear 
categories, method was the only procedure that enabled students to determine how 
these “slips of paper” should be arranged.  As a map of dichotomized diagrams, 
Ramus’s method presented a discourse as a visual structure that reduced knowledge to 
the bifurcated “spatial patterns” of a branching taxonomy.71 
                                                                                                                                                             
educational goal only if dispositions are "generalizable and transferable." 
70Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 172-177. 
71Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 162-189.  Ong suggests that Ramus’s diagrammatic 
method fabricated the early steps in the development of procedures for the information process model of 
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Ramus taught that no expression or passage was intellectually useful to a 
student “unless it had first been analyzed” using his method.  Continuing to adhere to 
his three dialectical stages, Ramus insisted that no form of knowledge, whether derived 
from a text or a student's own “mental possessions,” should be accessible to the student 
until it had first been passed through his pedagogical method.72  Furthermore, the ability 
of students to learn did not depend upon their ability to reason through complex 
questions for themselves or their own creativity, but upon their ability to analyze 
(dichotomize) a text.  Ramus taught that his knowledge diagrams “served a practical 
educative purpose” of enabling students to “externalize the process of human cognition; 
revisiting, absorbing, and reproducing the dialectical processes used by illustrious 
thinkers.”73  Following both the ancients and the early medieval schoolmasters’ use of 
dialectic, Ramus believed that by using his method students could know all things 
because it enabled them to organize an argument on any art or science that a 
schoolmaster wished to teach.  Thus, the educational significance of method is that its 
pedagogical logic became the mechanism, which “holds the world together.”  What this 
position implies, is that for Ramus and Ramist schoolmasters that followed him well into 
the next century, the classroom became the doorway to reality. 
The concept of curriculum as a formal course of study that all students are 
required to undertake arises directly out of Ramus’s use of diagrams to map knowledge 
                                                                                                                                                             
knowing by reducing understanding to the manipulation of slips or bits of information.  In time Ramus’s 
hunting exhibition would be modernized first into the textbook, then the calculating machine, and finally the 
electronic computer.  Ramus’s diagrammatic method attempts to demystify learning by presenting 
knowledge as an intellectual product that could be processed in terms of “intake,” “output,” and 
“consumption” rather than as an act of inquiry.   
72Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 152 & 162.  See also, Reiss's, 29-34 & 116, 
discussion on the transition of the medieval discourse of analogy and resemblances to the Renaissance 
discourse of analysis as a process of ordering knowledge, upon which modern scientific discourse was 
constructed. 
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into clear and distinct categories.  The term curriculum appears to have been derived 
from Ramus’s use of the term “vitae curricula” in a diagram he produced of Cicero’s life. 
 In this diagram, Ramus attempted to clarify Cicero’s entire intellectual career from birth 
to death, organizing it along the line of the liberal arts.  Ramus presented Cicero’s 
intellectual development as a standardized course of study that students should follow.  
In so doing, Ramus was following Calvin’s notion that salvation followed a vitae 
curriculum—a way of life that educated believers into the discipline of his severe social 
practices. 
Ramus’s diagram of Cicero’s biography can also be understood as a movement 
away from the dialogical, personal and idiosyncratic world of sound found in the oral-
aural linguistic tradition of disputation practiced in the earlier medieval art of dialectic 
found in Abelard's rediscovery of personality.  Instead, Ramus’s diagrams move 
discourse toward the silent, object world of the didactic, textbook, teaching tradition in 
which knowledge is conceived of in diagrammatic visual terms.  In effect, curriculum 
becomes a map directing students along a distinct and ideal course of study that all 
students are required to run in order to acquire the knowledge needed to become the 
ideal human being.  Ramus believed that to think is to bracket—dichotomizing 
knowledge into a logical architecture of a branching taxonomy.  As a bracketing 
process, method’s purpose is to separate and suspend the “natural” dialectic found in 
our everyday language, thereby, removing our use of reason from its everyday context. 
 By separating our everyday understandings of the world into distinct categories, they 
can then be reconfigured using method’s dispositions and exercised in the service of 
practical enterprises.  In this way, the concept of curriculum emerges out of Ramus’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
73Hamilton, 23 & 26; and Jardine, 43 & 46. 
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practice of methodizing by bracketing and dichotomizing concepts into distinct 
categories.74 
Successive generations of Ramists transformed Cicero’s “vitae Curricula” into a 
single pedagogical method—a predetermined course of learning that emphasized the 
certainty and clarity of thought.  In this way, Ramus’s “shortcut” to knowledge quickly 
became the method used for organizing all aspects of classroom instruction.  Ramus's 
methodological short cut of branching taxonomies became the structure that has 
evolved into our present day understanding of a school curriculum with objectives, 
measurable outcomes, and assessment.  Ramus believed that only through “formal 
education” could humanity be lifted from its fallen nature to its “natural perfection.”  By 
formalizing scholasticism’s practical teaching practices into the method of “curriculum,” 
Ramus firmly established himself as the “pedagogue’s pedagogue.”75 
Post-Ramus Method 
Following Ramus's death, his disciples continued to raise the use of method from 
its early position as a tertiary aspect of his initial writings on dialectical judgment, 
fashioning it into the entirety of the logical process.  In particular, Ramism became 
popular with seventeenth-century schoolmasters and their students, insisting that 
method presented a new order to teaching and learning.  Schoolmasters believed that 
method provided students with “the ultimate shortcut to knowledge,” teaching Ramist 
diagrams as a “universal skeleton key” for all classroom subjects.  In addition, Ramus’s 
                                                 
74Ong, Decay of Dialogue, 199. Ong describes Ramus diagrams as “cartography of the mind.” 
See also, Briggs, 202, who suggests that Ramus’s “schematic dichotomies“ are conducive to a conflation 
of rhetoric, dialectic, and a kind of observational inquiry equivalent to the Aristotelian meaning of scientific 
demonstration. 
75Ong, Rhetoric, Romanticism, and Technology, 164. 
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curriculum method gave teachers a generalized template to guide their teaching.76  The 
popularity of the “new learning” offered by method further reinforced the “didactic” 
pedagogical order that had been practiced in the medieval university since the thirteenth 
century.77  Thus, seventeenth-century schoolmasters used method to recast 
scholasticism's medieval dialectical teaching practices into the didactic transfer of truth 
and knowledge. 
The phenomenon that erupted into Ramism facilitated the development of an art 
of didactic.  However, as Ramism transformed dialectic into an art of "didactic," it 
completely routed many of the pupil-centered reforms advocated by the Renaissance 
reformers.  As Ramism’s offspring, the art of didactic was partly forged from medieval 
arts masters’ beliefs in a segmented or atomized view of the world, intensified by 
Renaissance reformers adaptation of the medical arts’ teaching practices in the 
decades immediately prior to Ramus. This segmented and highly structured view of 
reality was essential to the development of the kind of scientific mind that eventually 
evolved into the modern worldview.  As a direct heir of Ramism, the art of didactic also 
emerged out of the scholastic humanism's textbook tradition and is a distillation of both 
traditions.  The printed textbook became a driving force in the rapid rise of the European 
publishing industry.  Ong suggests that the art of didactic should be understood as a 
                                                 
76Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 162; and Hamilton, 26. 
77Hamilton, 26; Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 187-189; and William Haller, The Rise 
of Puritanism: The Way to the New Jerusalem as Set Forth in Pulpit and Press from Thomas Cartwright to 
John Lilburne and John Milton, 1570-1643 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), 300-302.  Stephen 
Toulmin’s, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York: The Free Press, 1990), provides an 
excellent explanation of how the political and religious disruptions in the sixteenth century led to the desire 
for certainty and order that culminated in Descartes’s philosophical method. 
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kind of quintessence of the university tradition that arose from scholasticism's art of 
dialectic and the Renaissance reformers pursuit of method.78 
One schoolmaster who epitomizes the modernization of Ramus’s dialectic into 
the art of didactic is Johann Comenius.  It is Comenius who organized what we have 
come to recognize today as the essential features of the school curriculum.  In his 
textbook the Great Didactic (1632), Comenius presents the didactic nature of curriculum 
in absolute terms, which is barely indistinguishable from Ramus’s method.  He believed 
that the curriculum needed to be properly organized in terms of time, subject matter, 
and methodology in order for the school to operate efficiently.  Declaring, "Whatever 
needed to be known must be taught," Comenius reinforced the Ramist perspective that 
the classroom furnishes the single doorway to what lies beyond students’ every day, 
familial existence, which they must pass through to properly experience the world.  
Comenius insisted that the corrective authority of his didactic pedagogy was so 
complete and absolute that once his curriculum was established and its mechanisms 
were set in motion, even teachers with no aptitude could use his methods to great 
advantage.  They no longer needed to select their own subject matter, or work out their 
own method of teaching.  Instead, they had only to deliver the curriculum's pre-set 
knowledge directly to their students.79 
 
                                                 
78Ong, The Decay of Dialogue, 163-164. 
79Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 139; Hamilton, 32; and Elmer Harrison, The 
Foundations of Modern Education: Historical and Philosophical Backgrounds for the Interpretation of 
Present-Day Educational Issues (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1942), 334-349.  Comenius was a student of 
the German Ramist and encyclopedist, Johann Alsted.  Harrison points out that the German schoolmaster 
and pedagogical realist, Wolfgang Ratke, also influenced Comenius.  Ian Westbury, in Teaching As a 
Reflective Practice: The German Didaktik Tradition (Studies in Curriculum Theory), ed. Ian Westbury, 
Stefan Hopmann, and Kurt Riguarts (Lawrence Erlbaum & Associates, 1999), 1-2, discusses Comenius’s 
influence on Fredrick Herbart. 
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While the art of didactic appeared primarily within the German milieu, 
nowhere was Ramism more important than at fledgling Harvard University.  Samuel E. 
Morison (1936) reports that Cotton Mather, one of Harvard’s first students and a 
president, referred to Ramus as “that great scholar and blessed martyr.”  Harvard’s 
adoption of Ramus’s method put it on par with its sister universities in Britain.80  Ramist 
logic was the first system taught to students attending Harvard, and his method of 
diagramming textual knowledge became highly popular with educators in New 
England.81  According to Morison, Harvard’s scholars taught their pupils Ramism’s “neat 
dichotomy, branching out like a family tree, and on which the student could conveniently 
hang all the knowledge that he acquired from either books or lecture.”  To emphasize 
this point, Morison relays a note that Leonard Hoar, an early Harvard student, wrote to 
his nephew, Josiah Flynt.  Hoar tells Josiah, who was about to enter the university, that 
when compiling your notebooks, “follow the definitions and distributions of the 
incomparable P. Ramus.”82  According to Morison, Harvard is one of the few places 
where Ramism remained important well into the nineteenth century. 
By the late nineteenth century, Harvard President and former student of the 
university, Charles Eliot, called for an American curriculum to “champion the systematic 
development of reasoning power as the central function of the schools.”  He argued that 
                                                 
80Samuel E. Morison, Harvard College in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1936), 188-190; and Haller, 298-302.  Harvard modeled its curriculum on the Scottish 
universities, whose program of study had been revised by Andrew Melville, a former student of Ramus.  
Additionally, John Harvard’s original library included a copy of Ramus’s Dialectic and three copies of his 
Institutions Logicae.  See also, Morison’s discussions on Melville’s career at various Scottish universities, 
in The Founding of Harvard (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935).  In addition, both Howell, 
172; and Dunn, xvii, point out that Ramus’s method had a “wide reaching” effect on English logic and 
rhetoric well into the seventeenth century. 
81Perry Miller, The New England Mind: From Colony to Province (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1953), 74-75; and John Morgan, Godly Learning: Puritan Attitudes Towards Reason, 
Learning, Education, 1560-1640 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 111. 
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reason provides a process of accurate observation, classification, and categorization, 
thereby, directing the curriculum to instruct a student in the mental habit of expressing 
one’s thoughts “clearly, concisely, and cogently.”83  It is not difficult to recognize the 
Ramist ideals expressed in Eliot’s statement. 
What makes Harvard’s complete adoption of Ramus’s Method significant is the 
crucial role Harvard has played in shaping American education and the school 
curriculum.84  Furthermore, the American curriculum can be seen as an on-going 
continuation of the Puritan educational system, which paralleled the rise of modernity 
replicating and re-enforcing our present educational forms: a curriculum of pre-
determined objectives, teacher-proof institutional techniques, and standardized testing.85 
 The sense of curriculum that these Calvinist educators provided has become a cultural 
artifact upon which American education has been built.  Furthermore, when the 
methods of modern science and pedagogy were introduced in American universities 
and school districts during the second half of the nineteenth century, scientific method 
                                                                                                                                                             
82Morison, The Founding of Harvard, 155.  See also, “The Letter of Thomas Shepard to his Son at 
Harvard,” (Internet, 2002) http://www.skidmore.edu/~tkuroda/HI107/sheplet.htm.   
83Kliebard, Struggle for the American Curriculum, 11.  In 1893, Eliot was the Chairman of the 
Committee of Ten, which established the first standards for a secondary school curriculum in American.  
Morison points out that even after the introduction of Cartesian rationalism at the end of the seventeen-
century, the study of Ramist logic continued to play an important role at Harvard. 
84Samuel E. Morison, Three Centuries of Harvard 1636-1936 (The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1936), 421-422, discusses Harvard’s influence on school preparation in seventeenth and 
eighteenth Colonial New England.  See also, Kliebard, Struggle for the American Curriculum; Pinar et al., 
75-78, 86-87; David Tanner and Laural N. Tanner, History of the School Curriculum (New York: 
Macmillan, 1990); and L. Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education 
1876-1957 (New York: Vintage, 1961).  Each of these works discusses the role that Harvard’s faculty and 
graduates have played in the continuous debate over an American curriculum.” 
85Douglas McKnight, Schooling, the Puritan Imperative, and the Molding of an  
American National Identity: "Education's Errand into the Wilderness" (Maweh, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, forthcoming).  See also the description of Puritan educational folkways in Colonial America, in 
David Hackett Fischer, Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1981). 
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found a ready audience in the United States because it had originally evolved out of the 
Ramist methodology already being practice in American schools and universities.86 
In the decades after Ramus, the pursuit of the “one right” method became a 
general preoccupation of seventeenth-century intellectuals.  Ong suggests that in just a 
few generations Ramism is all but completely subsumed by the obsession with method, 
influencing both Bacon’s empirical and Descartes’s rational methods.  As Morison adds, 
although “historians of logic have forgotten Ramus’s name,” for the history of education 
and modern culture it was “Ramus who cleared the way for the new scientific 
philosophies of Bacon and Descartes.”87  The significance of Ramism to modern 
thought and education is that it was Ramus’s method rather than Aristotle’s scientific 
logic that Bacon and Descartes adopted for demonstrating knowledge. 
Unlike Bacon’s and Descartes's methodologies, Ramus's method did not include 
specific content.  Ramism was concerned only with the structure of the demonstration 
rather than with what one was demonstrating.  This is indicative of the primarily 
pedagogical nature of Ramus's method.  By requiring that one begin only with the 
proposition that is first, Howell suggests that Ramism’s procedure begins with the class 
of things nearest to the subject being considered by the student rather than those things 
                                                 
86Higham, 93-94, suggests that America’s eighteenth and nineteenth century patrician historians, 
who were the heirs of the Puritan intellectual tradition, already possessed the methodology associated 
with scientific history. 
87Morison, Harvard College in the Seventeenth Century, 189.  In the texts on Bacon that I have 
looked at, all published since the 1960s, Ramus has been presented as having an important influence on 
Bacon’s ideas concerning, inductive method, natural philosophy, and logic. For comparisons of Ramus, 
Bacon, and Descartes see, Karl R. Wallace, Francis Bacon on the Nature of Man (Urbana, IL: University 
of Illinois Press, 1967); C. G. Crowther, Francis Bacon: The First Statesman of Science (London, The 
Cresset Press, 1960); Benjamin Farrington, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon: An Essay on its 
Development from 1603 to 1609 with New Translations of Fundamental Texts (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1964); and Charles Whitney, Francis Bacon and Modernity (New Haven, CN: Yale 
University Press, 1986). 
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that are more remote.88  Dudley Fenner's (1584) translation of Ramus's Logic (Dialectic) 
attempts to make method an even simpler and less problematic procedure by replacing 
the concept placed first in a disposition from the most general proposition to the axiom 
“easiest” for the student to comprehend of those under consideration.  Thus, the axioms 
placed next become the less general for no other reason than they are the axioms 
harder for the student to understand.  Finally, the “whole matter” should be arranged so 
that "all the parts may best agree with themselves and be best kept in memory."89  
Teaching practices that break learning into a set of simple tasks and arranges these 
tasks in a step-by-step procedure in order to train students in a pre-established 
knowledge continues to engage in Ramus's "one and only" method.  This suggests that 
Ralph Tyler's rationale, with its highly methodized approach to fabricating the school 
curriculum, appears to resemble much of the Ramist use of method as a  
shortcut to teaching and learning.  While differences between the two approaches exist, 
their dispositions of what a student must learn maintain an intimate relationship. 
The ultimate effect of Ramus's method was to raise the concept of techne, by 
way of pedagogical practices, to the pinnacle of what Aristotle considered an intellectual 
virtue, what the Puritans described as technologia.90  Thus, through the art of dialectic, 
the diagrammatic structures fabricated by the arts master to teach all natural 
phenomena—including reason, speech, physics, and mathematics—replaced the 
ancient practice of philosophical wisdom.  The Renaissance pursuit of method enabled 
Western intellectuals in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to bring into being 
                                                 
88Howell, 152. 
89Fenner, 167. 
90David H. Scott, “A Vision of Veritas: What Christian Scholarship Can Learn from the Puritans 
‘Technology’ of Integrating Truth,” in Origins, (Internet, 2000) http://www.origins.org/aip/docs/scott.html. 
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from human hands modernity's dependence upon theoretical discourses.91  
Reconceiving the school curriculum with the hope of returning education to a purpose of 
personal and social transformation,92 as suggested by the curriculum theorists 
discussed in Chapter One, above, asks teaching practices to begin using a language 
that has not been technologized, which recognizes that even the vaguest statement can 
teach profound meanings.93  As the next chapter will discuss, this is the purpose of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. 
 
91Bacon opens his Nova Organon: Aphorisms Concerning the Interpretation of Nature and the 
Kingdom of Man, First Book, no. 1-10, in Great Books of the Western World, no. 30, 107, by asserting that 
true understanding and mastery of the world is provided by the ”hand” trained in the proper use of 
“instruments.” 
92While I agree with Rorty's longing for education to be socially and personally transformative, I 
believe that his trust in the socialization of K-12 students in a neo-liberal ideology only misses the impact 
that teaching practices have in reproducing a technological and mechanistic world view: a point both 
Wittgenstein and I believe is most important, and one that lies at the heart of this dissertation.  As a 
parallel issue, not to be explored here, but worth further study at a later date, is Rorty's observation that 
the pragmatists' emphasis on scientific method ultimately leads to a dead end, resulting in current day 
neo-pragmatism emphasizing the use of language instead of method.  See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and 
Social Hope (New York: Viking Penguin, 1999), especially his essays "Education as Socialization and 
Individualization," and "Truth without Correspondence to Reality." 
93While the search for a new language for education has been an important aspect of Huebner’s 
work, presented in The Lure of the Transcendent, the religious language he employs to describe what it 
means to educate, is as much a product of techne—the art of discourse—by way of medieval theology, as 
is the idealized language used by the social sciences.   
CHAPTER 4 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: RECONCEIVING PHILOSOPHY 
 
Alan Janik and Stephen Toulmin (1973) report that the most important 
philosophical problem with which Wittgenstein was concerned was finding a way to 
describe the relationship between language and the world.  Wittgenstein began to 
pursue his investigation of this relationship upon entering Cambridge in 1912 to study 
philosophy with Bertrand Russell.  Wittgenstein’s initial philosophical work culminated, 
in 1922, with the publication of his Tractatus.  In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein presents the 
relationship between language and the world in his picture theory of language in which 
he proposes that a proposition (as a statement about the world) represents a diagram or 
schematic that models the logical structure of the world.  
In his later philosophical work, Wittgenstein abandons the formal logical structure 
presented in the Tractatus.  Instead, in his continuing endeavor to describe how 
language and the world are related, Wittgenstein enters the intellectual realms of 
pragmatics and psychology.1  His later investigations began in 1927 while engaging in 
informal conversations with some of the philosophers that made up the Vienna Circle.  
They were attempting to use the formal logic of the Tractatus to improve the philosophy 
of science.  Moreover, upon returning from the First World War, beginning in the 
summer of 1919 and through the spring of 1926, Wittgenstein worked as an elementary 
school teacher in several rural villages outside of Vienna.  Not surprisingly, his later 
investigations into philosophy focus upon trying to understand how a young child learns 
                                                          
1Janik and Toulmin, 223-228, suggest that Wittgenstein’s philosophical journey was a 
continuation of a general intellectual preoccupation during "fin-de-siecle" Vienna with the mapping of the 
limits of language.  They further maintain that the logical positivists and empiricists, two particular and 
important philosophical schools of this era, dismiss “areas like pragmatics and pyschologism, as a 
formless intellectual slag heap.” 
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to speak its native language.  By asking the question of how a child learns language, 
Wittgenstein is asking further questions about the practices used to teach.  For 
example, when having to teach a child about the existence of a chair, he asks, Does the 
“idealist” teach a child the concept of a chair any differently than does the “realist”?2   
Wittgenstein opens his Philosophical Investigations with an examination of St. 
Augustine’s explanation of how one teaches a young child the names of objects.  His 
later investigations end just prior to his death with a set of notes published under the 
title of Zettel, in which Wittgenstein asks whether his pursuit of the relationship between 
language and the world had become little more than a study of child psychology.3  By 
asking questions about teaching and learning to investigate how language and the 
world are related, he indirectly raises questions about curriculum not unlike those 
currently being raised by curriculum theorists.  A brief glimpse of how Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical concepts might impact current curriculum are presented in the following 
passage: “How do we learn the expression, ‘Isn’t that glorious’—No one explained it to 
us by referring to sensations, images or thoughts that accompany hearing!”  He further 
suggests that when one understands an expression, the impression it makes “is 
connected with things in its surroundings—e.g. with our language and its intonations; 
and hence with the whole field of our language-games.”4  By suggesting that learning an 
expression is not dependent upon what are referred to as internal mental processes, 
Wittgenstein is rejecting the representational view that language is merely a scaffold 
that connects the external world and the internal mind.  Instead, he is suggesting that 
                                                          
2Zettel, no. 413-414.   
3Zettel, no. 412; and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. B. E. M. Anscombe 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1958), I, no. 1.  Not long before his death, Wittgenstein gave up 
working on the notes that became Zettel because he was too weak to continue.  Amazingly, all of 
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learning is related to our everyday use of language as well as to other ordinary life 
activities in which we engage, as we use language. 
William W. Bartley (1974) claims that Wittgenstein’s experiences as an 
elementary school teacher helped him abandon all belief that a direct, formal 
relationship between language and the world can be found.  Instead, he came to 
recognize that meanings and our understandings of them emerge from the multifarious 
practices in which humans engage.  Teaching young children allowed him to “make the 
connection between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning.”5  This 
realization led him to urge that to better understand the relationship between language 
and the physical and mental worlds, one needs “to reflect more carefully on the ways in 
which children do in fact learn” the ordinary patterns of their native language.  Equally 
important, philosophy needed to study more closely the contingencies, as well as, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Wittgenstein’s works, except his Tractatus were published posthumously. 
4Zettel, no. 170-175.   
5William W. Bartley, Wittgenstein (London: Quarter Books, 1974), 98 & 126-129.  Bartley 
suggests that Wittgenstein’s experience as an elementary school teacher influenced his later 
philosophical shift away from his initial use of formal logic.  However, most scholars have either 
completely ignored the possible influences teaching may have had on his later thoughts, or have merely 
paid it lip service.  Judith Genova, Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing (New York: Routledge, 1997), 209, 
following Bartley, suggests that Wittgenstein’s teaching experience was crucial to his later thought.  She 
adds that Charlotte and Karl Buhler influenced Wittgenstein.  Karl Buhler’s 1934 work, Sprache Theori, 
influenced both Jean Piaget’s and Lev Vygotsky’s ideas on Constructionism.  However, Bartley, as well 
as Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Duty of Genius. New York: Penguin Books, 1990), report that 
Wittgenstein was exposed to Karl Buhler’s psychological and philosophical ideas in 1921 during his 
training at the institute run by the Austrian School Reform Movement.  Buhler had studied and worked 
with the experimental psychologist, Oswald Kulpe, at Wurtzburg developing the psychology of imageless 
thought.  Aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy resemble this psychology of “imageless thought,” in 
particular the relationship he points to between teaching, as an activity, a meaning.  Peters and Marshall, 
generally concur with Bartley's position.  However, Eugene E. Hargrove, "Wittgenstein, Bartley, and the 
Glockel School Reform," in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 18, no. 4 (1980): 453-461, claims that 
Bartley's position is not sufficient to establish a direct connection between Wittgenstein's later philosophy 
and the School Reform Movement's educational theories.  My research suggests that Wittgenstein was 
probably exposed to the Wurtzburg School’s psychological ideas as early as 1912 while doing 
experiments on the psychology of music in Cambridge’s psychology lab with C. S. Myers.  See Nancy 
Nelson, The Constructivist Metaphor: Reading, Writing, and the Making of Meaning (San Diego: 
Academic Press, 1997); McGuinness; and Steen F. Larsen and Dorthe Berntsen, “Bartlett’s Trilogy of 
Memory: Reconstructing the Concept of Attitude,” in Bartlett, Culture and Cognition, ed. Akiko Saito 
(Cambridge: Psychology Press, 2000), 91-97. 
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“metaphysical confusions that can flow” out of “everyday language.”6   He declared that 
the purpose of his later investigations was to eliminate all metaphysical considerations 
from our ordinary use of language. 
Wittgenstein’s later investigations acknowledge that logic's primary purpose had 
been to fix human experience within its meta-discourse, thereby, idealizing a particular 
(logical and theoretical) way of thinking.  He adds that this methodological way of 
thinking has led us to believe that the discourse used by logic must first be taught 
directly to students so as to ensure that they will use logic as the only proper way of 
explaining the world.  Wittgenstein's later works reject this centuries-old tide of 
scholasticism’s didactic pedagogy.  As such, his later philosophy presents an alternative 
to traditional teaching practices by proposing that teaching should be understood as an 
indirect rather than as a direct discourse.  Teaching should not be limited to one right 
method for delivering knowledge because it “does no good” for the teacher to draw 
explicit conclusions for students.  All a teacher can hope to accomplish is to help 
students imagine, for themselves, the various possibilities that emerge from their 
learning activities.7  As Wittgenstein observes, “You cannot lead people to what is good; 
you can only lead them to some place or other.  The good is outside the space of 
facts.”8  
                                                          
6Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 116 & 132. See also, Janik and Toulmin, 224; and  
Bartley, 127. 
7Janik and Toulmin, 228.  See also, Dewey, 158-163, who suggests that thought and experience 
work in a way similar to Wittgenstein’s concept.  He states, “A thought (what a thing suggests but is not as 
it is presented) is creative—an incursion into the novel.  It involves inventiveness.  What is suggested 
must, indeed, be familiar in some context; the novelty, the inventive devising, clings to the new light in 
which it is seen, and the different use to which it is put.” 
8Culture and Value, 3e.  According to the “Allegory of the Cave,” in Plato’s The Republic, Book 
VII, the purpose of education is the achievement of “the good.”  For Plato, while the “good” was fixed and 
determined, the student could achieve the good only indirectly, by way of experience and struggle.  It is 
not the role of the teacher to provide the student the good directly.  See also, Huebner’s description of the 
meaning “to educate” in “Religious Metaphors and the Language of Education,” 361; and Paul 
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Ironically, Wittgenstein’s critique of logic and its formal method for arranging 
thought, language, and the world into a single order appears to have emerged from his 
own teaching experience, not unlike Ramus’s refinement of the art of dialectic (into a 
method of logic), from his teaching experience.  However, unlike Ramus, Wittgenstein 
believed that the purpose of teaching should be to help students recognize that the 
world consists of multiple meanings.  The teacher’s purpose is to help students 
transform their ordinary understandings of the world by showing them new ways of 
"seeing."  This new way of seeing, however, should not simply send students off on a 
kind of conceptual holiday from which they are unable to return.  The later Wittgenstein 
contends that using logic sends students on just such a journey because logic’s meta-
discourse never allows them to return home to their ordinary use of language.  By 
keeping students away from their ordinary language, logic turns this holiday into a “`life 
in a bottle,’ transforming our ideals into a priori idols, to which, it insists, reality must 
correspond.”9 
Janik and Toulmin suggest that Wittgenstein came to believe that “there are no 
metalanguages.”  Wittgenstein established the position that formal, theoretical 
discourses, like logic, cannot alone give the totality of meaning to the world.  As he 
observes, we are taught logic’s “ideal,” which has become “unshakable,” that the “strict 
and clear rules of logical structure . . . must be found in reality.”10  He describes logic’s 
way of seeing as looking at the world through a “pair of glasses.” The purpose of these 
glasses is to remove “any vagueness,” conditioning us to “assume that a perfect 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Feyerabend, Against Method (New York: Verso, 1988), 273-274. 
9Genova, 10; and Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 131. 
10Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 101-103, as well as Wittgenstein's critique of the role of the 
“ostensive teaching of definitions” in language learning, no. 6-9. 
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language awaits our construction.”  However, “it never occurs to us to take them [our 
logic] off.”  Thus, we are compelled to see the world as just “such-in-such a case.”  Our 
glasses provide a methodized view of the world that we “cannot get outside of” and 
which compels us to ignore the possibility that “a thought can be what is not the case.”11   
The Vienna Circle and the Tractatus 
The intellectual goal of the Vienna Circle, not unlike Descartes’s, as well as his 
scholastic predecessors, was the development of a single method of organizing 
philosophy along “the sure path . . . of a single science, thereby unifying all intellectual 
thought.”12  Toulmin states, “The Vienna Circle’s chief preoccupation was reviving 
exactitude . . . around a core of mathematical logic.”  As such, logical positivism can be 
understood as a revival of Descartes’s “monopolistic position” that called for a single 
“universal method” for ordering the mind.  To accomplish this, members of the Circle 
integrated the philosophical logic presented in Wittgenstein’s (1921) Tractatus, with the 
positivist epistemology of “sense data.”13 
The Circle’s logical positivism was a reaction against the nineteenth-century 
upheavals in natural science away from Cartesianism’s “value free” rationalism and 
“mechanistic theories of physics.”  This upheaval had been generated by the “new 
sciences’s” (psychology, sociology and anthropology) attempts to restore a human 
quality to scientific inquiry by “reintegrating thought and feeling.”  Furthermore, as 
                                                          
11Philosophical Investigations, no. 95, 98, &103; Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. 
Anscombe & G. H. von Wright (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972),  
no. 133 & 287. 
12Janik and Toulmin, 212.  See also, Stephen Priest, Theories of the Mind (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 1991), 37-38; and Monk, 324. 
13Toulmin, 154; Janik and Toulmin, 133-138; and Antony Flew, ed., A Dictionary of Philosophy, 
2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 324-325; Bertrand Russell’s “Introduction” to the Tractatus. 
The term “sense data” refers to Ernst Mach’s theory of sensationalism, which argues that sensory 
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participators in Vienna’s fin-de-siecle cultural milieu, the “sciences” were reacting to the 
social uncertainties in Eastern Europe caused by the political upheavals following the 
end of the First World War, and in particular, to the cultural consequences of the 
dissolution of the Habsburg Empire.14 
While members of the Vienna Circle were excited by Wittgenstein’s use of logical 
calculus, as a method for analyzing the “truth-function” of propositions, following both 
Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege,15 what interested them most about Wittgenstein’s 
work was his proposal that “`atomic facts’ corresponded to the [elementary] propositions 
of an idealized formal language.”16  According to the Tractatus, “facts” are not “things,” 
but are, instead, statements about the world.  An “atomic fact” (Sachverhalt) is a simple 
fact that cannot be further divided into a simpler fact, but can be divided into “objects 
(things).”  A proposition is a statement that expresses a thought.  The objects that 
compose a proposition are names.  Thus, names, like “objects, are simples.”17  Garth 
Hallett (1967) explains that in the Tractatus, “The simplest facts are mirrored by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
experiences “are the ultimate and real components of the world.”  Thus, “anything knowable can be 
discovered through sensory experience.”   
14Toulmin, 149-155. See also, Culture and Value, 6e.  The significance of the Habsburg Empire to 
the Viennese frame of mind is a central theme in Janik and Toulmin’s Wittgenstein’s Vienna.  For the 
profound sense of loss produced by the Empire’s dissolution see, Stefan Zwieg, The World of Yesterday, 
Introduction by Harry Zohn (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1964, reprinted from Viking Press 
edition, 1943).   
15Janik and Toulmin, 213, observer that “the formal truth calculus of the Tractatus thus became a 
method for the logical construction of human knowledge." 
16Janik and Toulmin, 212-213, describe Wittgenstein’s “elementary propositions” as “unit 
propositions,” while Bertrand Russell, in his “Introduction” to the Tractatus, xiii, describes them as “atomic 
propositions” 
17Tractatus, no. 1, 1.2, 2, 2.01, 2.02, 3.14, 3.202, 3.203, 4.21, & 4.22.  Monk, 162, explains that 
C. K. Ogden’s 1922 translation of the Tractatus translates Sachverhalt as “atomic facts,” while Pears and 
McGuinness’s edition translate Sachverhalt as “state of affairs.”  Russell, xiii, provides the following 
example of a fact and an atomic fact: “Socrates was a wise Athenian” is a fact that contains the two 
atomic facts: “Socrates was wise” and “Socrates was an Athenian.”  
 106
simplest propositions—elementary propositions.  And in these there are no signs except 
names.”18  
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains the traditional philosophical position that 
the structures of the external physical world and the internal mental world are linked by 
a “logical scaffolding” found in the structure of language.19  He provides the following 
example of this relationship: 
A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound waves, 
all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds 
between language and the world. 
They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern.20 
 
However, Wittgenstein’s logical scaffold does not include an empirical component.  In 
the Tractatus, Wittgenstein does not provide empirical examples of either atomic facts 
or elementary propositions.  Nor does he maintain that simples (objects or names) are 
required to contain any empirical content.  Instead, he states that “names” (i.e. objects) 
occupy a logical space in the similar manner that a “point” occupies a geometric space.  
According to Ray Monk (1990), Wittgenstein insists, “The very possibility of analysis 
demands that there be such things, providing the structure of both language and the 
world.”  As such, simples, which correspond to reality, exist as a consequence of the 
“logical necessity demanded by theory.”21  
                                                          
18Garth Hallett, S.J., Wittgenstein’s Definition of Meaning in Use (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1967), 19, further explains that by establishing this relationship between facts, names, and 
simples, Wittgenstein was following the suppositional theory of William of Ockham.  Hallett states that 
names become the only signs because “Ockham’s razor eliminates all others.”  Wittgenstein, no. 3.328, 
declares, “If a sign is useless, it is meaningless.  In, no. 5.47321, he adds, “the point of . . . Ockham’s 
maxim . . . is that unnecessary units in a sign-language mean nothing” (Wittgenstein’s emphasis).  
Furthermore, Hallett suggests that this is the origin of Wittgenstein’s concept of “meaning in use,” which 
will be further developed in his later philosophy, in part, by eliminating only the logical structure of 
Ockham’s suppositional theory. 
19Tractatus, no. 3.42. 
20Tractatus, no. 4.014. 
21Monk, 118 & 129, observes that in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein contends that “there must be a 
logical structure in common between a proposition and states of affairs and it is this commonality of 
 107
Michael Dummett (1973) observes that in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein endeavors 
to “reinstate philosophical logic as the foundation of philosophy.”22  In so doing, 
Wittgenstein was attempting to “overthrow” the epistemological foundations upon which 
modern philosophy has been built since Descartes.  
The Tractatus presents an analytical method of representation that reduces 
propositions from their most general into their most elementary linguistic components.  It 
is a method of representation that mirrors the atomistic structure of the world.  The 
Tractatus opens with the highly general proposition, “The world is all that is the case.”  
The next proposition states, “The world is the totality of facts, not of things.”23  By 
defining the world as the totality of facts and then dividing facts into linguistic simples, 
Wittgenstein's philosophical logic echoes Ramus’s “natural” method of analysis that 
proceeds from the most general to the most particular.  Wittgenstein goes on to 
describe his “picture theory of language,” explaining that these facts provide a “picture” 
of reality that arranges facts into a logical scaffold.  However, this “picture” is not an 
image or snapshot.  Instead, he asserts that a picture projects “a model of reality.”  
Wittgenstein then declares that this logical scaffold is a human construction by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
structure which enables language to represent reality” (my emphasis). 
22Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1973), xxxiii, 
cited in McGuinness, 83.  Dummett observes that following Descartes, philosophical investigations began 
with the questions: “What do we know and how?”  McGuinness adds that the philosophical shift brought 
about by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus has remained limited to only a few schools of thought within the Anglo-
American tradition.  Interestingly, Wittgenstein’s Cambridge mentor, Bertrand Russell, and the logical-
empirical school of analytical philosophy that followed him, were among those who did not fully appreciate 
the philosophical shift Wittgenstein presented in the Tractatus.  This was the case, despite Russell’s 
belief, as early as 1912, along with others at Cambridge, that Wittgenstein would produce the next great 
advance in philosophy. 
23Tractatus, no. 1 & 1.1.  Following these opening propositions, he states, “The facts in logical 
space are the world,” no. 1.13, and next, “The world divides into facts,” no. 1.2.  See also, McGuinness, 
77. 
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asserting, “We picture facts to ourselves,” further adding, “A logical picture of facts is a 
thought.”24     
Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language, as a model of reality, functions like a 
map or diagram of the physical world.  Norman Malcolm (1984) reports that 
Wittgenstein conceived of his picture theory from a diagram or schematic of an 
automobile accident he saw in a magazine, while on the Eastern Front during World 
War One.  Malcolm observes that as he was looking at the diagram, “It occurred to 
Wittgenstein that this map was a proposition and that there in was revealed the 
essential nature of propositions—namely to picture reality.”25   This story suggests that 
there is an even stronger resemblance between Wittgenstein’s logical scaffolding and 
Ramus’s method.  Thus, it appears that Wittgenstein was unknowingly extending to a 
single proposition a structure similar to the one Ramus had given to a string of 
propositions.  As such, the Tractatus could be understood as indirectly following in the 
tradition of previous dialectical textbooks produced by scholastic arts masters.26   
Members of the Vienna Circle believed that logic’s main function was to provide 
science with epistemological guarantees.  They wanted to reverse the relationship 
between logic and science by “using the techniques of science” to solve philosophical 
problems.  They proposed that by uniting scientific facts—empirical statements about 
                                                          
24Tractatus, no. 2.1, 2.12. & 3.  By presenting philosophical logic as a human construction, and 
not something found pre-existing in nature, he was returning logic to the Greek and Scholastic concept of 
an "Art" or techne (to make something). 
25Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 68, 
See also, Georg Henrik von Wright’s more detailed story of this event, in  “A Biographical Sketch,” in 
Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, 7-8; and Hallett, 16. 
26In the Tractatus, no. 3.26, Wittgenstein claims that "a name cannot be dissected [analyzed] any 
further . . . ."  Janik and Toulmin, 184, suggest that in the Tractatus, the logical “arrangement of ‘facts’ are 
not exact reproductions of these facts, but only of what is essential in the logical relationships between 
them.”  Using the word “arrangement” to refer to the Tractatus’ method of demonstration, further suggests 
a strong resemblance to Ramus’s method, as an orderly disposition of propositions.  
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the physical world—with the tautological arguments found in the Tractatus, 
philosophical language would be better able to “distinguish meaningful, from 
meaningless” statements about the world.  To do this, the Circle had to remedy 
Wittgenstein’s omission of empirical evidence.  By equating atomic statements with the 
empirically “hard facts” of positivism’s sensory epistemology, Wittgenstein’s “atomic 
facts” were re-presented as “the ultimate carriers of knowledge, each of them recording 
one single item of sensory evidence.”27  
After Wittgenstein entered into informal discussions with members of the Vienna 
Circle concerning their use of his philosophical ideas, he quickly rejected their 
philosophical position.  He argued that its members were misinterpreting the 
philosophical position he had presented in the Tractatus.  Their conclusions compelled 
Wittgenstein to rethink his use of philosophical logic and logical calculus to present his 
philosophical ideas.28  Thus, Wittgenstein’s later philosophical work can be understood 
as a critique of the Circle’s adaptation of his earlier work.   
Wittgenstein's Critique of Logic 
In his later philosophical investigations, Wittgenstein abandons the logical 
scaffolding he constructed in the Tractatus.  He insists that we have been led to believe 
that the purpose of logic is to present concepts like “proposition, language, thought, and 
                                                          
27Janik and Toulmin, 212-216, report that the Circle’s members adapted “Russell’s doctrine of 
‘knowledge-by-acquaintance to Wittgenstein’s ‘atomic facts.’”  See also, Priest, 37-38; as well as Kaye’s 
criticism of Russell’s realism using Ockham’s suppositional logic, in “Russell, Strawson, and William of 
Ockham.” 
28For Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, what logic shows is that knowledge, which cannot be 
expressed using language, like higher forms of ethical and moral knowledge, is unsayable.  Therefore, he 
states, “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence,” no. 7.  For the logical positivists of 
the Vienna Circle, however, what was most important about logic was what it could say about the world 
(i.e. could be proved). 
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world as standing in line one behind the other.”29  Thus, we are taught to believe that 
this method of arranging logic is the essence of thought, which he declares: 
Presents an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is the order of 
possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought.  But this order, it 
seems, must be utterly simple.  It is prior to all experience, and must run through 
all experiences; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it-
----It must rather be the purest crystal.30   
 
He adds that this belief places us “under the illusion that what is essential in our 
investigations, resides in trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language.”  
 Wittgenstein’s critique of logic calls into question the analytical method by 
definition and division that philosophy uses to examine what can be said about the 
world.  As he explains, logic attempts to clarify the "misunderstandings concerning the 
use of words" that are "caused by certain analogies between different forms of 
expression."  Logic attempts to eliminate these misunderstandings by "substituting one 
form of expression for another," thereby, attempting to "make our expressions more 
exact."  He observes that this procedure "may be called an ‘analysis’ of our forms of 
expressions for the process is sometimes like taking things apart."  Furthermore, logic 
assumes that "our usual forms of expression were essentially unanalyzed; as if there 
were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light . . . and which an analysis 
digs out."31  
The purpose of Wittgenstein's later investigations, however, is not to dig for 
something that is hidden" because, he argues, everything "we want to understand . . . is 
                                                          
29Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 96. 
30Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 97.  This description of logic's essential order is reminiscent 
of Ramus's description of method (see Chapter two, above).  Because in his later philosophical works 
Wittgenstein uses punctuation and grammar to disrupt the usual way one reads (i.e. thinks about) 
philosophy, I have quoted him by using his original form of punctuation and grammar as often as 
possible. 
31Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 90-92. 
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already in plain view.  For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand."32  He 
adds that while he wants “to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of 
language,” he is not attempting to establish “the order.  To this end we shall constantly 
be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make 
us overlook.”  As such, “It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the 
use of our words.  There is not a [single] philosophical method . . . no measuring-rod to 
which reality must correspond.”  Instead, he suggests, “There are indeed methods, like 
different therapies.”33  Here, Wittgenstein is not only rejecting Ramus’s “one and only” 
method of demonstration, but by declaring that methods are like therapies he is 
trivializing the concept of method by returning its meaning to the ancient notion of a 
conversation between a physician and a patient.  In so doing, Wittgenstein is also 
undermining the pedagogical underpinnings that led to Ramus’s refinement of method.34 
Judith Genova (1997) suggests that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy “presents the 
radical notion that language is not a product of art or techne; it is not a human-made 
artifact, but a living dimension of existence.”35  Wittgenstein notes, “Reading the 
Socratic dialogues one has the feeling: what a frightful waste of time!  What’s the point 
of these arguments that prove nothing and clarify nothing?”36  By rejecting the belief that 
an art of language could fabricate a structure of distinct meanings for words, 
                                                          
32Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 89 (Wittgenstein's emphasis). 
33Philosophical Investigations, no. 131, 132, and 133. 
34See Chapter Two, above.  In Philosophical Investigations, no. 255, Wittgenstein adds, “The 
philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.”  This statement follows his 
discussion on the impossibility of a “private” language by showing how our concept of “pain” is related to 
a language-game of pain, which ties back into the notion of a diagnosis as a conversation and a 
treatment as an idiosyncratic remedy. 
35Genova, 120.  In On Certainty, no. 475, Wittgenstein states, “Language did not emerge from 
some kind of ratiocination.”  In Culture and Value, 4e, he suggests that if “the study of logic” provides “a 
‘solution’ to the problems of philosophy, we need to remember that at the time when they had not been 
solved people still knew how to live and think.”  
36Culture and Value, 14e.  
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Wittgenstein alters the dialectical relationship between language and the world, which 
forms the basis of the Tractatus.  As just one language-game among many, the art of 
dialectic no longer remains “the capstone of the sciences, [beyond which] . . . the nature 
of knowledge can go no further.”37  In other worlds, Wittgenstein is recognizing that the 
methodization of language—Ramus’s systemization of our “natural” language into a 
practical discourse through the art of dialectic—Is not the only way of applying language 
to our everyday world.  Instead, he weds the use of reason to the activity of playing 
games.  In so doing, Wittgenstein calls into question the very intellectual foundations of 
Western philosophy, science, and most importantly for us, pedagogy.  
Genova further suggests that Wittgenstein’s later investigations continue to show 
that modernity’s “diachronic” method of analyzing and explaining the world is a 
continuation of the Cartesian, epistemological misconception which assumes that a 
direct cause-effect relationship exists between associated concepts.38  Focusing on the 
contingencies found in our ordinary forms of life that are expressed in our everyday 
language, Wittgenstein disrupts the modern epistemological debate between empiricism 
and rationalism over the ultimate source of knowledge.  His later philosophy contends 
that the "dialectical relationship between the internal and external worlds (mind and 
nature), [upon which method was developed] no longer provides a framework for 
understanding human relationships to the world.”39  Method’s step-by-step procedure 
maintains the illusion that an essential order exists within a logical discourse “between 
concepts, words, truth, experience and so on” that links language, thought, and the 
                                                          
37Plato, The Republic, Book VII, 398. 
38Genova, 34.  See also, Toulmin, 11. 
39Genova, 26 & 34. 
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world.40  For Wittgenstein, logic is unable to transform its formal representations into a 
plain description of the world.  Furthermore, by undermining the philosophical dualism 
that separates human thought from the material world, Wittgenstein's later philosophy 
disrupts the theory-practice relationship upon which modernity’s theoretical practices 
and discourses are embedded.  His rejection of both the empirical and rational 
foundations of knowledge signals an abandonment of the practice of “grand theorizing” 
upon which modernity operates.41 
Jean-Francois Lyotard (1988) observes that logical discourse is “an artificial 
(axiomatic) language” that is composed of our “‘natural’ or ‘everyday’ language."  Our 
everyday "language is universal . . . [because] all other languages can be translated into 
it.”  This universality limits our ability to completely understand any formal language 
system with absolute certainty because our everyday language "is not consistent with 
respect to negation, [thereby] . . . allowing the formation of paradoxes” (i.e. 
uncertainty).42 
Wittgenstein asserts that “logic’s science” is not an act of inquiry or discovery in 
the search for truth.  Instead, its scientific method is an act of “persuasion.”  By arguing 
that logic is an act of persuasion, Wittgenstein is reminding us of how medieval 
scholasticism refined the art of dialectic from a use of reason to judge truth to a method 
of persuasion, and, thereby, an act of teaching.  As he observes, the essence of logic is 
the construction of a “super-order” (i.e., a “super-mechanism”) that structures language 
                                                          
40Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 97. 
41Genova, 173-175 and 196.  See also, Toulmin, 11, whom observe that the main thrust of 
Wittgenstein’s critique found in the Philosophical Investigations and beyond “is directed at Descartes’s 
‘theory-centered’ style of thinking—one that ‘sees’ the world in timeless and universal terms and linked to 
the quest for certainty.” 
42Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi, Forward by Fredric Jameson, Theory and History of Literature, vol. 10 
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into “a chain of associations which come naturally under certain circumstances.”  This 
"super-mechanism" leads us to express ourselves using superlatives, as in, “This is 
really this.”  Superlatives use the super-mechanism of “logical necessity” to transform 
our ordinary and inexact descriptions of the world into clear and distinct definitions.  
Wittgenstein explains that logical necessity provides language with a “geometric lever” 
that “cannot bend.”  Logic is the only lever “made of an infinitely hard material.”  Thus, 
“logical necessity persuades us . . . to believe one thing over another,” thereby 
compelling us “to neglect the differences” that our investigations may reveal.43  
Wittgenstein’s later philosophical thought led him to believe that no direct, formal 
relationship exists among “propositions,” “facts,” and “nature.”  Genova suggests that 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy puts forward the radical notion that "language, logic, and 
the world are all autonomous phenomena."44  Forcing human experiences to conform to 
the rules of logic divides thinking into distinct linear threads that run infinitely parallel to 
one another.  Methodizing thinking in this way blocks out the immediate surroundings 
that situate our experiences within their social and cultural contexts.  It is like asking us 
to see the world while "wearing blinders."  Wittgenstein insists that these methodological 
blinders (both logical and theoretical) make the multifarious meanings that emerge from 
our everyday activities impossible to grasp.45   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 43. 
43Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious 
Belief, Compiled from Notes taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor, ed. Cyril Barrett 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), II, no. 23-29, and III, no. 20, 22, & 33-35.  Wittgenstein 
observes that “it reminds us of that marvelous motto: ‘Everything is what it is and not another thing.’”  He 
adds that by connecting thinking with both physical and mathematical form, our view of reality as a 
mechanistic and mathematical order has become an “incontrovertible truth.”  This way of seeing and 
thinking, he declares, holds for us “a great deal of charm.” 
44Genova, 141, and Philosophical Investigations, no. 402 (my emphasis).  For Wittgenstein, 
seeing the world wearing blinders would be akin to reasoning by using Kantian categories. 
45Zettel, no. 447; and Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 81– 82.  See also, Gier, 79-80; and John 
Shotter, “in Living in a Wittgensteinian World: Beyond Theory to a Poetics of Practices,” in Journal for the 
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Contrary to the Western intellectual drive toward a single method, Wittgenstein 
opposes any attempt to impose a mechanistic order onto the world.  He rejects all ways 
of thinking which argue that to better understand either our existence or the world we 
are required to bracket or distance ourselves from our everyday understandings.  
Instead, Wittgenstein believes that it is impossible for us to completely disengage 
ourselves from the immediate situations surrounding our ordinary use of language and 
our everyday understandings, “as if our logic were a logic for a vacuum.”  As such, 
using logic or theory to bracket everyday experiences does not alleviate the problems 
we seek to solve.  Reasoning should not be seen as a “simple validating machine . . . 
like an idling engine not doing any work,” merely transmitting already established 
knowledge.  Unlike an ideal discourse, our ordinary language permits us to stay on the 
“rough ground of our everyday experiences.”46  By allowing us to interact within an 
immediate context of a particular time and place, our everyday use of language 
operates in the not-yet-analyzed, complex wilderness of our everyday surroundings.  As 
such, we enter a nascent wilderness through which no path (no method) has been 
cleared.  Thus, we are compelled to find our own way through the rough ground of our 
everyday life, leaving open the possibility for new understandings. As the contexts 
surrounding our ordinary ways of living change, our everyday use of language is 
compelled to cope with these changes.  Because no method has been constructed for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Theory of Social Behavior, 26, no. 3 (1996): 295, who observes that, “if Wittgenstein is right and we 
cannot change ourselves simply by ‘putting a theory into practice,’ it is only . . . by developing new 
practices, that we can change ourselves.”   
46It is possible that Wittgenstein is referring to the early computers developed by the British during 
World War II to break the German encryption machine, Enigma.  Some of the scientists and 
mathematicians developing this computer were from Cambridge.  One of the most notable, Alan Turing, 
was one of Wittgenstein’s seminar students in 1939.  Monk, 417-422, reports that this seminar evolved 
into a contest of wits as Wittgenstein attempted to convince Turing of the social foundations of 
mathematics.  Notes of this seminar were eventually published as the Remarks on the Foundations of 
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us to follow, our everyday language provides a generative process that transforms our 
ordinary understandings into something new.  
Language-Games and Forms of Life 
Wittgenstein initiated his later philosophical investigation by reconceiving 
language’s relationship to the physical and mental worlds.  Describing the rudimentary 
practices in which people engage when using language, he proposes that the 
relationship between language, thought, and the world should be reconceived as 
playing a children’s game.  He observes: 
We can also think of the whole process of using words as one of those games by 
means of which children learn their native language.  I will call these games 
“language-games” and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a 
language-game. 
And the processes of naming [objects] in [an activity] and of repeating 
words after someone [calls them out] might also be called language-games.  
Think of much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses. 
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into 
which it is woven, the “language-game.”47   
 
To help us understand how language-games work, Wittgenstein suggests that 
the relationship between language and games is similar to the relationship between 
playing a game and the rules of the game.  Lyotard suggests that language-games are 
the "various categories of utterances which are defined in terms of rules specifying their 
properties and the uses to which they can be put.”48  Although the concept of rules may 
help us understand something about the nature of language-games, the relationship 
between language and meaning cannot be simply determined by the rules.  A language-
game is not the totality of a set of rules.  Instead, both the meanings of the words used 
in a language-game and the rules for the use of these words emerge from the way 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Mathematics (Cambridge, MA: M. I. T. Press, 1967). 
47Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 7. 
 117
someone applies language in a given situation.  For Wittgenstein a language-game is 
the relationship between an expression and the rule it appears to depict.  This 
relationship is established by the dynamic relationship that exists between a speaker 
and a situation that encompasses expressing words in a particular way.  He insists that 
we do not learn to speak a language by first learning definitions, nor by merely following 
the rules.  Constructing definitions and obeying rules are already forms of language-
games.  As such, learning the rules changes our judgment of a given situation.49 
Wittgenstein observes that while we often use propositions “like the rules of a 
game,” as with any game, we can learn to play “without [first] learning explicit rules.”50  
Unlike the rules that govern logic, the rules that govern our everyday language-games 
do not exist prior to our playing the game.  He explains, “Language is not something 
that is first given a structure and then fitted onto reality.”51  Because the rules of our 
everyday language-games are dynamic and flexible, they emerge as we begin playing 
the game.   
The dynamic and emergent nature of our everyday language-games generates 
the pragmatic contingencies from the context of our ordinary lives that provide the 
cross-strips we use to weave together the ideal streams of thought that theoretical 
discourses induce us to imagine.  Without the connecting cross-strips of our ordinary 
lived experiences theoretical discourses become our infinitely disconnected imaginings.  
As such, our everyday language-games give meaning to our lived experiences by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
48Lyotard, 10.  See also, Genova, 117.  
49Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 80-81; and Lectures on Aesthetics, I, no. 15, 5.  See also, 
Janik and Toulmin, 223, who suggest that language-games are “the pragmatic rules that govern the uses 
of different expressions”; and Gier, 101, who suggests that language-games represent language systems 
that relate to different linguistic worlds.  See also, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, trans. R. 
Hargreaves and R. White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), 118. 
50On Certainty, no. 95. 
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weaving together our multifarious concepts and activities into a linguistic kinship.  Thus, 
Wittgenstein believed that by investigating the language-games we use in our ordinary 
practices and activities, rather than analyzing them like some natural phenomena 
through a theoretical lens, we are better able to bring into the open the various 
contingencies that give meaning to our ordinary ways of living.  
Wittgenstein’s discussion of language-games presents human thinking within a 
non-mechanistic view of the world by returning meaning and understanding to the 
nascent multiplicity found in everyday human existence.  As he observes: 
There are countless kinds of different uses of what we call “symbols,” “words,” 
“sentences.” And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once and for all; 
but new types of language, new language-games, come into existence, and 
others become obsolete and get forgotten.52 
 
Rather than providing clear and distinct meanings of words, language-games form a 
momentary linguistic gestalt whose purpose is to keep us from falling into skepticism’s 
meaningless abyss.  Thus, the construction of meaning, “ceases to lie in the formal 
character of linguistic [logical] representations.  Instead, meaning emerges as an aspect 
of humanity’s ‘natural history’.”53 
The concept of games illustrates that there is no essential order that is “common 
to all the activities” that compose our various uses of language.  On the other hand, 
language-games are not related by mere chance.  He explains:  
Consider, for example the proceedings that we call “games.”  I mean 
board games, card-games, ball games, Olympic games, and so on.  What is 
common to them all?  Don’t say: “there must be something common, or they 
would not be called ‘games’”—but look and see whether there is anything 
common to all.  For if you look at them you will not see something that is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
51Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 89. 
52Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 23. 
53Janik and Toulmin, 223; and Ting, Fu-ning, Wittgenstein's Descriptive Method (Hong Kong: 
Caritas printing training center, 1989), 40 & 50. 
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common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.  
To repeat: Don’t think, but look!   
And the result of this examination is: We see a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: Sometimes overall similarities, 
sometime similarities of detail.54 
 
He adds that there is "no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family 
resemblances.’  I shall say: ‘games’ form a family.”  Thus, what is common to our 
everyday language-games is the concept of a “spinning thread twisting fiber on fiber.”  
The strength of the relationship between various language-games, “like the strength of 
the thread, does not reside in the fact that some one fiber runs the whole length, but in 
the overlapping of many fibers.”55 
Wittgenstein maintains, “The term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into 
prominence that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life.”56  He 
adds that “language is characteristic of a larger group of activities: talking, writing, 
traveling on a bus, meeting a stranger, building a house.”57  By situating language within 
human activity, meaning and understanding become contingent upon our “forms of 
life”—the everyday practices in which we are engaged—rather than some formal, pre-
defined structure.  
“Forms of life” are the localized patterns of human existence found within our 
current practices, activities, and behaviors.  They are, at the same time, both social and 
biological, embodying the individual, the culture, and the environment in a linguistic 
unity.  Wittgenstein attempts to illustrate this point by contending that even “if a lion 
                                                          
54Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 65 & 66. 
55Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 67. He adds that like games, “The various resemblances 
between members of a family: build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. overlap and 
criss-cross in the same way.” 
56Philosophical Investigations, no. 23.  In On Certainty, no. 229, Wittgenstein added “our talk gets 
its meanings from the rest of our proceedings.” 
57Lectures on Aesthetics, I, no. 2. 
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could talk, we could not understand him.”58  Forms of life provide a way of seeing and 
thinking that begins at birth and is continuously configured out of our everyday human 
activities and practices.  In other words, even if a lion could speak, because it is not 
human, we would not be able to understand the way in which the lion is using the 
language.   
A form of life tells us how the world ought to look.  However, we are typically 
unaware of the view it provides.  As such, a form of life constitutes a point of view that 
appears completely natural and inevitable because we acquire it “at a time when the 
correctness of our thoughts and actions are unimportant.”  Wittgenstein observes, 
“Acquiring a form of life” is similar to the way children are instructed either “to believe in 
God, or that no God exists.”  Hence, forms of life are the ground from which our beliefs 
first emerge.  He adds, “A child learns to believe a host of things [by] learning to act 
according to these beliefs.”  For instance, the first time a child arrives at school, is not 
the child ready to “believe the teachers and the textbooks.”  Over time, these initial 
beliefs “form a system” (a form of life) in which “some things stand fast, while other 
things are likely to shift.”59  What stands fast does so not because of anything 
intrinsically obvious, but because of the context in which the form of life appears.  As 
such, forms of life, and their language-games, make up the riverbed of human existence 
that emerges out of ordinary human situations. 
Like a riverbed, which “consists partly of hard rock and partly of sand that gets 
washed away and re-deposited,” language-games and forms of life are subject to 
alteration.  While momentarily appearing fixed, at any moment they may return to a 
                                                          
58Philosophical Investigations, II, 223.  See also, Gier, 103-110, who discusses the 
phenomenological implications of “forms of life” as Lebensphilosophy (life philosophy). 
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“state of flux”—“now in one place, now in another.  Nothing is final.”60  While the 
movement of the water and the shifting bed are often distinguishable, this distinction is 
not always a sharp one and can often be imperceptible.  Wittgenstein uses this riverbed 
metaphor to show that the practices of everyday living, rather than the rules of logic, 
constitute our various forms of life.  He observes, “Rules leave open loop-holes, and the 
practice has to speak for itself.  We do not learn practices . . . by learning rules: we are 
taught examples and their connection with other examples.”  In this way, “The totality of 
a practice is made plausible to us.”61  It is through the practices of a form of life—not 
only the way people build shelters, construct roads, and plow land, but also the way 
they hope, grieve, believe, and, in particular, the way they use language—that people 
go about actively shaping the world and are shaped by it.  Because a form of life 
consists “of the language and the actions into which it is woven,” it is related to a 
particular social situation.62   
Furthermore, forms of life appear to be Wittgenstein’s attempt to undermine the 
philosophical foundation of first principles as the absolute knowledge that one starts 
from to prove what can be known.  Wittgenstein’s description of forms of life as a point 
of view that is completely natural and inevitable suggests that it is roughly equivalent to 
Aristotle’s notion of intuitive reasoning from which first principles are established.  
However, by presenting forms of life as socially constructed understandings that 
emerge from our everyday use of language, Wittgenstein is challenging the belief that 
first principles provide the invariable knowledge from which all proof and all direct 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
59On Certainty, no. 103, 105, and 107. 
60On Certainty, no. 95, 96, & 99. 
61On Certainty, no. 139-140 & 287.  Wittgenstein adds, “We no more need a law of induction to 
justify our actions or our predictions, then does a squirrel to infer that it is going to need stores next 
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instruction are required to begin.  As such, if first principles are variable (i.e. not 
absolutely known), and subject to social agreement, then, as Aristotle argued, one 
cannot demonstrate directly what one knows.  Wittgenstein observes, “When language-
games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with concepts the meanings of 
the words change.”63  It is this active and generative sense of meaning and 
understanding that culminates in the concept Wittgenstein describes as “meaning-in-
use.”64 
Meaning-In-Use 
In Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the concept of meaning-in-use presents a new 
way of knowing that asks us to “see” the family relationships that exists among 
concepts, rather than just “think” (i.e., use reason).  By calling upon us to “look” at the 
ways in which concepts are related, Wittgenstein uses his notion of “family 
resemblances” to weave “thinking and “seeing” into what Genova describes as “an 
inextricable whole.”  As the weaving together of resemblances, meaning-in-use 
reconfigures our patterns of thinking by removing our logical blinders and applying the 
cross-strips of our everyday language-games to the endless theoretical imaginings that 
Descartes’s unaided reason has constructed.  According to Genova, through our 
everyday language-games, meaning-in-use comes to the aid of reason.  In so doing, 
meaning-in-use turns our attention away from investigating one’s mental state, where 
the modern concept of meaning has theoretically resided.  Instead, Wittgenstein 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
winter.” 
62Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 337.  See also, Gier, 107. 
63On Certainty, no. 65. 
64Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 139. I have hyphenated meaning-in-use to suggest its use as 
a unitary concept. 
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refocuses our investigations of meaning onto the ordinary activities of “thinking” and 
“seeing” in which we engage.65   
Wittgenstein asks, “What really comes to mind when we understand a word?”  
Critiquing the logical scaffolding of the Tractatus’ “picture theory” of logic, he answers 
that what comes to mind is not merely a picture of a word because no single picture that 
we could construct will “fit” all the possible “uses” of a word that can be imagined.  What 
one understands is the use of a word that is suggested by a given situation.66  He 
emphasizes that maintaining a “picture” of a word (whether as an image or a diagram) 
in our “imagination” “is absolutely unessential” to our ability to apply a word.67  Thus, 
meaning-in-use asks us to reconceive thinking as the application of our language in a 
given situation.  Following Wittgenstein, thinking can be reconceived as fundamentally 
different from method’s “utterly simple” order, which logic assumes is essential to 
thought.  He observes, “When I think in language, there aren't ‘meanings’ going through 
my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of 
thought.”68   
Rather than being a logical or theoretical bridge between an internal and external 
reality constructed by method’s single way of thinking, meaning-in-use employs family 
resemblances to weave together the understanding provided by our everyday language-
games.  While momentary and incomplete, this dynamic and open-ended “way of 
seeing” brings together our immediate circumstances and surroundings in which our 
current activities are situated.  In so doing, meaning-in-use “produces just those 
                                                          
65Genova, 26 & 98.  
66Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 139.  For a full explanation of the difference in the way 
Wittgenstein applies this concept in the Tractatus and his later philosophy, see Hallett’s discussion, in 
Wittgenstein’s Definition of Meaning as Use. 
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understandings which consist of ‘seeing connections’”—“synoptically.”69  Instead of 
determining meaning by first analytically taking language apart and then reconstructing 
an ideal discourse by synthesizing isolated concepts, meaning-in-use portrays thinking 
as a synoptic presentation of an ensemble of concepts.  Wittgenstein’s synoptic way of 
seeing recognizes that all we need to understand meaning in our everyday lives are the 
rough sketches and family resemblances already existing between concepts.  Rather 
than linear, disconnected threads of theoretical thought that lead from “causes to ends,” 
meaning-in-use presents knowing as a pragmatic description of the world.70  As 
Wittgenstein observes, no single proposition holds fast because of what it is in itself, but 
because it belongs to a “nest of propositions.”71 
The Knowledge Game 
We can begin to understand the revolutionary nature of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy as we come to realize that its purpose, in Genova's words, “is the 
undermining of all previous foundations for knowing.”  In his later philosophy, 
Wittgenstein establishes the position that our ability to know something does not require 
the presence of some form of internal or external authority.  If knowing does not require 
either kind of authority, then the empirical and rational foundations of knowledge that 
underlie Western thought are no longer necessary.  Presenting the relationship among 
concepts as a kinship of family resemblances that are configured synoptically through 
meaning-in-use, Wittgenstein’s later investigations provide an on-going illustration that 
knowing something depends upon little more than the act of acknowledging that we 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
67Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 141 (my emphasis). 
68Philosophical Investigations, no. 329.  See also, Ting, Fu-ning, 40. 
69Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 122.  See also, Gier, 77-78; and Genova, 33 & 34. 
70Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 90; and Genova, 45. 
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know something.  This act of acknowledgement, however, does not require a decision.  
As such, this form of knowing does not require reflective thought or contemplation.  
Instead, acknowledgement only requires that one be in a position to know.72  To 
illustrate this concept, Wittgenstein describes the following example:  
We teach a child ‘that is your hand,’ not ‘that is perhaps (or ‘probably’) your 
hand.’  This is how a child learns the innumerable language-games that are 
concerned with his hand.  An investigation or question, ‘whether this is really a 
hand’ never occurs to him.  Nor, on the other hand, does he learn that he knows 
that this is a hand.73 
 
Genova explains that as acknowledgement, knowing creates its own authority.  
Acknowledgement further recognizes that knowing neither begins nor ends with a 
specific object or event.  By declaring that “our talk gets meaning from the rest of our 
proceedings,” Wittgenstein was indicating that when someone knows something, one 
does not know just one thing.  Because what one knows is related to numerous other 
concepts in a family of ways, knowing and learning cannot be limited to a direct 
psychological relationship between a fact and a mental state.  Instead, knowing and 
learning depends upon a complex relationship involving one’s use of language within a 
larger social context.  Thus, to know one thing is to know something else.   
Because our language-games and forms of life form a system of beliefs, our 
acknowledgement of these beliefs makes knowing others possible.  As such, knowing 
and learning do not depend upon our being certain about what we know.  Instead, our 
sense of certainty resides in our ability to already to play the game.  This suggests that 
learning a new language-game is only possible if one first “trusts” the game being 
taught.  Wittgenstein explains that being certain that “this is my hand . . . doesn’t rest” 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
71On Certainty, no. 225.  See also, Gier, 79; and Genova, 34. 
72Genova, 196-197. 
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upon being certain.  Instead, this certainty pre-supposes ones participation in the 
language-game concerning learning the concept of hands depicted above.74  What 
Wittgenstein is attempting to illustrate is that our being certain results from our playing 
the game rather than this certainty providing the framework upon which knowing and 
learning depend.  
Genova equates the notion of having knowledge without certainty to having 
“knowledge without Descartes” because she maintains that it was he who made 
certainty a condition of knowing (i.e., the elimination of all doubt and error).75  
Wittgenstein challenges Descartes’s method of doubt by calling into question 
Descartes’s method for constructing epistemological certainty.  Wittgenstein asks, “Can 
one say: Where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either?  Doesn’t one need 
grounds for doubt?” He replies that a “child learns by believing [trusting] the adult.”  He 
adds, “When someone is trying to teach us mathematics, he will not begin by assuring 
us that he knows that a + b = b + a.”  Thus, it is by accepting what we are being told that 
we come to accept an enormous amount of knowledge.  It is only later that we realize 
that what we initially learn is either “confirmed or disconfirmed by our experiences.”  
Thus, “Doubt comes after belief.”76 
For Wittgenstein, acknowledgement “teaches” through the practices in which we 
engage rather than the certainty assumed by a set of rules.  He states, “We come to 
know the nature of calculation by learning to calculate.”  In this statement, Wittgenstein 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
73On Certainty, no. 374. 
74On Certainty, no. 229, 378, & 446.  In no. 457, he asks: “Do I want to say, then, that certainty 
resides in the nature of the language-game?”  See also, Genova, 175 & 196-198. 
75Genova, 188.  In On Certainty, no. 115, Wittgenstein states that “if you tried to doubt everything 
you would not get as far as doubting anything.  The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.”  
Genova suggests that Wittgenstein’s argument, that doubt must have a context and that it follows trust 
and certainty, is similar to the pragmatic position taken by Charles Sanders Peirce. 
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tries to show that mathematical knowledge, like all knowledge, is tied to the practice of a 
form of life.  We learn how to calculate by being taught, “’this is how calculation is done.’  
In such circumstances a calculation is treated as absolutely reliable, as certainly 
correct.”  He also reminds us that, while “we do calculate according to a rule,” the rule 
for calculating is not necessary.  It is only by “practicing the use of the rule that shows . . 
. a mistake in its employment.”77    
Additionally, Wittgenstein indicates that, not unlike calculating, “A meaning of a 
word is a kind of employment of it.  For it is what we learn when the word is 
incorporated into our language.”78  Wittgenstein asks, “How do I know that this color is 
red?”  He responds that “it would be an answer to say: ‘I have learned English.’”  
Wittgenstein further disrupts our standard way of thinking by declaring, “You learn the 
concept of ‘pain’ when you learned a language.”79  Genova cautions that the purpose of 
Wittgenstein’s comments are “to shock and disturb us” by undermining the authority of 
empirical evidence as being essential to knowing.  In so doing, he is providing a further 
disruption to Cartesian rationalism.  Genova describes Descartes’s statement, “I think, 
therefore I am,” as an empirical declaration, which “claims that everything can be 
deduced from the act of one thinking subject.”80  In opposition to Descartes, 
Wittgenstein asserts that knowing is not “the logical condition of someone having such-
and-such an experience!”  Nor is it “simply a question of physiology.”81 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
76On Certainty, no. 121-123, 126, and 160-161.  He adds: “Doubts form a system.” 
77On Certainty, no. 29, 38, and 45-46. 
78On Certainty, no. 61.  In no. 62, he adds, “That is why there exists a correspondence between 
the concepts ‘rule’ and ‘meaning.’” 
79Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 381 & 384 (my emphasis). 
80Genova, 188. 
81Philosophical Investigations, II, 208.  This can also be understood as a critique of Bacon’s belief 
that understanding is a product of the hand and its instruments. 
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For Wittgenstein, “knowledge is possible without first-hand experience.” Contrary 
to our typical way of thinking, experience is not crucial to learning.  Genova explains 
that Wittgenstein’s position is that we do not have to “experience the exact same 
phenomenon” in order to understand one another.  While experience is necessary for 
language, for the development of the game, it is not a requirement for learning particular 
statements about the game.  As such, “We learn and grow by acquiring a language.”82  
Wittgenstein opposed the psychological belief that all human behavior is 
governed or caused by overt physical behavior or by the body’s internal physiological 
processes.  He reports, “To ‘know’ something is not one clear-cut physical event.  Nor 
can one be disturbed while intending.”83  Wittgenstein asks:  
Think of this language-game: Determine how long an impression lasts by means 
of a stopwatch.  The duration of knowledge, ability, or understanding cannot be 
determined in this way.   
 
Pain is a state of consciousness [that can be measured] understanding is not.  I 
don’t feel my understanding.84 
 
To illustrate another example, Wittgenstein asks, “Think of the expression ‘I 
heard a plaintive melody.’  ‘Does one hear the plaint?’ And if I reply: ‘No, one merely 
has a sense of it’—where does that get us?  One cannot mention a bodily organ for this 
‘sense’.”85  He observes that “if you feel the seriousness of the tune, what are you 
perceiving?—Nothing that could be conveyed by reproducing what you heard.”  In this 
                                                          
82Genova, 176 and 186.  Think of how a toddler learns not to touch a hot pot.  What is the more 
typical experience in this case?  The child’s direct experience of touching a hot pot, or just hearing the 
mothers cry: HOT!  At the moment the mother says the word, hot, the child enters the form of life of 
multiple language-games in which the term, “hot,” is operative and is repeated more often then actually 
touching.  Without language, touching a hot pot becomes an isolated personal experience that has no 
connection to a broader social context.  In this case, would not a child need to touch a hot iron in order to 
learn not to touch it? 
83Zettel, no. 46, 49, 469 & 487; and Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 545 & 585. 
84Zettel, no. 82 & 84. 
85Philosophical Investigations, II, 209. 
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example, Wittgenstein suggests, “The physiological is a symbol of the logical.”86  
Because of the many subtleties involved in this kind of situation, it is difficult to imagine 
how someone could have used method when learning a language.  
Learning as Meaning-In-Use 
Genova suggests that “meaning in use” was Wittgenstein’s attempt to answer the 
“age-old questions: How do we know, and what equipment do we use to learn?”87  
While sensory stimulation and innate mental structures are the traditional tools of 
learning theorists, Wittgenstein believed that learning, like teaching, requires a more 
dynamic and immediate medium.  Contrary to scholasticism’s pedagogical and 
philosophical tradition, it is senseless to talk of a one-to-one correspondence between 
the simples of language and those of the physical and mental worlds.  Even if we 
assume, as do the rules governing logical method, that objects of this kind even exist, 
Wittgenstein asks: how can “private sensations” be used to anchor language, which is 
socially situated?88  By turning to our everyday language, he presents a new way of 
thinking about learning.  Once we recognize that to “imagine a language means to 
imagine a form of life,”89 learning occurs by listening carefully to the language-game 
used for another “form of life and simultaneously imagining other possibilities,” which we 
                                                          
86Philosophical Investigations, 209-210.  Paul Rabinow, in “Representations are Social Facts: 
Modernity and Post-Modernity in Anthropology,” in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography, ed. James Clifford and George F. Marcus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 
236, observes that Wittgenstein, along with Martin Heidegger and John Dewey, agree that the notion of 
knowledge as accurate representation, made possible by special mental processes, and intelligible 
through a general theory of representation needs to be abandoned” so that we can begin playing a 
different game.  See also, Richard Rorty, in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), 6; and Shotter, 293. 
87Genova, 26. 
88Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 246-253. 
89Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 19, 23 & 141. 
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synoptically present to ourselves.  By doing so, we can “discover what others already 
know, albeit indistinctly.”90  
Wittgenstein believes that teaching should not be governed by one right method.  
Although a curriculum that breaks learning activities into a series of simple skills may 
make it easier for some students to acquire particular skills, having to accumulate all 
these separate skills tends to clutter, confuse, and then paralyze a student’s thinking.  
Knowing as an act of acknowledging suggests that we already understand aspects of 
the new language-game before we begin to learn it.  Wittgenstein emphasizes that “one 
has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a 
thing’s name.”91  This implies that we do not build language, as the school curriculum 
maps out, by learning individual sentences, words, or skills, but in a reverse manner by 
learning to apply these things within an integrated whole.  
Wittgenstein urges that “to understand a sentence means to understand a 
language.  To understand a language means to be master of a technique.”92  As such, 
meaning-in-use is oriented in the belief that by being educated in a technique, a student 
is also educated in a way of seeing that is rooted in the technique.  Wittgenstein 
cautions, however, that the mastering of a technique is not determined by any particular 
experience.  While a technique may involve some experience, it “does not direct us to 
                                                          
90Genova, 25-26. 
91Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 30. 
92Philosophical Investigations, no. 199; and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 124.  
Both Bacon and Descartes blur the relationship between a technique and “seeing” by referring to their 
method of thinking as "common sense."  John St. Julien, in "Cognition and learning: the implications of a 
situated connectionist perspective for theory and practice in education," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana 
State University, Baton Rouge, 1994), describes how the technique of using a telescope changed 
Galileo's way of seeing and thinking about the world.  Reiss, 22-27, discusses how Galileo's telescope 
and the telescopic metaphor changed the medieval way of referencing the world into the modern rational-
technical, analytical-referential, visual way of seeing.  See also Doll's discussion on the subjectivity of 
scientific knowledge, in A Post-Modern Perspective, 124-132; and Thomas Kuhn's, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 48 & 175. 
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derive anything [specific] from this experience.”  Crucial to Wittgenstein’s belief that 
teaching is an indirect activity is his position that an experience does not occur as a 
discreet step in some pre-arranged series of demonstrable facts.  Instead, one’s ability 
to master a technique is but a substratum of an ensemble of experience: 
It is only if someone can do, has learnt, is [already] master of such-and-such that 
it makes sense to say he has had this experience.  We talk, we utter words, and 
only later [do we] get a picture of their life.93   
 
He maintains that what our experiences show us is how the world could otherwise be 
envisioned.  Within any single experience, aspects of multiple understandings are 
available.   
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy suggests that learning and meaning are intimately 
related.  When learning the name of an object, we do not learn the image of the thing 
the word represents.  “What we learn is the word’s meaning.  Meaning, therefore, is not 
a thing referred to, but the use of the word referring to such a thing.”  Thus, when we 
learn a word’s meaning, what we are learning is the word’s use in a particular situation.  
Furthermore, when we learn a word’s meaning we are also learning the meaning of an 
experience.  Because it is related to the use of a language, the meaning of an 
experience is not simply determined by any a single experience.  While one is more 
immediate that the other, both the meaning of a word—its meaning—and the meaning 
of an experience—meaning it—are related to the language-game in which it is being 
used.94 
Hallett further suggests that Wittgenstein is definite in that meaning is not related 
to a mental image or sensation.  On the final page, Wittgenstein ends the Philosophical 
                                                          
93Philosophical Investigations, II, 209. 
94Hallett, 90-93.  Hallett describes Wittgenstein’s application of meaning-in-use in his later 
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Investigations by stressing the point that meanings do not have experiential content 
(i.e., the mind is not a store house of meanings).  The mental content that sometimes 
accompanies an experience—images and words—is not the same as experiencing 
meaning.95  Thus, meaning is not something we construct.  What we do construct is the 
way in which words are used—language-games—to which meanings adhere.  While 
theories of learning attempt to show the causal connections between what Wittgenstein 
describes as “what is experienced with something physical,” he contends that, as 
meaning-in-use, learning weaves together “what is experienced with what is 
experienced.”96  This implies that what we experience is language and it is by using 
language to learn new language-games and not by merely engaging in physical activity 
that we learn and grow.  Genova contends:  
Wittgenstein’s conclusion is not that experience fails to teach, only that its 
success depends upon our use of language-games.  It depends, that is, on a 
form of life.  Experience teaches in context.  And this context is as much a 
function of language as it is of experience.97   
 
Interestingly, Genova expresses fairly well Wittgenstein’s possible contribution to the 
field of curriculum.  She states, “Language is a teacher as much as experience, and in 
many cases a better teacher.”  Thus, by sharing a language one is sharing a form of life, 
thereby, “ensuring a degree of understanding.”  Furthermore, because knowing does 
not require “first hand experience,” we are not required to experience others lived 
experience to understand what they know.  Instead, all we need to recognize is that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
philosophy as, “Ockham’s razor in action.  
95Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 693, and II, 184, 217-225. 
96Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on Color, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. Linda L. McAlister and 
Margarete Schulte (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 48.  
97Genova, 186. 
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their forms of life, and the language-games that inform them, share a kinship of 
meaning resembling our own.   
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy suggests that the absolute nature of method and 
its ideal discourse has the tendency of putting everyone to “sleep.”  Instead of 
attempting to motivate everyone methodologically by beginning with what we already 
know, a way is needed to awaken us to the wonders and mysteries that can be found in 
our everyday lives.98  As an elementary school teacher, Wittgenstein had come to 
believe that by providing students with new ways of seeing they could learn better when 
working through interesting and complex situations.  Beginning with difficult and 
complex problems allows teachers to lead students, indirectly, toward the multifarious 
understandings that underlie any given situation, and not just to a single understanding.  
He suggests that what we often call simplicity is the ordinary way an activity comes to 
feel through conventional or habitual use.  In order to go beyond traditional classroom 
methodology, it is important for teachers to learn how to transform the strange into the 
ordinary and the ordinary into the strange.99 
By reconceiving curriculum as meaning-in-use, teaching would no longer be the 
practice of transmitting a series of pre-determined facts directly to students.  What 
meaning-in-use suggests for the school curriculum is not that national curriculum 
standards, high stakes testing, and bureaucratically determined methods of instruction 
construct learning experiences that are too narrow, but that its discourse of educational 
assessment constructs an ideal language that is too limited.  This limited language does 
                                                          
98Culture and Value, 5e. 
99Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 47, and Bartley, 97-98 & 137.  See also, Gershon Weiler, 
Mauthner’s Critique of Language (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1970), 29. See also Doll, A Post-
Modern Perspective; and Huebner, “Religious Metaphors and the Language of Education,” 361-363. 
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not allow students to integrate their classroom activities with their practices of living 
outside of school.  As such, the movement toward using high-stakes tests to assess 
students' acquisition of (isolated) "knowledge" undermines the dynamic and generative 
role that meaning-in-use (using language-in-action) plays in enhancing students' 
capabilities to understand the complexities that emerge from the various forms of life 
that one lives in the broader world.  
CHAPTER 5 
A WITTGENSTEINIAN CURRICULUM: LANGUAGE, CURRERE, PEDAGOGY 
AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
Wittgenstein told the following story to his elementary school students: 
Once upon a time there was an experiment.  Two small children who had not yet 
learnt to speak were shut away with a woman who was unable to speak.  The 
aim of the experiment was to determine whether they would learn some primitive 
language or invent a new language of their own.  The experiment failed.1  
 
Bartley maintains that this brief story, which was likely part of a larger lesson, presents 
the central role that Wittgenstein believed language plays in the practices of teaching 
and learning.2 
In Wittgenstein’s Vienna, Janik and Toulmin propose that the totality of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical ideas should be viewed within the context of Vienna’s 
social and cultural milieu at the end of the nineteenth century.  They suggest that 
Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations into the limits of what can be known from the 
use of language continued the kind of language critique that had been occurring within 
aesthetics and the sciences in fin-de-siecle Vienna.3  Carl Schorske (1980) contends 
that to more fully understand the complexities of the Viennese milieu, scholars need to 
go beyond the “diachronic” investigations that limit research in the sciences, the arts, or 
social studies only to the theoretical discourses established by the academic disciplines.  
Instead, Schorske advocates using a style of inquiry that cuts across the academic 
disciplines by enabling scholars to study the “synchronic” relationships that integrate the 
whole of Viennese society at the end of the nineteenth century.  While Schorske uses a 
                                                          
1Bartley, 74. 
2Interestingly, Wittgenstein’s story resembles aspects of Plato’s “allegory of the cave” in which the 
prisoners can see and hear shadows and echoes, but have no way of knowing what it is their senses are 
experiencing because they have no language, The Republic, 388.   
3Janik and Toulmin lay out their theses in Chapters Two and Three of Wittgenstein’s Vienna. 
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psychoanalytical lens to examine Viennese life, Janik and Toulmin present a synchronic 
investigation that focuses on the central role being played by language within the 
Viennese milieu.  They contend that focusing on language, as well as on the critique of 
its use, offers greater insight into Wittgenstein’s own project.4 
The Viennese Coffee House:  
A Fin-de-Siecle Learning Environment 
 
Stefan Zweig maintains that fin-de-siecle Vienna's coffee houses blossomed into 
the nexus that created the city’s cultural and intellectual milieu.  In its coffee houses a 
variety of cross-threads of conversations intertwined all aspects of Vienna’s unique 
milieu—the various language-games produced by the daily practices of business, 
science, the arts, beauracracy, and the proletariat.  According to Zweig, a gymnasium 
student's  “true” education was learned in the coffee houses.  Their rich aesthetic and 
intellectual atmosphere provided the city's youth with an escape from the rote and 
stifling pedagogy of the state-run schools.  He explains that in school a student was 
compelled "to assimilate the science of the not-worth-knowing."  In the coffee houses 
one could hear and discuss the latest Expressionist poetry of the Jung Wien writers 
such as Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Rainer Marie Rilke; debate the latest exhibitions of 
the Secession artists such as Gustav Klimt and Oskar Kokoschka; and hear and critique 
the new music of Gustav Mahler, Joseph Labor, Richard Wagner, and Arnold 
Schonberg, as well as the older music of Strauss, Mendelssohn, and Brahms.  The 
“textbook” of the coffeehouse "classroom" was the Viennese paper, Neue Freie Presse, 
                                                          
4Carl Schorske, Fin-De-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), xx-
xxv; and Mark Francis, The Viennese Enlightenment, ed. Mark Francis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1985), 2, suggests that the unique experience of Viennese society can best be understood within the 
framework of Freudian psychoanalysis. 
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and its most read and discussed section, the cultural and literary essays of the 
“feuilleton,” which acted as a catalyst for aesthetic debate.5   
Fin-de-siecle Vienna presents us with a sonorous world of conversation, debate, 
noise, and music.  As the novelist, Robert Musil, remarks: 
Hundreds of sounds were intertwined into a coil of wiry noise, with single barbs 
projecting, sharp edges running along it and submerging again, and clear notes 
splintering off—flying and scattering.  Even though the peculiar nature of this 
noise could not be defined, a man returning after years of absence would have 
known, with his eyes shut, that he was in the ancient capital and imperial city, 
Vienna.6 
 
Here is an auditory world of orality and sound that cannot be easily limited to a 
methodized view of the world.  While the visual world of the fine arts is ever present, it is 
ancillary to the production of sound.  In the paintings of a Kokoschka, one does not see 
only human misery; more significantly, one is called upon to hear the cries of human 
suffering.  Rather than merely representing a static visual image, Kokoschka's paintings 
are a dialogical performance between the artist and the audience.7 
Mark Francis (1985) further describes fin-de-siecle Vienna as a city of dynamic 
movement using terms such as “decadence,” “liberation,” and “destruction.”8  Musil, 
illustrates this feeling of dynamic, even chaotic, movement permeating Vienna 
remarking: 
Motorcars came shooting out of deep, narrow streets into the shallows of bright 
squares.  Dark patches of pedestrian bustle formed into cloudy streams.  Where 
stronger lines of speed transected their loose-woven hurrying, they clotted up—
                                                          
5Zweig, 39-42 & 99-102.  For fin-de-siecle Vienna, the Neue Freie Presse played a role similar to 
the New York Times in the United States today.  Besides the feuilleton, the Viennese read other 
publications dedicated to cultural and social critique, including Karl Kraus’s Die Frankel. 
6Robert Musil, Man Without Qualities, vol. 1, trans. and forward by Eithne Wilkins & Ernst Kaiser 
(New York: Capricorn Books, 1965; Coward-McCann, Inc., 1953), 3. 
7See also, Janik and Toulmin’s, 100-102, discussion of Kokoschka's impact on the aesthetic, 
ethical, and intellectual sensibilities of Vienna before and after World War One. 
8Francis, 6. 
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only to trickle on all the faster then and after a few ripples regain their regular 
pulse-beat.9 
 
Musil additionally characterized Vienna’s fin-de-siecle generation as ostensibly a culture 
of young men who were “urged forward by some uncanny wanderlust . . . for whom 
there is no returning home and no arriving anywhere.”10   
Another fitting term used to describe Vienna's energy is the term “modernism.”  
As one of the city's many progenies, Zweig articulated the extent of the city’s 
modernism by stating that for late nineteenth-century Viennese society, the belief in 
“progress” had become its “religion,” and “science its archangel.”11  Although modern, 
industrial society arrived late to the Habsburg Empire, and only in the Austrian half, 
compared to the cities of Western Europe, Vienna had become, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, the city where modernity began to mature fully.  Here began the 
social and cultural experiment that would become the twentieth century.12 
The group primarily responsible for modernism’s rapid development was the 
empire's industrial and commercial bourgeoisie.  From their initial beginnings as 
peasants, petty merchants, and artisans, the Austrian bourgeoisie grew rapidly, 
developing into some of Europe’s richest families. Their burgeoning wealth also brought 
                                                          
9Musil, 3.  
10Musil, 277.  This notion led me to attempt to find works that study the role of women in fin-de-
siecle Vienna.  To date I have found only one recent work, Harriet Anderson, Utopian Feminism: The 
Women’s Movement in Fin-De-Siecle Vienna (New Haven: Yale University Press 1996).  According to 
Anderson, to a great extent women operated below the cultural and social radar.  However, in a 
patriarchal society in which so many of the ruling elite’s sons committed suicide (Vienna had the highest 
suicide rate in Europe), the surviving daughters almost certainly would have had an opportunity to play an 
increasingly public role.  One of those that did was Margaret Wittgenstein Stonborough, Ludwig’s sister.  
The role of women in turn of the century Viennese society appears to be an apt area for further research 
and study. 
11Zweig, 3. 
12See Janik and Toulmin’s, 19, observation that, while nineteenth-century Vienna has been 
described as “the City of Dreams,” in the initial years of the twentieth century it was described by the 
social and cultural critic, Karl Kraus, as the “Proving-Ground for World Destruction” that would exemplify 
the rest of the century.  
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access to the best of German high culture, of which the bourgeoisie became the 
principal consumers.  Following the 1848 revolution, the liberal bourgeoisie took control 
of all aspects of Viennese society, with the exception of the Imperial Government.  
Because the bourgeoisie, whose intellectual depth was epitomized by the slogan 
"business is business," were primarily preoccupied with commercial activity, they did not 
create a cultural style of their own.  While both economically and politically they had 
been able to push the Austrian aristocracy aside, the bourgeoisie were satisfied to leave 
issues of culture and manners to the aristocracy.  This left all of Viennese society 
exposed to the fashion whims of the aristocratic dilettantes and professional cultural 
elite.  Zweig explains:  
The Imperial Theater, the Burgtheater, was for the Viennese and for the 
Austrians more than a stage upon which actors enacted parts; it was the 
microcosm that mirrored the macrocosm.  In the court actor the spectator saw 
how one was to dress, walk into a room, how to converse, which words one 
might employ as a man of general taste and which to avoid.  It was a spoken and 
plastic guide to good behavior and correct pronunciation.13 
 
The Viennese theater influenced all levels of Viennese society because its 
operas, plays, and symphonies were open to and attended by all social classes. This 
constant access to performances of all types gave all Vienna's citizens, as Zweig noted, 
“an uncommon respect for every artistic presentation.”  Thus, “a connoisseurship 
without equal evolved” among Vienna's general population, thereby enabling all classes 
to feel secure in critiquing or commenting on any performance “no matter what their 
station.” 
The Viennese believed that the turn of the century was the "Golden Age of 
Security," which blended Liberal political civility and economic prosperity with 
                                                          
13Zweig, 15 
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conservative social and cultural life.  It was an age in which  "everything had its norm, its 
definite weight and measure."14   With a quantifiable sense of security and certainty 
came a confidence and tolerance that guaranteed Vienna’s younger generation a 
freedom of expression that blended the society’s various cultural and intellectual 
language-games.  The vitality and dynamism that Vienna's language-games offered its 
younger generation were best represented in coffeehouse conversations.15   
The importance of language in Viennese society is further illustrated in the 
Expressionist poetry of the Jung Wien (Young Vienna) literary movement, which 
emerged out of the aesthetic and intellectual conversations spoken in the coffee 
houses.  This younger generation of Viennese rejected the received aesthetic orthodoxy 
of their parents.  Jung Wien did not want to be anchored to what they believed to be the 
anachronistic fashions that had been dictated by the dilettante taste of Habsburg 
aristocracy.  Nor did the Jung Wien generation want “truth” limited to some rational or 
dogmatic concept of beauty.  The use of scientific reason and technology to dominate 
“nature” in the name of “progress” conferred upon the liberal bourgeois the belief that 
they had the moral authority to create the “good society.”  However, their rationalism, as 
well as their practices of social certainty had produced only an allusion of security, while 
at the same time creating a kind of “spiritual vacuum.”  This spiritually empty, logical 
fantasy led the bourgeois to believe that the physical world could be forced to comply 
with their aesthetic whims.16   
                                                          
14Zweig, 1; and Harry Zohn, "Introduction," in The World of Yesterday, viii-ix. 
15Andersen, observes that young women, as well as young men frequented the coffeehouses in 
an attempt to escape the drudgery waiting for them as a virtual object in the liberal household.  
16Janik and Toulmin, 99-110. 
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Conversely, the Jung Wien Expressionists came to believe that “truth” could not 
be discovered rationally, but could only be revealed aesthetically through one’s actions.  
Their aesthetic practices were opposed to the idea that an object should determine how 
one ought to live.  Instead, Jung Wien presented a new aesthetic, maintaining that 
human artifacts should conform to the transformations occurring in contemporary 
society.  The Viennese architect, Adolf Loos, provided an excellent example of this new 
aesthetic concept by suggesting that “culture” should take on the form of society's 
“uses” of it.  He declared, “We do not sit in such-and-such a way, because [carpenters 
believe that] a chair is built in such-and-such a way.  Rather, the chair is made because 
someone wants to sit in that way.”17 
Expressionism’s new aesthetic led its Jung Wien’s poets to adopt Ernst Mach’s 
psychological “sensationalism.”  Expressionist poets used Mach’s “sensationalism” to 
assert that their poetic language more authentically represented the “reality” of sensory 
experiences than did the theoretical discourses of science.  Thus, the Jung Wien 
Expressionists came to believe that only the arts and not science and technology 
furnished Austrian society with the cures for its ills.18 
While the freedom of expression found in Vienna’s coffeehouse-culture enabled 
them to produce an amazing level of aesthetic, as well as scientific, achievements, this 
freedom of expression also created significant social and political problems.  As Janik 
and Toulmin observe, “The problem of identity and communication plagued Viennese 
                                                          
17From Paul Englemann’s unpublished collection, Bel der Lampe.  Quoted in Janik and Toulmin, 
99.  Loos was a close friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein.  The two worked together to build the Stoneborough 
House for Ludwig’s sister, Margaret. 
18Janik and Toulmin, 113. 
 142
society at every level of life.”19  The problem of communication among the various 
national (ethnic) groups served as a catalyst for the language critique pursued by 
Viennese intellectuals as they endeavored to find the limits of what one can know from 
language.   
The communication problems are particularly apparent in the Austrian Liberal 
Party’s attempts to govern the Habsburg’s multinational empire.  During the nineteenth 
century, language had become the primary means the Empire’s various ethnic 
nationalities used to identify themselves.20  An example of the kind of problems the use 
of these different ethnic languages created can be seen when, in 1907, the Austrian half 
of the Empire, which included Germans, Czechs, Slovenes, Italians, and Poles, granted 
the vote to all males citizens.  The Czechs and Germans, who made up the vast 
majority of Austria’s liberal assembly, were unable to communicate with one another—
the two languages speaking across each other—and thereby had difficulty governing.  
The liberal government’s failure to communicate was partly due to many of the German 
in the assembly “failed to recognize the Czech language,”21 much less the languages of 
the lesser national minorities.  While the Czechs were the most significant ethnic 
                                                          
19Janik and Toulmin, 65.  The degree to which language continues to play a significant role in 
areas once controlled by the Habsburg Empire can be seen in bitter differences between Croats and 
Serbs.  While they are represented as two different nationality groups, they are ethnically and 
linguistically identical, divided only by their alphabet and religion.  For a complete discussion of the role of 
language in the rise of national and political identity in the Habsburg Empire see, the Austrian Yearbook, 
vol. 1-3 (Houston: Rice University, 1967). 
20See Hans Kohn’s discussion, in The Idea of Nationalism: A study in Its Origins and Background 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1945), 428-437, of the differences between the rise of national identity in 
Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe.  Kohn applies the ideas of Johann Herder, who argues 
that in Central and Eastern Europe nationalism arises out of the natural language of the folk, which is 
transformed into a national consciousness (a kind of collective common sense) through the synthesis of 
folk tales, poetry, and songs into a romanticized national literature and history (not unlike the 
developmental stages of Ramus’s dialectic).  Herder points particularly to the rise of Czech nationalism 
and praises the role of Johann Comenius and his leadership of the Bohemian Brethren in this movement.  
Kohn observes that Herder’s purpose was to extend the noble ideas of the Renaissance “humanists 
principles to the folk . . . [and] to form and educate mankind to make it more human and humane.” 
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minority in the Austrian government, many Germans continued to believe that as Slavs, 
Czechs were either not capable of, or unworthy of, any political or economic power.22  
Living A Fin-de-Siecle Form of Life 
Ludwig Wittgenstein was born into Vienna’s fin-de-siecle social and cultural 
milieu in 1889.  The Wittgenstein family epitomized the rapid rise of the liberal bourgeois 
to wealth and culture during the late Habsburg Empire.  Ludwig’s grandfather, Hermann 
Christian Wittgenstein, began life as a Jew in Korbach, Hesse.  Hermann Christian’s 
father, Moses Meier Wittgenstein, worked as an agent for the house of Pyrmont-
Waldeck in the county of Wittgenstein.23  Hermann Christian began to acquire wealth 
through large-scale farming and the successful management of his real estate holdings.  
Upon moving to Vienna, many of the city's renowned musicians, including Johannes 
Brahms, were frequent visitors to his home, where they performed, taught music to the 
Wittgenstein children, and socialized with Hermann Christian's family and friends.  In 
addition, Hermann Christian was an occasional financial patron of aspiring young 
musicians.  One of these musical progenies was his wife’s nephew, the violin virtuoso 
Joseph Joachim, whom Hermann sent to study with Felix Mendelssohn.  Like the other 
newly forged bourgeoisie, the Wittgenstein home was where family and friends 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
21Janik and Toulmin, 65.  
22For an excellent example of the role of language and literature in the rise of Czech nationalism, 
see, Bruce M. Garver, The Young Czech Party 1874-1901 and the Emergence of a Multi-Party System 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). 
23McGuinness, 1-2, reports that in all likelihood Moses Mierer adopted the name of the county in 
order to comply with an 1808 edict by Jerome Bonaparte that all Jews were required to take a family 
name.  In addition, Hermann Christian was not Moses Mierer’s son’s original name, but the name he took 
upon being baptized. 
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gathered to discuss the latest literary works from across Europe and was also filled with 
some of the finest examples of the art of the period.24 
Of Hermann Christian's ten talented children, the most successful was Ludwig's 
father, Karl, who became one of the richest industrialists in Europe—Austria’s 
Rockefeller.   Unlike his other siblings, Karl was a difficult and troublesome youth.  
While the rest of Hermann Christian’s children were taught at home, Karl insisted upon 
being sent to a state gymnasium, which, in the officially Catholic Habsburg Empire, was 
run by the Church.  Karl, however, was not a good student.  He often neglected his 
studies to spend this time practicing and playing the violin.  At age 11, not long after the 
family moved to Vienna, Karl unsuccessfully ran away from home in an attempt to return 
to the family’s former home in Leipzig.   In 1864, at age 17, he purposefully got himself 
expelled from the gymnasium, one year away from receiving his certification, by writing 
a paper disputing the immortality of the soul.  Soon after Hermann Christian arranged 
for a tutor to complete his son’s studies, Karl vanished.  He reportedly spent the first two 
months hiding out in Vienna.  He eventually traveled to New York where he spent two 
years; initially he worked as a laborer and later taught music, strings and horn, as well 
as Greek, Latin, German, and mathematics at a Christian Brothers School.25   
Upon returning to Austria, Karl spent a year studying engineering at the 
Technical High School in Vienna to complete his education.  During this year he also 
worked for the State Railway.  In 1872, following a number of minor technical jobs, he 
                                                          
24McGuinness, 5-8, and Janik and Toulmin, 169-170.  The Wittgenstein’s considered Brahms to 
be a close family friend. 
25Jean Baptist de La Salle founded the Brothers of Christian Teaching in 1684 to teach the sons 
of poor families.  The Christian Brothers “charity schools” were the first successful schools opened 
specifically for poor youths.  In addition, La Salle opened the first schools for delinquents.  For a more 
complete discussion of La Salle’s career see, Edward A. Fitzpatrick, La Salle, Patron of All Teachers 
(Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1951). 
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obtained a position working as a draftsman for Paul Kupelwieser, the brother of his 
brother-in-law, constructing the Teplitz Rolling Mill.  Karl used this position to begin his 
rapid rise, becoming the leading industrialist and steel manufacturer in Austria by 
putting into practice lessons he had learned from the freewheeling capitalism practiced 
during the American Civil War.  Because he remained loyal to Paul Kupelwieser during 
a boardroom dispute, he was, in 1876, promoted to the board of directors.  A year later 
he succeeded Kupelwieser as the company’s managing director.  As the company’s 
director, Karl showed daring and an ability to make quick decisions by using his 
considerable technical knowledge to think through problems and provide solutions.  
These abilities allowed him to secure contracts over some of the most prestigious 
companies in Europe, such as Krupp and Rothschild.   
The beginning of Karl Wittgenstein’s professional career coincided with his 
beginning a family.  The same year that he went to work for the Teplitz mill, Karl married 
Leopoldine Kalmus (Poldy).  Karl and Poldy had eight children, the youngest being 
Ludwig.  Their home was a world, like both their parents, filled with music, literature, and 
art.  While Karl and Poldy participated in the liberal bourgeois practice of being 
consumers of Vienna’s aristocratic culture, their offspring embraced the younger 
generation's desire for creating a new style of culture.  Their oldest son, Hans, was an 
extremely gifted musician, who began composing at the age of four.  The next to 
youngest son, Paul, despite losing his right arm in the Great War, had a successful 
career as a pianist.  It was for Paul, in 1931, that Ravel wrote his "Concerto for the Left 
Hand."  The oldest daughter, Hermine, and the second son, Rudi, were also talented 
artists.  In addition, Hermine, along with the youngest daughter, Margaret, were 
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members of the intellectual circles and close friends with such notable artists, 
musicians, and scientists as Gustav Klimt, Gustav Mahler, Josef Labor, and Sigmund 
Freud.  Of all the children, the one who showed the least potential talent as a child was 
Ludwig.26 
When it came to his children’s education, Karl Wittgenstein did not pursue the 
approach he laid out for himself, but instead, followed the example laid out by his father.  
Rather than sending the children to a traditional state school, they were educated at 
home by a variety of nurses, governesses, and tutors.  However, those hired to teach 
the Wittgenstein children were less than competent.  By 1903, when Ludwig was 
fourteen, the situation came to an end when Ludwig and Paul’s tutor informed Karl that 
his two youngest sons were learning "nothing."  After testing the boys himself and 
finding their academic abilities wanting, and possibly troubled over the underlying 
conditions for Hans’s recent suicide, Karl decided to send the boys to school.  While 
Paul was sent to a gymnasium in Vienna, for a traditional academic education, Ludwig, 
because he was considered less academically inclined and more technically gifted, was 
sent to the K. u. K Realschule in Linz.  The Realschule taught more technically oriented 
courses in science and engineering than did the more traditional gymnasium.  
Interestingly, however, despite Karl's belief that Ludwig would be more suited to the 
Realschule’s technical curriculum, his youngest son's school grades, which were low, 
overall, revealed that he made even lower marks in his science and engineering 
                                                          
26Monk, 10-14; and McGuinness, 10-23.  It is suggested that Karl’s insistence that his older sons 
following him in the family business, rather than their artistic talents, probably contributed to both Hans 
and Rudi’s suicides.  While Rudi’s suicide is certain—poisoning himself with cyanide in a Berlin bar—
Hans’s is less so.  Like Karl, Hans abandoned his father’s plans by escaping to America.  One evening 
Hans disappeared from a boat on the Chesapeake Bay and his body was never found.  Thus, the family 
concluded that he had committed suicide.  A third son, Kurt, also committed suicide towards the end of 
the First World War after his troops refused to obey his order to advance into action. 
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courses.  McGuinness suggests that Karl's belief in young Ludwig's technical abilities 
was apparently based on a single incident.  According to family stories, ten-year-old 
Ludwig surprised everyone by constructing a working model of a sewing machine from 
wood and wire.  Not long after this incident, Karl bought his son a small wood-lathe to 
play with.27 
Generally, what young Ludwig's educational experiences illustrate, is that formal 
academic instruction at school was no more important to him than when he was taught 
informally at home.  As such, he never developed the desire exhibited by “good” 
students to learn the great quantity of knowledge that schoolwork requires.  Nor did he 
show the desire to compete academically with his classmates merely for the sake of 
competition.  Thus, Ludwig never learned to use his mind to accumulate and store the 
copious amounts of received knowledge that is the function of schooling.  Nor did he 
develop the practices of “collecting, sorting, storing, and retrieving information”28 
generally associated with classroom learning over the centuries.  Yet, despite this 
apparent lack of academic training, as an adult Ludwig possessed the ability to become 
a person of deep intellect and cultural understanding. 
Not unlike his father, Ludwig showed the ability to learn those things he needed 
to know for some immediate purpose.  He also showed a preference for learning those 
                                                          
27McGuinness, 32; Janik and Toulmin, 174-175; and Monk, 14-15.  All three works present the 
effectiveness of Wittgenstein's education differently, confusing somewhat the issues involved.  While 
McGuinness views both his education at home and at school negatively, Janik and Toulmin present both 
in a more positive light.  Monk appears neutral on Wittgenstein's home schooling, but concurs with 
McGuinness on young Ludwig's school training.  However, Monk attributes Ludwig's low scores to his 
being homesick and his inability to fit in with the school’s middle and working class students.  
Furthermore, although McGuinness, as well as Janik and Toulmin, state a case for young Ludwig's 
technical talents, Monk portrays Wittgenstein's apparent interest in technical subjects as merely his 
unwillingness to go against his father's desires and what the family generally expected.  Monk reports that 
as an adult, Wittgenstein "privately regarded himself as having 'neither taste nor talent' for engineering" 
and his youthful willingness to always do what was expected as a character flaw. 
28McGuinness, 44. 
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things that he could teach himself.  One of his greatest talents lay in his capacity to 
concentrate on a particular problem, and he was particularly adept at mastering the 
knowledge and techniques required for problem solving.  To accomplish this, however, 
required Wittgenstein to become fully engaged in finding the solution, which thereby 
compelled him to abandon all other activities.  Through this practice of focused 
concentration, Wittgenstein developed the ability to explore every possible combination 
for solving any given problem.  McGuinness suggests that these habits of thought 
provided Wittgenstein with the ability to study “problems in fundamental and concrete 
terms,” thus enabling him “to become involved with the most abstract of problems.”29 
Wittgenstein’s “habits of thought,” as described by McGuinness—the ability to 
work through problems for himself; to learn on his own; and to focus on a single 
problem until a solution is found—closely resembles Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
concept of meaning-in-use.  As the activity of applying language to a given situation, 
meaning-in-use presents knowing—learning and understanding—as an active process 
that requires the knower to exert effort.  The habits of thought Wittgenstein developed in 
his youth offer a possible explanation for his later belief that teaching, and thereby 
learning, should be seen as an indirect exercise in a language-game that alters the 
riverbed of one’s existence.  Teaching as the direct conveyance of existing knowledge 
requires the student to remain a passive spectator, rather than one engaged in a form of 
life.  However, by striving to apply the language one is learning, meaning can only be 
                                                          
29McGuinness, 46; and Janik and Toulmin, 174, all are in agreement that Wittgenstein's 
educational experiences fostered his remarkable intellectual abilities. 
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acquired indirectly because a language-game is altered by one’s effort to understand 
the words being spoken.30   
If Wittgenstein's investigation of how a child learns language is reconceived as an 
autobiographically situated language-game, then, applying William Pinar's concept of currere, the various 
practices and activities that constitute the forms of life from which these idiosyncratic learning habits 
emerge may be "seen" as a form of curriculum.  Currere allows a teacher or student to reconceptualize 
curriculum as one’s biographically situated experiences while engaging schooling's pre-determined 
course of study.  In addition, because the school curriculum is situated within a larger social and cultural 
context, currere attempts to re-embody an individual's experiences outside the classroom into one’s 
understanding of curriculum.  Likewise, the various remarks about teaching, learning, and knowing that 
Wittgenstein used in his later philosophy to critique both epistemology and logic's formal methodology 
imply a concept of curriculum that expands pedagogical practices to include the emergent realm found in 
the nascent complexity of one’s everyday language-games.  Finally, Wittgenstein's biographically situated 
idiosyncratic habits of thought appear surprisingly similar to the "progressive" curriculum of the Austrian 
School Reform Movement, in which Wittgenstein taught elementary school. 
Wittgenstein’s Pedagogy 
In 1919, Wittgenstein entered the Austrian School Reform Movement’s teacher 
training institute, Lehrerbildungsanhalt, which was directed by the Social Democrat 
educational reformer, Otto Glockel.  Glockel had a long history of opposing the 
Habsburg’s educational system and its “drill school” curriculum.31  However, until the fall 
of the Habsburg Empire at the end of the First World War, neither he nor other 
                                                          
30As an effortful act, Wittgenstein’s meaning-in-use resembles Frederic Bartlett’s concept of 
knowing as “effort after meaning,” in Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology 
(Cambridge: The University press, 1932), 20.  Bartlett was C. S. Myers’s assistant in the Cambridge 
psychology lab in1912 when Wittgenstein and Myers performed experiments in the psychology of music. 
31Charles A. Gulick, Austria: From Habsburg to Hitler, vol. I, “Labor’s Workshop of democracy,” 
Foreword by Walther Federn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948), 544, opens the chapter on 
Austrian education between the two World Wars stating, “’Drill schools!’ ‘Beating schools!’  Such were the 
epithets flung at the schools of imperial Austria by working class parents and middle-class educational 
reformers in protest against the mechanical instruction and severe discipline of which the children were 
the victims.”  
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reformers enjoyed much political or educational success.  With the beginning of the 
"new," post-Habsburg Austria, Glockel and the school reformers quickly gained control 
of the country’s education system and replaced its traditional academic curriculum with 
an “Arbeitsschule” or “work school” curriculum.32 
The Reform Movement’s pedagogical goal was the elimination of all rote learning 
and passive storing of facts.  Instead, the reformers wanted students to develop all of 
their capabilities by participating in learning activities that required them to puzzle 
through problems and resolve complex questions with as little involvement from the 
teacher as possible.  The leaders of the reform movement, in particular the Social 
Democrats, believed that “their” new Austria needed students who could develop into 
independent and original thinkers.33  The three key curriculum concepts most often 
associated with the Austrian school reforms were: “self activity, use of local 
environment, and integrated instruction.”  For Social Democrat educators, like Glockel, 
“self activity” referred to something more than mere manual or hands-on learning and 
industrial training.  “Self activity” required students to become “active participants" in the 
planning of their own lessons including the organizing of their own learning materials 
and activities.  This was especially true when students engaged in traditional learning 
practices.  Furthermore, the term Arbeit emphasized the concept of craftsmanship, 
                                                          
32Bartley, 97; and Ernst Papanek, The Austrian School Reform: Its Bases, Principles and 
Development – The Twenty Years Between the Two World Wars, Forward by Hans Mandl, Introduction 
by William H. Kilpatrick (New York: Frederick Fell, Inc., 1962), 49-59 & 66-68; and Gulick, 553-554. 
Papanek reports that the Austrian Reform Movement adopted the “work school” concept from the 
curriculum developed in Germany by Georg Kerschenstelner.  American educators, John Dewey, William 
H. Kilpatrick and G. Stanley Hall, as well as, Sweden’s Ellen Key and Switzerland’s Jean Piaget also 
influenced the Austrian reform curriculum. 
33Bartley, 80.  As discussed in Chapter Three, above, note 22, Bartley reports that Glockel’s 
School Reform curriculum was strongly influenced by the psychologist, Karl Buhler, and his wife, the child 
psychologist, Charlotte.  See also, Papanek, 68-75.  According to Papanek, the reform curriculum was 
not only influenced by the Buhlers, but also by Austrians Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, Edwin Lazar, and 
Siegfried Bernfeld, to name a few. 
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which the Social Democrats viewed as a pedagogically important concept to their 
general political strategy of acquainting Austria's middle-class children with the real 
intellectual demands and creative skills needed to perform industrial labor.  For 
example, the curriculum called for students to construct their own spelling lists as they 
engaged in various reading and writing activities.  The traditional “drill school” 
curriculum required students to memorize the spelling words and grammar rules 
dictated to them by the teacher.  Instead, the school reform curriculum encouraged 
children to discover the rules of spelling and grammar for themselves.  Initially students 
were allowed to write stories without paying attention to either spelling or grammar.  It 
was only after students had acquired some writing ability that spelling and grammar 
rules were introduced for the students to use to correct the mistakes in their writing.34 
To incorporate the local environment into the curriculum, teachers organized their 
lessons by incorporating village life or the surrounding countryside familiar to their 
students.  The reformers believed that education should begin with “the unceasing 
torrent of ‘why’s’ and ‘how’s’ which flow from the tongues of children concerning”35 their 
everyday lives.  From the immediate surroundings of the students, the teacher would 
expand their lessons to include broader intellectual areas.  For example, since most 
students entered school speaking a local German dialect, the reform curriculum used 
these dialects as the basis for teaching language and grammar.  
Because the Austrian reform curriculum encompassed learning from “the 
environment and human life (Heimat-und Lebenskunde),” the reform principle of 
integrated instruction (Gesamtunterricht) was closely related to the other two principles 
                                                          
34Gulick, 560; and Bartley, 79 & 96.   
35Gulick, 561. 
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of self-activity and using the local surroundings.  While the reformers laid out broad 
goals for the kinds of content and techniques students needed to be taught, the teacher 
was granted tremendous “latitude” in preparing how and when these goals would be 
introduced to the students.  In the elementary grades subjects were not taught as 
distinct disciplines, thus no subject-centered curricula were ever formulated.  Nor were 
teachers required to establish specific periods of instruction for “reading” or “spelling.”  
As such, learning activities were organized around particular topics.  Some topics were 
taught for a day or two, while other ran for two to three weeks.36 
Bartley observes that the aims of the reform curriculum were admirable and 
worked surprisingly well.  The Reform Movement’s success “caught the attention of 
educators throughout the world.”37  However, in the social and political atmosphere that 
existed in Austria between the two world wars, the country's educational reforms, 
despite being supported by diverse aspects of the Austrian society, became too closely 
associated with the Social Democrats’ political agenda.  Many conservative politicians 
viewed the School Reform Movement as “less a program of educational reform, and 
more a program for dissent and revolution.”38  While Wittgenstein did not fully support 
the reform movement’s political program, and often poked fun at their slogans and 
projects, he nevertheless threw all his energy and imagination into what evolved into a 
                                                          
36Gulick, 561; and Bartley, 94-95. 
37Bartley, 76.  See also, William H. Kilpatrick, Introduction to The Austrian School Reform 
Movement, v-vii; May Hollis Siegl, Reform of Elementary Education in Austria (New York, 1933); and 
Robert Dottrens, The New Education in Austria, ed. Paul L. Dengler (New York, 1930). 
38Monk, 188-189.  The movement's political ties to the Social Democrats meant that as 
Conservative forces regained political power in the new Austria, the school reform movement eventually 
became limited to the areas in and immediately around Vienna.  Such ideological and geographical 
distinctions in the administration of educational programs may not have been so absolute.  Gulick, 571, 
reports that a “curriculum especially adapted” to the Social Democrats school reforms was “tried out in 
rural elementary schools during 1926-27.”  Siegl, 21, cited in Gulick, 555, reports that despite the 
reformers’ best social democratic intentions, rather than mitigating the class distinctions produced by the 
former Habsburg social structure, the reform curriculum tended to maintain them. 
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six-year-long effort to “get the peasantry out of the muck.”  Bartley contends that this 
simple statement fully embodied Wittgenstein's educational views as well as his goals.39 
Unlike Glockel, as well as the other leaders of the reform movement, many of 
whom provided Wittgenstein with constant and enthusiastic support, Wittgenstein did 
not believe education provided a social panacea.  Thus, Wittgenstein threw himself into 
the teaching the peasants’ children not to “improve their external conditions.”  Instead, 
he wanted to help them become better human beings by improving them intellectually.  
Wittgenstein did not teach his students mathematics, science, German literature, and 
art, merely to provide them a way out of their rural poverty or with the goal of preparing 
them for a "better" life in the city.  Instead, as Bartley reports, “He wanted to impress 
upon them the value of intellectual attainment for its own sake.”40   
However, because his teaching practices closely adhered to the reform 
movement’s curriculum principles, Wittgenstein’s elementary school teaching could be 
described as being thoroughly progressive.  He encouraged his students to engage in 
all sorts of activities that went well beyond the traditional curriculum’s routines of 
mathematical and grammatical drill.  For example, his students learned zoology by 
assembling the skeletons of cats and other small animals.  His students learned 
principles of physics by constructing models of steam engines, pulleys, and other 
mechanical instruments.  Many of the educators who saw these models claimed that 
they were better constructed than those models the school system could have 
                                                          
39Bartley, 80 & 85.  In addition, Janik and Toulmin, 243-245, suggest that Wittgenstein’s 
skepticism of the political agenda of the School Reform Movement was a reflection of his “ahistorical” 
(anti-progressive), and therefore apolitical ethical approach.  Under the influence of Oswald Spengler’s 
Decline of the West, throughout his philosophical works Wittgenstein maintained his opposition to the 




purchased, if it had the money to do so.  To study astronomy, Wittgenstein took his 
students on excursions into the surrounding hills to gaze at the night sky and to discuss 
what they observed.  They studied botany and geology by identifying plants and rocks 
during walks through the countryside, and learned about architecture and art during 
overnight visits to Vienna.41   
One of the best examples of how Wittgenstein’s teaching practices paralleled the 
reform movement's progressive curriculum is the wordbook he had his students 
compose, which was published in 1926 under the title, Worterbuck fur Volksschulen, by 
the Ministry of Education.  Beginning in his first year of teaching, Wittgenstein instructed 
his students to create their own word lists from which they selected words to be entered 
into a general class wordbook.  He then made the general wordbook available for all his 
students to use during class. Eventually the wordbook grew into a compilation of all the 
words entered over his years of teaching.  Many of the words were drawn from the local 
German dialect spoken by the students.  Wittgenstein then adapted these words for use 
to teach spelling and grammar. 
Bartely reports that in the preface Wittgenstein prepared for the published edition 
of the Worterbuck, he explained how he adapted the words from the local dialect for 
teaching the use of language.  In addition, he used the preface to claim that the official 
language textbooks provided by the Education Ministry for teaching spelling and 
grammar were "poorly adapted" for this purpose.  The new wordbooks approved for 
teaching language were not much different from the ones previously used for the 
                                                          
41Bartley, 94-95; and Monk, 195.  As Monk points out, an integrated curriculum was so important 
to Wittgenstein’s concept of learning that at the beginning of 1924, he lasted only thirty days during his 
one attempt to teach secondary school (middle school in the Austrian system), leaving for this very 
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traditional curriculum.  Wittgenstein contended that these official texts were "littered with 
foreign words [meaning words from other parts of Germany] that peasant children did 
not use."  In addition, the students had great difficulty comprehending the examples 
used to teach grammar because the grammar used by these texts was too "literary" and 
confusing.  
What made the wordbook Wittgenstein and his students created more conducive 
for the teaching and learning of spelling and grammar was that it included only those 
words students would typically encounter and, thereby use during their daily activities.  
Wittgenstein believed that having them compile a word list while engaging in their daily 
learning activities taught his students (indirectly) to be aware of “the ambiguities of their 
own use of language.”42  By becoming aware of the complexities embedded within their 
own dialect, students learned better how to apply the rules of spelling and grammar. 
Wittgenstein believed that providing his students with an integrated curriculum, 
which does not seek to sort out and simplify the complex relationships among the 
concepts, indirectly teaches an alternative “way of seeing” that opposes the 
methodological way students are traditionally taught to learn and think about the world.  
He maintains that the purpose of teaching is to help students "see" the world 
synoptically rather than analytically, thereby teaching them to connect familiar concepts 
in new and varying ways.  In so doing, students could begin to understand that “the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reason.  See also similar examples of topical lessons integrated around similar excursions in Gulick, 562; 
Dottrens, 72-87; and Siegl, 57-112. 
42Bartley, 96-98.  See also, Monk’s account, 225-228.  Both Bartley and Monk suggest that 
Wittgenstein’s use the local dialect of his students to teach spelling and grammar made his Wordbook 
unique.  However, since using the local dialect to teach the formal use of the German language was a key 
aspect of the Austrian reform curriculum, as Gulick reported above, then all that appears to be unique 
about the Worterbuck was that Wittgenstein took the time to compile and maintain a book of the words 
used by his “peasant” students, as well as thinking to have it published for other teachers to use (which 
defeats the initial purpose of having students compile their own lists).  
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applicability or inapplicability of some actual category or concept depends upon the 
practices of human decisions,” rather than some pre-determined rational structure.43  
Thus, students are able to learn how to "see" (understand) the world synoptically only 
by learning to employ the meaning of a word in their everyday use of language.   
By suggesting that concepts are connected synoptically through the way a 
language is used in a given situation, Wittgenstein is situating meaning and 
understanding within the nuances expressed in people's everyday conversations which 
resist being transcribed into a theoretical discourse's visually oriented frame of 
reference.  Thus, his synoptic "way of seeing," articulated by meaning-in-use, recovers 
the sonorous relationship between our concept of meaning and speaking a language 
that blurs the analytical distinctions presented by diagramming logical categories.   The 
sonorous quality of speech blends concepts together into a continuous flow of sound 
that requires us to listen, judge, and interpret all that one hears.  As an alternate way of 
"seeing" that asks teachers and students to listen for the sonorous relationships among 
concepts, meaning-in-use offers curriculum theorists the kind of synchronic investigation 
that opens all aspects of our educational practices to investigation.44  Wittgenstein 
                                                          
43Janik and Toulmin, 229. 
44See Ong’s discussion, in Rhetoric, Romance and Technology, 232-236, of how the 
development of associationist psychology in the seventeenth century completed the transformation of 
Western thought, begun by Ramus’s method of diagramming knowledge, “away from the auditory . . . 
[and] sonorous world . . . of antiquity . . . to the visual [and] . . . observational world of modern science.”  
Ong contends, however, that meaning and knowing can no longer be returned to the ancients' auditory 
world of orality.  As Wittgenstein's use of the metaphor of "seeing" for thinking suggests, because the 
modern world is so embedded in a visual frame of reference any endeavor to return reason to orality is 
ultimately framed within the visual form.  Ong describes the phenomenon of resituating modernity's visual 
frame within an auditory pattern as "secondary orality."  See also J. C. Nyiri, "Wittgenstein and the 
Problem of Machine Consciousness," in Wittgenstein in Focus—Im Brennpnkt: Wittgenstein, eds. Brian 
McGuinness and Rudolf Haller (Atlanta: Rodopi, 1989), in which he suggests that Wittgenstein's 
meaning-in-use represents language’s transformation from literacy to Ong's concept of a secondary 
orality. 
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suggests that any research that "does not include a complete investigation of all aspects 
of our practices while in use is either misdirected or at best inadequate."45 
Educational Uses of Wittgenstein’s  
Pedagogical Perspective  
 
 Most scholars studying Wittgenstein, including those in the field of education, 
have either minimized or chosen to pass over the role his elementary school teaching 
experience may have played in the development of his later philosophy.  Nor has 
anyone, including McGuinness, suggested that a relationship may exist between 
Wittgenstein’s informal educational practices and those activities that contributed to his 
“habits of mind” and his later philosophical ideas.  Furthermore, to date, Wittgenstein's 
philosophy has had little impact on the field of curriculum.46  Attempts by curriculum 
theorists over the last quarter century to reconceptualize the field within more dynamic 
and socially situated philosophical and theoretical frameworks have tended to 
overlooked Wittgenstein's later philosophy.47  One possible reason has been that, until 
recently, the philosophers of education who have studied Wittgenstein's ideas have 
worked within the logical-empiricist or logical-positivist schools of analytical philosophy, 
which are perspectives that curriculum theorists have been critiquing.  Another possible 
reason is that Wittgenstein's later philosophy criticizes the use of theoretical discourses 
to analyze the meaning of human activity.  As such, using Wittgenstein's philosophy 
would appear to be contradictory to the whole notion of a curriculum theory.  
Furthermore, his anti-theoretical perspective makes it difficult to classify Wittgenstein's 
                                                          
45On Certainty, 61.  See also, Susan B. Brill, Wittgenstein and Critical Theory: Beyond 
Postmodernism and Toward Descriptive Investigations (Athens, OH: University of Ohio Press, 1995), 105. 
46Peters and Marshall, 179-184. 
47Pinar, et al., for example, cite only a single reference for Wittgenstein, which they place within 
the broader framework of curriculum as phenomenological text.  Dwayne Huebner does mention 
Wittgenstein, but only in passing.   
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later work within the broader philosophical and theoretical perspectives that curriculum 
theorists draw upon to critique the field. 
Within the last few years, however, a small number of educational philosophers 
and curriculum theorists have begun using Wittgenstein’s later works in their effort to 
transform education beyond the Cartesian epistemology that undergirds modern 
theories of education.48  These scholars want to undermine rationalism's methodological 
hold on educational practices in the hope of finding an alternative to the behavioral and 
information processing theories of mind that dominate the modern concept of 
curriculum. They believe that Wittgenstein's radical anti-foundational approach offers 
education a new perspective for understanding both the residual problems that continue 
to confront teachers in the classroom, such as motivating students to learn, and the new 
challenges facing education, such as teaching in diverse, multicultural classrooms.49   
Three scholars in particular use Wittgenstein's later philosophy, strongly and 
directly, to reconceive curriculum and teaching practices.  David Jardine50 uses 
Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances to suggest a new way of understanding 
                                                          
48See Stephen S. Triche and John St. Julien, "Reconceptualizing Educational Psychology: A 
Pragmatic Approach to Developments in Cognitive Science," in Philosophical of Education (Urbana, IL: A 
Publication of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1996), contend that the later Wittgenstein and John 
Dewey possess a pragmatic kinship that can be used to understand problems within the field of situated 
cognition.  Recently, Wittgenstein's later philosophy has been used within the emerging discourse of 
“Queer Theory” and its desire for a queering of our conventional understandings of the social 
relationships that constitute the curriculum.  See essays by James T. Sears  “A Generational and 
Theoretical Analysis of Culture and Male (Homo)Sexuality,” and Kenn Gardner Honeychurch “Carnal 
Knowledge: Re-Searching (through) the Sexual Body,” in Queer Theory in Education, ed. William F. Pinar 
(Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, Associates,1998); and Suzanne de Castell and Mary Bryson, in 
Curriculum: Toward New Identities, ed. William F. Pinar (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998). 
49Michael Peters, “Philosophy and Education: ‘After’ Wittgenstein,“ Philosophy of Education: 
Accepting Wittgenstein’s Challenge, ed. Paul Smeyers and James Marshall (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1995), 189-190, describes ways in which philosophers like Jean-Francois Lyotard and 
Richard Rorty use Wittgenstein’s anti-foundational arguments to undermine the Cartesian-Kantian 
rational tradition. Peters and Marshall, 133-151, expand upon the discussion of Wittgenstein’s influence 
on Rorty’s philosophical thought found in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.  See also, Alven Neiman, 
in “Wittgenstein, Liberal Education, Philosophy,” in Philosophy of Education: Accepting Wittgenstein’s 
Challenge, 85. 
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how human beings learn about the world.  C. J. B. MacMillan51 suggests that 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers educators "a source of insights into the theoretical 
and practical problems" teachers face getting students to learn.  M. Jayne Fleener52 
believes that the language-games students use effect what and how they learn.   
Jardine suggests that Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblances offers the 
field of curriculum a relationship of kinship that unites modernity's dualism by disrupting 
education's dependence upon Cartesian rationalism's “univocal” methodology, and its 
representation of the world as a pre-defined, distinct, and self-existent object.  Instead, 
the kinship of meaning found among varying language-games presents knowing as a 
constant integration of various “multivocal” activities that continuously aid human beings 
in “sustaining relationships of kind,” rather than as the practice of sorting concepts into 
distinct categories.53   
By applying Wittgenstein's philosophy to pedagogical practices, Jardine believes 
that the curriculum can no longer subsist as a static form of knowledge.  Instead, 
teaching would be understood as the practice of initiating a child into dynamic forms of 
life and their related language-games.  As such, Wittgenstein frees education from the 
rational, step-by-step procedure of the information processing model that present simply 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
50David Jardine, Speaking with a Boneless Tongue (Bragg Creek, Alberta: Makyo Press, 1992). 
51C. J. B. MacMillan, “How Not to Learn: Reflections on Wittgenstein and Learning,” in Philosophy 
of Education: Accepting Wittgenstein’s Challenge.  
52M. Jayne Fleener, Andy Carter and Stacey Reed, “Language-Games in the Mathematics 
Classroom: Learning a Way of Life,” in Journal of Curriculum Theorizing (Pending).  See also Fleener’s, 
Curriculum Dynamics (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), Chapter Six. 
53Jardine, Boneless Tongue, 120.  Shotter, 293-294, also echoes Jardine, stating that 
Wittgenstein offers a “radically different way of grasping our continuously changing sense of living 
relatedness, both to each other and to the larger world around us.” 
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arranged bits of knowledge as the building blocks of pedagogical practice and, thereby, 
of intellectual life.54 
As a kinship of human practices, Jardine proposes that forms of life present 
education as an ecological tale (the interrelationship of human beings, their culture, and 
their environment) in which everything and everyone is intimately related within the 
living history of all human beings.  He accepts the Wittgensteinian notion that forms of 
life are both social and biological patterns of human existence that offers an ecological 
breakthrough by furnishing a dynamic shift in our understanding of how human beings 
live in the world that rejects logic's categorical scaffolding.  Instead, forms of life situate 
meaning as a “nest of interweaving, ambiguous kinship” that no longer isolates human 
thinking within the individual separated from the material world.55 
Moreover, Jardine observes that Wittgenstein's later philosophical ideas offer 
educators a multivocal perspective for understanding pedagogical practices that 
coincides with the postmodern rejection of meta-discourses.  As such, teaching 
practices would no longer be required to present knowledge as being that which is only 
textually inscribed as an internal mental object and as the symbolic projection of a 
                                                          
54Jardine's, Boneless Tongue, 21, position is supported by Paul Smeyers, “Initiation and New 
ness in Education and Childrearing,” in Philosophy of Education: Accepting Wittgenstein’s Challenge, 
113, who suggests a view sympathetic to Jardine’s, stating “the knowledge acquired at school is 
senseless so long as it does not belong to the ‘living child.’”  See also, Paul Smeyers and James 
Marshall, “The Wittgensteinian Frame of Reference and Philosophy of Education at the End of the 
Twentieth Century,” in Philosophy of Education: Accepting Wittgenstein’s Challenge, 3, who state that as 
a form of life, the curriculum can be reconceived as one’s "dynamic initiation into a form of life.”   
55Interestingly, Jardine’s description of Wittgenstein’s forms of life echoes Bartlett’s explanation of 
the relationship between psychology and culture should be conceived, in Psychology and Primitive 
Culture (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923), that Bartlett adopts from C. S. Myers and W. H. Rivers. 
Jardine’s views resemble concepts Wittgenstein presents in Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, trans. 
A. C. Miles and revised by Rush Rhees (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, Inc., 1979), which 
Jardine does not cite.  Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough is a compilation of notes from 
his first seminar at Cambridge following his return in 1930.  This all further implies some kind of 
connection between Bartlett and Wittgenstein’s work, probably through Myers’s work on social 
psychology, that to date scholars appear not to have explored.   
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formally defined certainty.56  Using Wittgenstein’s concepts, Jardine repositions 
pedagogy as a form of postmodern anthropology that resituates teaching as a practice 
of seeing the learning activities of students in ecological terms.57  Resituating pedagogy 
as a postmodern anthropology asks educators to recognize the complexities of 
students’ current situations.  Jardine maintains that while “asking the young into the 
world is the task of pedagogy,” the oppressive authority imposed by the school 
curriculum has routed the intimacy that is associated with educating children into a form 
of life.  He believes that by applying the multivocity of language-games and family 
resemblances to education, repositions pedagogy in the hope of recovering “schooling’s 
lost intimacy” by restoring an attitude of “kind-ness and generosity” to the practices of 
teaching the young.58   
MacMillan proposes that those who take the challenge of teaching seriously need 
to begin to pay attention to the “pedagogical utterances” being used in the classroom.  
In part, teachers need to recognize the conceptual relationship that exists between the 
language employed by teachers as well as students’ everyday use of language.  In 
other words, MacMillan believes that a student’s ability to learn is intimately related to 
                                                          
56Jardine, Boneless Tongue, 119-122.  Similar to Jardine, Peters, 192-194, suggests that 
Wittgenstein's thought represents a historical “shift away from a single, universal, and formal model of 
rationality motivated by logical considerations, to an informal, historical, and sociological model that more 
closely approximate the kind of “rationality” employed by agents in their practices and in their active 
construction of social reality.” Peters further observes that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a cultural critique 
that parallels some of the strains of thought associated with "post-structuralism’s" critique of modernity.  
For a discussion on the differences between Wittgenstein’s late work and poststructuralism, see Marjorie 
Perloff, Wittgenstein's Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1996); and Henry Stanten, Wittgenstein and Derrida (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1986). 
57Jardine draws the notion of a postmodern anthropology from James Clifford’s, “Introduction: 
Partial Truths,” in Writing Culture. 
58Jardine, Boneless Tongue, 21. See also, Peters and Marshall, 175, who suggest that the style 
of Wittgenstein's later philosophical is "essentially pedagogical" because it attempts “to shift our thinking” 
by “helping us escape the picture [of education] that holds us captive." 
 162
the ability of a teacher’s pedagogical utterances to translate a student’s everyday 
concepts into the concepts presented by the curriculum discourse.  
MacMillan maintains that Wittgenstein's philosophy of language helps educators 
recognize that students learn a tremendous amount of knowledge simply on trust.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, above, Wittgenstein suggests that beginning with the first 
day of school, students learn many things merely by acknowledging the language-
games being used in the classroom as they listen to and accept what the teacher or 
textbook says.  Students’ then mimic and parrot the words and gestures they hear and 
see in the same way that a toddler first begins to learn to speak.  In other words, as 
Wittgenstein asserts, by imagining and trying to use a language-game, a student is 
accepting the existence of a form of life.  The student does not ask the teacher to prove 
anything.  As such, learning a form of life would be impossible for students who are 
unable to first accept the language-game into which they are being initiated. 
MacMillan maintains that the relationship between learning and the ability of 
students to accept (acknowledge) the existence of a language-game is one that 
educators have not readily acknowledged themselves.  As Wittgenstein points out, a 
student’s failure to learn cannot be related to his or her decision to doubt something’s 
existence.  Doubting requires that one already knows something about what one 
doubts.  As such, when a student fails to learn, it is not because the student doubts 
something’s validity.  Instead, a student’s failure to learn is due to the student’s inability 
to trust the language-game being used in the classroom.59   Thus, the ability of students 
to learn what is being taught requires that they first accept what either the teacher or the 
curriculum is saying. 
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 Fleener, Carter, and Reeder offer a position that closely resembles the one 
presented by MacMillan.  They suggest that, in order to discover why students 
sometimes fail to learn, educators should begin investigating the ways both teachers 
and students use language in a classroom.  They propose that the curriculum should be 
viewed as an on-going conversation emerging from a classroom situation.  Following 
Wittgenstein, the authors view language as a dynamic social activity out of which the 
meanings of words emerge from the way people use language in everyday social 
contexts.  Similar to Jardine and Michael Peters, Fleener, et al maintain that human 
knowing is socially situated within a form of life.  As they explain: 
From the perspective of language-games as communication networks within 
social contexts, we are interested in exploring how mathematical meaning is 
conveyed and transformed through conversations during a problem-solving 
episode.  We explore the language-games of a particular mathematics classroom 
in order to better understand how students construct meanings about fractions.60 
 
 In order to understand better these patterns of meaning, the authors use 
Genova's three notions of play, which she derives from Wittgenstein’s language-games, 
to explore the way students apply the language of an elementary math curriculum.  The 
study discusses four African-American female 3rd graders and their attempts to 
understand and solve a word problem involving the use of fractions.61  Fleener, et al 
observe that initially the students begin trying to solve the problem by initiating a variety 
of conversations relating to the problem.  In so doing, the students disrupt the sequence 
of learning activities intended by the teacher.  Consequently, in her attempt to manage 
her students and to keep them focused on her planned outcomes, the teacher quickly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
59On Certainty, no. 283. 
60Fleener, et al, 7.  See also Genova, 174. 
61The Pizza Problem: Amber, Mario, Denise, and Jason have a pizza they want to share fairly.  
How much pizza would each one get? 
 164
steps in to halt the group’s attempts at generating conversations to help each other 
understand the problem.  Instead, the teacher refocuses her students by engaging each 
of them individually in a question-answer dialogue. 
Fleener, et al contend that in an effort to solve the word problem, the students 
were engaging in what they describe as a kind of dynamic word play with the language 
of the problem.  However, by constantly interrupting their conversations, in an attempt to 
keep the students on task, the teacher was depriving them of a possibility for 
understanding the problem from their own everyday context.  Responding to the 
teacher’s questioning, two students eventually give the right answer and a third shows 
that she appears to understand the principles concerning fractions that the problem 
asked for.  In the case of the fourth student, she not only fails to answer correctly, but 
because her repeated answer consistently “misused” the fractional term "one half," it 
appears she failed to learn much about fractions from the lesson.  While the teacher 
responds to the student’s consistently wrong answer by employing the proper fractional 
term, she never once stops to ask the student to explain how she was attempting to use 
the term "one half."  
Fleener, Carter, and Reeder propose that Wittgenstein's notion of games can 
"serve as tools for analyzing the interactions of classroom language,” which might help 
educators to understand better why the fourth student is the only one who fails to learn 
how to use properly the fractional terms.  They claim that the students and teacher were 
engaging in three levels of play, which the authors describe as “playing-with,” “playing-
at,” and “playing-in” language.  In the case of "playing-with" a language, students are 
allowed “to stretch or extend meanings through analogy” similar to the way “children 
 165
‘suppose’ or ‘imagine’ that a toy can do certain things” it is not designed for.  The 
authors suggest that, when students play-with language, as in the case of the group’s 
initial conversations about the problem, students are not bound to a particular script or 
procedure for understanding the meanings of words.  Instead, by playing-with words, 
they are composing their own meanings in imaginative and varying ways.   
 When “playing-at” a language, the authors suggest that students are attempting 
to use the words in an appropriate or conventional manner by endeavoring to follow 
correctly the rules of operation for a particular language.  Despite trying to follow the 
rules students’ playing-at a language may make mistakes.  However, when playing-at a 
language little is learned because new understandings do not emerge from students’ 
conventional application of the rules for the particular language-game being employed.  
Nor are new meanings allowed to emerge from the mistakes students make when 
employing mathematical terms because there is no imaginative interplay between the 
student and the mistaken application of the rules in a conventional language-game.62  
 Finally, the authors contend that the activity of students’ “playing-in” a language 
is the same as their appropriately following a script.  As such, playing-in a language is 
the practice of correctly using the rules of the language where the meanings adhere to 
their conventional use.  Thus, students playing-in a language, are engaging in a 
performative activity by which their application of the words are measured against the 
established rules of practice.  As the authors suggest, “In the traditional mathematics 
classroom, ‘playing-in’ the mathematics discourse by following the script determines the 
student’s level of success.”   
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 The school curriculum and its component lesson plans, as a set of standards for 
behavior, asks students to play-in only the formal, established script of the subject 
disciplines or the behavioral standards used to measure "effective teaching."  Teachers 
are generally held accountable for how well students can play-in the language of the 
pre-determined school curriculum.  A teacher is expected only to engineer the leaning 
activities of the students, thereby ensuring that they can correctly follow the curriculum's 
instructional blueprint. 
In the pedagogical situation presented by Fleener, Carter, and Reeder, the 
teacher and students alternate among all three levels of play.  In their initial attempts at 
constructing conversations concerning fractions and pizza the students endeavor to 
understand the word problem's language by playing-with its particular use of words.  In 
so doing, the students attempt to explore the meanings of words; construct additional 
contexts in which fractional terms are used; and generate ideas from their own 
experiences associated with the problem.  The teacher, however, playing-in her role as 
curriculum engineer or decision-maker, does not allow the group to move away from her 
lesson's planned objectives, by consistently working to bring each student back from 
playing-with to playing-at the mathematical language of fractions.  When left alone, the 
students attempt to return to playing-with the problem, especially in their attempts to 
help each other understand the use of fractional terms.  However, as the teacher 
questions each student in succession, the group slowly abandons its attempt to help the 
one student find the right answer by playing-with the problem.  Instead, they all opt for 
pleasing the teacher by playing-at the mathematical language of fractions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 62Fleener, et al, 6.  While I believe that Genova presents a dynamic sense of play for all three 
levels, not just for playing-with, the way in which the authors apply these three notions of play do provide 
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 What this classroom situation shows is that not only are the students expected to 
adopt the discipline’s mathematical language, but that the meaning of mathematical 
words also depends upon the students adopting the teacher’s particular use of the 
language in the classroom.  Because she focuses only on the conventional use of the 
language of fractions, the teacher either misses or chooses to ignore the other 
language-games that the students endeavor to play-with while trying to understand the 
problem.  In so doing, the teacher is unable to hear and imagine the various difficulties 
the students are having as they try to solve the problem.  As the authors observe, the 
difficulties exhibited by the students may not be so much mathematical, but the difficulty 
understanding the language-game used by the mathematical word problem.63  
The pedagogical problem presented by Fleener, Carter, and Reeder is closely 
related to the question MacMillan raises of why students sometimes fail to learn.  
Apparently, the student unable to answer the pizza problem correctly fails to do so not 
because she is unable to perform the activity of dividing a pizza, but because she was 
unable to learn the formal language of fractions.  However, one could suggest that her 
incorrect answer does show that she is attempting to play-at the mathematical 
language.  For some reason, she appears unable to accept or acknowledge the 
mathematical language scripted in the lesson plan.  Equally important, however, is the 
teacher’s apparent failure to acknowledge the highly contextualized language within 
which the group was engaging to help each other understand the problem.  What 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy suggests is that when a student fails to learn or when a 
teacher does not attempt to listen for the alternative language-games a student may be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
a useful way to investigate the kinds of pedagogical problems they are trying to explore. 
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applying to a particular situation, then the pedagogical problem facing educators is not a 
methodological one related to an incorrect way of thinking, but is, instead, a conceptual 
problem related to a teacher’s inability to "see" the ways in which students are using 
language.   
What is missing when a person is unable to experience a variation in a word's 
meaning is not a lack of knowledge, but the ability to conceive of the language-game 
being used.64  This is a conceptual problem that returns us to the connection that 
Wittgenstein identifies between meaning-in-use and the practice of teaching.  The case 
presented by Fleener, et al, suggests that, when students are allowed only to play-in or 
play-at a curricular language-game, the teacher is assuming that a direct cause-effect 
relationship between teaching and learning is constructed by the curriculum's 
discourse—Ramus’s methodological language-game.   This belief does not allow a 
teacher to imagine the applicability to the lesson's pre-planned outcomes of any other 
language-game that the students may need to use to help them understand the 
concepts being taught.  If the teacher in this study had understood that teaching is an 
indirect relationship between her and her students, then she may have been more open 
to the everyday language her students used to help each other understand fractions by 
playing-with the words in the problem, and, thereby ultimately enabling the entire group 
to apply fractional terms correctly. 
 
63The point of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics is to show the social 
nature of mathematical operations. 
55Philosophical Investigations, II, 213-216. 
CHAPTER 6 
A WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH TO CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION 
Teaching and Learning as an Indirect Activity 
Wittgenstein’s notion that teaching, and thereby learning, is an indirect activity 
initially led me to explore further his philosophical works.  While researching a paper on 
the history of Soviet curriculum, I happened upon the educational writings of Leo 
Tolstoy.  In his essays on education, written in the mid-nineteenth century, Tolstoy 
vigorously criticized contemporary methods and theories of education being 
implemented in Europe and America.  Rather than shackling students to a narrow 
predetermined concept of knowledge, Tolstoy believed that education should free 
students to engage in understanding through “creative improvisation,” allowing them to 
“reshape society to meet new needs and challenges.”1  After reading Tolstoy's essays 
on education, I re-read Janik and Toulmin’s Wittgenstein’s Vienna.  I first read their work 
as an undergraduate student and remembered that Tolstoy’s ideas on art, morality, and 
religion had influenced both fin-de-siecle Vienna and Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
thought, which led me to investigate whether Tolstoy’s educational writings influenced 
Wittgenstein as well.2 
                                                 
1Reginald D. Archambault, “Introduction,” Tolstoy on Education, trans. Leo Wiener (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1967), ix.  The notion of “creative improvisation” can best be seen in 
Tolstoy’s description of teaching peasant children to write in his school at Yasnaya Polyana.  In “Are the 
Peasant Children to Learn to Write from us?  Or, Are We to Learn from the Peasant Children?” 191-244, 
Tolstoy’s position is similar to the one advanced by Huebner in “Religious Metaphors,” which he patterns 
on Whitehead’s “Aims of Education” (see Chapter One, above).  See also, William H. Schubert, 
Curriculum: Perspective, Paradigm, and Possibility (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 
70, who observes that “Tolstoy's brief [educational] experiment anticipated the most liberal aspects of 
progressive education and saw curriculum as primarily embodied in the teacher." 
2According to Janik and Toulmin, 157-165, Tolstoy’s literary works as well as his polemic against 
aesthetic theories, What is Art?, trans. Almyer Maude, introduction by Vincent Tomas, The Library of 
Liberal Arts (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1960), was part of the general cultural milieu of fin-de-
siecle Vienna.  In addition to Tolstoy, Kierkegarrd’s notions of “indirect communication,” or 
“communication by means of reflection” in the service of Christian understanding, also had a profound 
influence on both Viennese society and Wittgenstein.  The difference between the two was that 
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The idea that students learn indirectly what they are taught suggests that no 
matter what method(s) a teacher employs, students ultimately learn and know in their 
own way.  The notion that teaching is an indirect activity, further suggests that 
knowledge cannot be transmitted directly by some immediate pedagogical stimulus.  As 
Dewey counsels, “Perhaps the greatest of all pedagogical fallacies is the notion that a 
person learns only the particular thing he is studying at the time.”3  This is not to 
suggest, however, that teachers do not play an important role or that the method or 
practices in which teachers engage are irrelevant to what students eventually learn.  On 
the contrary, the notion that the relationship between teaching and learning is an 
indirect one places an even greater importance on teachers and their practices.  As 
MacMillan observes, if students are unable to trust a teacher’s pedagogical language-
games because they appear either irrelevant or nonsensical, or, if a teacher's practices 
limit the kinds of learning activities in which students are allowed to engage, then the 
students’ understanding students of what is being taught may itself be limited.  
Additionally, as suggested by the study presented by Fleener, Carter, and Reeder, if a 
teacher’s classroom language is too narrowly focused on a disciplinary discourse, then 
some students may fail to learn what is being taught.  This not only pertains to the strict 
use of language within a discipline’s discourse, but pertains to the restricted 
pedagogical language used to plan, manage, and assess what students learn as well.  
Moreover, limiting the ability of students to understand what is being taught also limits 
their ability to apply what they learn beyond the context of the classroom. As Whitehead 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kierkegarrd’s notion of indirect communication was rooted in the individual while Tolstoy’s was situated 
socially in the village collective or commune (the mir).  
3John Dewey, Education and Experience (New York: Colliers, 1938), 48. 
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advises, being educated means that a student must be able to say that he or she has 
made the “ideas [being learned] one’s own.” 
In this chapter I will explore first the assumptions of the Tyler rationale, and then 
Wittgenstein’s notions of synoptic seeing, language-games, and play; all of which 
disrupt the organizational flow toward Tyler’s educational goals and the historicist 
progressivism surrounding these goals. 
The School Curriculum: 
An  Historically Ordered Activity 
 
The current school curriculum, following the general procedures laid out by Ralph 
Tyler’s rationale, organizes instruction in a way that those who are responsible for the 
curriculum believe can best ensure a direct transfer of knowledge to the learner.  In 
order to facilitate this direct transfer of knowledge, the curriculum organizes teaching 
and learning by reducing knowledge into a set of simple facts that are then organized 
into a logical sequence of steps.  This method of organizing knowledge is based upon 
the belief that there are basic or essential forms of knowledge upon which future 
teaching and learning must be built.  It is a belief that learning—and by implication 
thinking—progresses over time from simple ideas to more complex concepts.  It is a 
method of thinking that organizes knowledge in a progressive “historicism,” which 
maintains that the more a society knows the better off it will be in the future. Following 
from Tyler, the school curriculum becomes the knowledge a society has accumulated 
that it believes continues to be most useful toward achieving its social objectives.4 
Throughout the twentieth century, American education has been carried along by 
the currents of progressivism's three modern theoretical movements of "social 
                                                 
4See Chapter Two, above, 25-26.  
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efficiency," "human [psychological] development," and "social meliorism."5  While 
focusing on varying aspects of the curriculum, all three of progressivism’s currents of 
thought were undergirded by positivism’s theories of organic social development and its 
historicism.6  It is progressivism's varied pedagogical currents that Tyler endeavored to 
rationalize mid-way through the century.  Tyler’s rationalization of progressivism’s three 
currents into an efficient procedure of curriculum and instruction continues to function as 
a general framework for the models for effective teaching upon which the current 
curriculum of “high-stakes” accountability is based.   
Because the school curriculum is organized in a logical step-by-step sequence 
that leads students to what are considered pedagogically useful or practical outcomes, 
teaching practices that begin a lesson by activating students’ prior (or taught) 
knowledge could be understood as a kind of historicism.  In other words, this practice 
assumes a progressive, building block approach whereby students’ prior knowledge, in 
order to be made useful, must be arranged in a logical fashion that is related to the 
content area being taught. As such, the usefulness of students’ prior knowledge 
becomes limited to the organizational structure of the subject discipline.  In other words, 
the pedagogical method used to plan and implement a lesson has the effect of 
organizing students’ prior knowledge in a textbook fashion. This understanding of how 
                                                 
5Herbert Kliebard, "Three Currents of American Curriculum Thought," in Current Thought on 
Curriculum, ASCD Yearbook (1985): 31-44.  Kliebard asserts that during the twentieth century the 
opposing curriculum forces were not progressivism versus humanism, but were progressivism's three 
currents struggling for dominance among each other.  However, the nineteenth-century humanist 
curriculum, which could be roughly described as maintaining the Puritan's Ramist practices, was not 
eliminated from American education.  Instead, it remained in the educational background and thus 
functioned as a kind of didactic embankment within which progressivism's three currents rampaged. 
6See Chapter One, above, 5; and Kliebard’s discussion in “Dewey and the Herbartians: The 
Genesis of a Theory of Curriculum,” in Contemporary Curriculum Discourses: Twenty Years of JCT, ed. 
William F. Pinar, in Counterpoints: Studies in the Postmodern Theory of Education, vol. 70 (New York: 
Peter Lang, 1999/1981). 
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the knowledge students bring with them into the classroom needs to be sequentially 
organized is, I believe, closely related to Peter Ramus’s belief that a student’s own 
“mental possessions” need to be arranged by employing a set (his, or the teacher’s) 
method in order to make them pedagogically useful.7   
The reconceptual view of curriculum offered by currere’s autobiographical 
method disrupts the history upon which Tyler’s rational efficiency curriculum framework 
is built.  In addition, currere’s use of existential imagination resists the loss of 
individuality precipitated by positivism’s scientistic and progressive pull on social history.  
In so doing, currere challenges Ramus’s dialectical stages, as well as his belief that his 
pedagogical method could organize all knowledge for its practical exercise in life.8  
Moreover, currere disrupts the Ramist belief that a student’s experiences are made 
more useful by organizing them pedagogically. Currere’s autobiographical method calls 
upon teachers and students to remember their experiences that occur outside of 
school—their “biographic situation”—so these experiences can be used by teachers’ 
and students’ to better understand their on-going experiences with (and within) the 
school curriculum.  
Similar to the way Wittgenstein’s ahistorical understanding of forms of life offer us 
a means to move beyond positivism’s progressive historicism, I believe his concept of 
language-games affords everyone involved with curriculum the opportunity to move 
educational practices and research beyond progressivism’s theories of education as 
well as the school curriculum’s ever-present didactic underpinnings. Recognizing, as 
                                                 
7See Chapter Three, above, 93. 
8See Chapter Three, above, 82. 
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John Dewey urges, that “we never educate directly, but indirectly,”9 helps teachers 
reconceive their pedagogical practices as the multiple use of languages (discourses), 
rather than simply a logical sequence of learning activities, designed to achieve some 
pre-determined objective.  In addition, by understanding that to educate is to lead 
students in the use of a great variety of languages, curriculum theorists may begin to 
conceive of teaching and learning as a synoptic activity that opens up multiple 
interpretations and forms of knowing. By expanding knowing via synoptic seeing, by 
exploring the use of language-games, and by reconceiving the role of play, Wittgenstein 
offers us a new way to conceive of curriculum, quite in keeping with currere’s 
autobiographical dynamism. 
Synoptic Seeing: A New Way of Knowing  
 
Wittgenstein observes that to teach is the practice of teaching students the use of 
words in a language-game.  He emphasizes that it is only by using a word within a given 
context that we learn to employ its meaning.  Words do not just represent a naïve 
reality.  Nor do they simply stand-in for meaning.  Meaning is not an external or internal 
“object” that stands outside our use of words.  Words are utterances that we use, like 
tools, to fashion relationships among concepts and, to which, meanings adhere.  As 
such, Wittgenstein maintains that our uses of words form a system (language-games)—
a nest or knot of social-linguistic relationships—that inform and present our forms of life.  
In so doing, our everyday uses of language work to shape our lives, while, at the same 
time, being shaped by our lives. 
As expressions of our forms of life, our uses of words aid us in understanding the 
variety of forms that our lives take, helping us see the various routes of meaning that 
                                                 
9Dewey, Democracy and Education, 19 (my emphasis). 
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interconnect our uses of words to concepts.   Ramus, and those who would follow his 
direction, focus such “seeing” on the narrow pathway constructed by his method.  In this 
seeing process, one begins always with what is “absolutely known,” progressing 
methodologically and surely, step-by-step, to that which is “not so known.”10  
Overarching or underlying this methodological process is, as Kliebard points out in his 
critique of the Tyler Rationale, a practical view of learning that is limited to a utilitarian, 
functional use of knowledge. This, of course, is one reason why the New England 
Puritans, as well as their English brethren, were so taken with Ramism.   
In asking us to “see synoptically,” Wittgenstein encourages us to replace seeing 
narrowly and simply with seeing broadly and complexly, thereby helping us become 
aware of the multifarious connections that exist among the concepts emerging from our 
everyday use of words.  In asking us to see in such a manner, Wittgenstein is asking us 
to see “perspicuously” (i.e., clearly) by setting “out the whole conceptual field” so that 
our understanding of the possible meanings of words can pass more easily from one 
concept to another.11  Furthermore, he believes that attending to the everyday uses of 
our various language-games enables us to see more “clearly” that these multifarious 
connections, and their interwoven knots of meaning, are indeed in plain view.  
Understanding the world synoptically requires us to remove the logical blinders forced 
upon us by “method’s” essential ordering of meaning, thereby allowing us to see the 
context and complexity of our everyday surroundings and its interlocking labyrinth of 
                                                 
10The Logike of P. Ramus, 54-56 (my emphasis).  See also, Chapter Two, above.  
11Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, 9e & notes.  Wittgenstein describes this “synoptic” view as 
an ubersichliche Darstellung.  According to Miles, we really don't have an English word for ubersichliche.  
While it is often translated as 'perspicuous,' Miles suggests that no one really uses this word in English.  
Gier, in Wittgenstein and Phenomenology, 12 & 81, suggests that ubersichliche is better understood as 
"synoptic," which is the translation that I have chosen to use.  According to Gier, the term ubersichliche 
Darstellung first appears in Wittgenstein’s original, 1931, notes on Frazer's Golden Bough.  
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meanings.  In so doing, we can begin seeing the connections among concepts that we 
might not have otherwise seen.  Synoptic seeing asks us to reduce our dependence on 
thinking and increase our ability to “look,” thus reconceiving our practically understood 
situations as ones holding new and yet unimagined possibilities—what Wittgenstein 
calls “seeing –as.”12  John Shotter (1996) calls Wittgenstein’s synoptic seeing “a poetics 
of practice” through which “new usages are spontaneous and unforeseeable 
adaptations of past usages.”13  
Presenting the curriculum synoptically provides teachers and students an indirect 
presentation of the varying aspects of meaning that concepts can take as they emerge 
from the multiple language-games used in the classroom.  Rather than understanding 
the curriculum in its conventional, taken-for-granted way, seeing the curriculum 
synoptically, as Wittgenstein’s teaching experiences show, enables students to 
recognize new meanings that emerge, first as one thing, then as another, out of the 
context of their everyday lives.  As such, the synoptic practice of seeing-as provides 
curriculum theorists with a new way of understanding how students learn.   
While teaching practices that employ method’s limited use of language compels 
teachers into delivering, and students into receiving, the curriculum as “inert ideas,” 
Wittgenstein’s synoptic seeing replaces the essential order of the school curriculum’s 
logical discourse with the unmapped wilderness of our everyday language through 
which no single pathway need be cut.  A synoptic view of knowledge applies the “rough 
ground” of our unrefined uses of language to the classroom, thereby allowing 
                                                 
12Henry Stanten, Wittgenstein and Derrida (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 66, 
suggests that the extent to which Wittgenstein is using a “method,” it is a method of destabilizing our 
taken-for-granted understandings of the world.  
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schooling’s concepts to be seen differently.  In this way, seeing synoptically asks 
teachers and students to know by seeing-the-curriculum-as something other than inert, 
dead ideas.   
Wittgenstein maintains that to read a “sign” (i.e., to understand the meaning of a 
word) in a conventional way requires no interpretation; no change is our use of a word; 
no change in meaning.  His practice of seeing-as, on the other hand, gives teachers and 
students the opportunity to see the curriculum’s practical use of knowledge in new and 
imaginative ways.  Seeing-as allows teachers and students to recompose the practical 
meanings taught by the curriculum’s limited use of words by imagining new 
metaphorical relationships. Seeing-as makes it possible for teachers and students to 
return to the flux and dynamic relationships that emerge from our everyday life 
experiences.   
If we understand that the words students use outside of the classroom are 
metaphorically related to the words they are being taught inside the classroom, then 
teachers would better understand that the pedagogical discourse used to teach employs 
an indirect use of words, even when teacher are trying to teach directly.  The practice of 
teaching as a direct, ostensive demonstration of a language limits these metaphorical 
relationships.  As such, teaching directly limits the connections students are allowed to 
imagine among concepts, thereby limiting what students may learn.  Thus, the greater 
the variety of words (language-games) teachers use in the classroom, the greater the 
possibility that the students will make the kinds of metaphorical connections they need 
                                                                                                                                                             
13Shotter, “Living in a Wittgensteinian World,” 306 (my emphasis).  Shotter uses the standard 
translation of “perspicuous presentation” for ubersichliche Darstellung. 
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in order to learn the concepts being taught.14  Synoptic knowing is not a process that 
asks students only to learn skills (i.e., techne) that seek to change their behaviors to fit 
within bureaucratically pre-set social norms.  By recomposing concepts metaphorically, 
seeing-as offers teachers and students a way to see the curriculum creatively, thereby 
helping them invent new ways of speaking, new understandings, new practices, and 
new forms of living.   
Reconceiving the Curriculum as Language 
Over the second half of the twentieth century, despite the best efforts of those 
responsible for curriculum to provide more interactive, creative, and dynamic learning 
activities, the school curriculum has remained rutted in Tyler’s rational methodology as 
well as the technological, positivist language of the social sciences used for planning, 
implementing, and assessing student achievement. In so doing, teaching practices have 
remained overly directed toward pre-determined outcomes solely because they are 
presumed to be measurable.  As such, not only are students’ learning experiences 
limited in terms of the kinds of activities in which they engage, but, more importantly, 
overly directed learning activities restrict the ways in which language is used in the 
classroom.  Thus, the ability of students to transfer the school curriculum to their 
everyday lives continues to be a significant educational problem.  Huebner observes, 
“The problem is that the language and the practices of education are nearly 
independent.  Educational practices too often are inarticulate, unconnected to the 
legitimating and descriptive powers of language.”15   
                                                 
14Nelson, 2, suggests a similar view of the role that metaphors play in her discussion of 
communication and discourse.  See also, Doll, A Post-Modern Perspective, 169.  
15Huebner, “Curriculum Field: Its Wake and Our Work,” 242.  Throughout his career, Huebner has 
tried to show that the curriculum’s dependence on the language of the social sciences limits what 
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Over the generations, traditional teaching practices of literacy and calculating 
have constructed classroom knowledge into a hierarchical taxonomy, which is often 
presented today as higher-order-thinking-skills.  Such taxonomies effectively suspend 
the dynamic and generative nature of human understanding (i.e., learning) within rigid 
categories that have been fabricated for the purpose of instruction.  Moreover, didactic 
forms of instruction depend upon a discourse that stands idle as objective, formal 
knowledge.  This knowledge can be bracketed, classified, categorized, and, thereby, 
memorized by students.  Our everyday, unrefined language-games, however, keep our 
understanding running in such a way that even a vague utterance can be understood.  
This is because our everyday use of language depends heavily upon the tacit 
understandings that are part of the living dynamics of our ordinary lives.  Wittgenstein 
came to believe that our tacit understandings are not knowledge that is transmitted by 
some psycho-physiological phenomena or by some gnostic metaphysic.  Instead, our 
tacit understandings are implied by, and acquired indirectly from, our everyday 
language-games that inform our ordinary forms of life.  As he discovered, through his 
later investigations, the ordering of our ordinary use of concepts into distinct and rigid 
categories is impossible.  What this suggests, is that due to the dynamic nature of 
hands-on, as well as, creative learning activities the use of language never stands idle.  
Instead, as students are shown how to engage in an activity, words are acting in 
ordinary, unrefined ways as students are being told what they can and cannot do.16 
                                                                                                                                                             
students learn in the classroom.  See also, Doll’s critique of the engineering framework within which the 
social sciences are situated and its limited view of what it means to educate, in A Post-Modern 
Perspective, Chapter Two. 
16It is only when we try to directly demonstrate to a child what a ball is by showing the ball to the 
child and naming it saying, “This is a ball” that we would try and ostensibly teach a child what a ball is. 
This is the kind of methodological language-game that is used in the classroom. However, the first time 
we play ball with a child we do not stop to ostensibly teach the child what a ball is, we just begin playing 
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Even from those perspectives, including Wittgenstein’s, that situate knowing 
within a larger social context, which recognize that knowing one thing enables a student 
to know many other things, the school curriculum's use of a narrow positive discourse to 
construct objectives and assessments (i.e., technologizing knowing) continues to limit 
the ability of students to fully understand that there exists numerous other possible 
understandings of the curriculum’s use of language.  While the social, interactive, and 
dynamic nature of human understanding suggests that the experience of learning 
something has no single direction, or that knowing neither begins nor ends with a 
specific object or event, it is still the individual student who engages in the knowing.  As 
such, if the goal of the school curriculum (following the noblest aspirations of the 
humanist tradition) is to provide students with the ability to apply what they learn to their 
everyday lives, thereby becoming independent learners, then why would the curriculum 
not want to draw upon the ordinary, unrefined ways that students use language.  From a 
Wittgensteinian view, any curriculum that does not completely investigate all aspects of 
students’ everyday use of language is either misdirected or inadequate.17 
While Wittgenstein’s proposition that knowing something does not require some 
external authority, rational certainty, or direct sensory experience undermines the 
rational and empirical theories of learning, upon which the current school curriculum has 
been built, his later philosophy helps teachers recognize that language plays a crucial 
role in both experiential learning and the didactic practices used to teach the subject 
                                                                                                                                                             
by saying, “go get the ball,” or “kick the ball here,” etc.  This is a point that Wittgenstein is making in his 
discussion of St. Augustine’s example of ostensive teaching at the opening of Philosophical 
Investigations, I, no. 1. 
17On Certainty, no. 61.  This is also, Brill’s, 105, argument. 
 181
disciplines.18  Educators who support experiential learning activities often seem to forget 
that when students engage in “hands-on” learning activities, the use of language does 
not suddenly disappear.  As one of my students recently wrote, as a high school student 
he had realized that language played an important role in learning because he 
recognized that "the sheer volume of information available [to students] would take too 
long to experience and develop, one piece at a time."19 
However, even Dewey’s discussion of experiential learning gives the use of 
language little if any role.  Instead, he presents experience as a psycho-sensory 
connection (albeit an indirect one) between the mental and physical world.  Rather than 
relating experience to one’s use of language, Dewey describes experiential learning as 
a journey of discovery.  He suggests that experiential learning is “a psychological 
statement . . . it is historic; it notes steps actually taken.”  What one notes, however, are 
not the words one uses to describe such experiences, but the activities of the 
experiences themselves, “the more or less accidental and devious paths traced by the 
explorer" (the one experiencing).20  On the other hand, neither essentialism’s “back to 
                                                 
18These are the two pedagogical categories set forth by Dewey as the ”psychological” method 
and the “logical” method of education, in Child and Curriculum (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1902), reprinted in Curriculum and Evaluation, 178.  Current curriculum standards continue to 
maintain this dichotomy of teaching methods.   
19Christopher Smith, in his "Educational Autobiography" assignment spring semester, 2001.  
Chris is an alternative certification student who teaches math and science at a small town parochial high 
school in South Louisiana.  Prior to becoming a teacher, he had been a successful hospital administrator.  
This notion that experience can teach only over an extended period of time is an important aspect of 
Aristotle’s discussion of “practical wisdom” (phronesis) in his Nicomachean Ethic. 
20 Dewey, Child and Curriculum, 182-183.  Dewey’s act of mapping appears to be a systematic 
ordering (i.e., a smoothing over of the unrefined rough edges of experience) using his “scientific method.”  
As such, Dewey’s concept of experiential learning echoes the New England Puritan practice of using 
Ramus’s diagrams to map their pathway to salvation from their life experiences.  See Haller’s, 301-303, 
discussion of the Puritans’ use of “biography and history” (whose refinement in the New England colony 
was adopted and advanced in England by John Milton) as a method of observing (demonstrating) “the 
operations of the Holy Spirit in their own breasts and the lives of men about them.”  Ong, Decay of 
Dialogue, 116-121, further observes that Renaissance scholars, like Rudolph Agricola or Francis Bacon, 
often depicted the “common” places (loci) from which arguments were derived as a forest or wilderness 
(silva).  Rhetorical or dialectical “invention” enabled a speaker to “cut out” and sort or arrange the timber 
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basics” curriculum of reading, writing, and calculating, nor “perennialism’s” humanist 
curriculum of the Western canon pay any more attention to students' use of language.  
In the current school curriculum, the consideration that teaching and learning practices 
involve students’ own use of language appears to get overlooked in the technological 
discourse of information processing, communication, and scientific methodologies. 
Dewey and Wittgenstein do, though, come together in the pragmatic belief that 
one must move in order to know.  In both experiential exploration and language-games, 
knowing is not a matter of mere contemplation, but is a matter of action.  The 
differences lie in the kinds of actions taken; for Dewey the fundamental act of human 
experience is to psychologically map one’s experiences.  For Wittgenstein, however, the 
most fundamental of human acts (what makes us human) is to speak.  Dewey’s use of 
the mapping metaphor suggests that his view of knowledge, while personal, is still a 
representational one.21  Wittgenstein’s language-games, on the other hand, are “not a 
representational structure, but a presentational act.”  While language is composed of 
signs, these “signs mean by doing for themselves, not by pointing to something or other 
[as does a map].”22  Moreover, Genova observes that Wittgenstein’s rejection of 
philosophy’s analytical practices is a rejection of the use of the therapeutic “as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
or trees into a useful discourse.  Ramus’s method transformed the process of sorting out into one of 
mapping a clear path through the forest.  The Frenchman, Jean Bodin employed the metaphor of a “clear 
path” in an attempt to methodize history in his 1566 work, Methodus ad Facilem Historiarum Cognitionum. 
21Dewey, in Child and Curriculum, 182, suggests that “the map . . . serves as a guide to future 
experience: it gives direction; it facilitates control; it economized effort, preventing useless wandering, and 
pointing out the paths which lead most quickly and most certainly to a desired result.” 
22Genova, 117 (my emphasis), states, “Thus, like other post-structuralists, Wittgenstein comes to 
appreciate the importance of speech, parole . . . .  Language is an action, a tongue whereby sounds 
achieve meaning.” 
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primary simile for his concept of philosophy,”23 which has been one of the underlying 
practices of schooling since the Renaissance.  Rather than a means to an end, 
language-games are an end in themselves.  As such, Wittgenstein’s “synoptic 
presentation” reminds everyone responsible for the curriculum that teaching and 
learning are not simply technological products, but involve the dynamic and generative 
use of language in a variety of ways.  His use of “seeing-as” calls upon teachers to 
change the conventional or practical ways language us used, instead, asking students 
to see the other possible conceptual relationships presented by alternative uses of the 
words.  Changing the way a word is used changes the word’s meaning.  As such, by 
changing the language-game, “seeing-as” changes the context of the form of life in 
which a word is socially situated.  Furthermore, Wittgenstein is suggesting that the 
curriculum’s use of language—the concepts and meanings students learn—should 
emerge out of the multifarious activities and practices in which teachers and students 
engage, while interacting both in and out of school. This use of language, rather than 
directing students to some per-set outcome, composes a "kinship of meaning" intimately 
related to these activities. 
In his latter philosophy, Wittgenstein constantly uses the resemblances among 
our multifarious language-games to show us that through our experiences we are 
continuously altering our concepts about the world, like an ever-changing riverbed.  
Because to learn one thing is to learn others, as we acquire new facts we merely 
exchange one concept for another.  At times these alterations occur without our even 
                                                 
23Genova, 124.  Stanten, 67-68, further suggests that Wittgenstein's philosophical "method," 
rather than being a therapeutic conversation, is a ruse—an act of playful disruption that endeavors to 
stabilize our taken-for-granted understandings. 
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noticing that a change in our beliefs has taken place.  In this way, what was once 
important to us becomes unimportant and what had been unimportant finds new 
importance.24  In other words—taking a cue from Wittgenstein—what would a 
conceptual structure for the term “games” look like?  Does not the “concept [games] 
“presuppose the concept ‘difference of [games].’”25  Because the games we play 
resemble one another in so many different ways, would there not be too many 
differences to make such a conceptual structure useful when trying to understand how 
the word “game” is being used in a particular situation.  Instead, Wittgenstein is 
suggesting that by engaging in the practice of “seeing-as,” teachers and students are 
engaging in acts of language-play, through which they are better able to understand the 
great variety of meanings that concepts reveal in our many language-games. 
Reconceiving Curriculum as A Dialectic of Play 
The practice of play that Wittgenstein offers the curriculum field suggests a 
different way of speaking (i.e., thinking) about how students come to understand (i.e., 
learn) the meanings that emerge from the dynamic, social interactions that take place 
among people when engaging in any activity.  Furthermore, Wittgenstein’s use of 
synoptic language play offers teachers’ and students’ insights into the curriculum that 
are different from the practical or instrumental explanations educators typically use to 
account for the way students learn in school.  In other words, Wittgenstein engages in a 
practice of play in an attempt to persuade us to change our way of thinking about 
knowing and learning. 
                                                 
24In Zettel, no. 352, Wittgenstein asserts, “It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their 
concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly 
important becomes unimportant, and vice versa.”  
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In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein is not attempting to create a theory of play.  
Instead, through the way he uses language to discuss the concepts of language-games 
and meaning-in-use, Wittgenstein is presenting the reader with a “practice of play” 
through his use of a conversational language-game to present his ideas—what Shotter 
describes as Wittgenstein’s “poetics of practice.”  In so doing, Wittgenstein is 
endeavoring to expand our understanding of meaning, which logic has fixed through its 
use of method.  Through his use of language-play, Wittgenstein is hoping to disrupt 
logic’s methodological foundations it uses to understanding the world by transforming its 
understanding into a use of non-sense.26        
Henry Stanten (1986) suggests that, while not speaking about a concept of play, 
Wittgenstein is playing “the classroom cut up;” he is acting-out his frustrations with 
logic’s limited methodological representation of the world by playing the “refractory 
student, one who refuses to go the way [his teachers have] laid out for him, and he sets 
himself up as a model for other ruffians to follow.”27  By so playing, Wittgenstein is 
calling into question Western Civilization’s social and intellectual norms (i.e., its exercise 
of practical “common sense”).  The consequences of playing are believed to have little, 
if any, practical utility—as suggested by the statement: “children at play.”28  Through his 
use of seeing-as, Wittgenstein is playfully disrupting our conventional and practical 
understandings of the words that we use, thereby exploring the possible alternative 
                                                                                                                                                             
25For the sake of this example, I have substituted Wittgenstein’s use of the term, “substances,” 
with the term, “games.” 
26Stanten, 132. 
27Stanten, 132. 
28Charles Lamb, in “The Old and the New Schoolmaster,” 62, offers an adult’s view of the 
impracticality of children at play, stating that children are “unwholesome companions for grown people.  . . 
. The noises of children, playing their own fancies . . . inexpressibly take from the labor of my task.  . . . for 
in the voice of that tender age there is a kind of poetry, far unlike the harsh prose-accents of man’s 
conversation.”   
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meanings among concepts, which our conventional ways of seeing do not provided.  As 
such, he uses the practice of play in the recuperation of “sense” (i.e. understanding) 
through the use of “non-sense.”29 
The concept and action of play may, at first, appear to be paradoxical to the 
purposes presumably served by the school curriculum.  This paradox is based upon an 
assumption that playing is equivalent to having “fun” or “frivolity.”30  On the other hand, 
not all learning that is understood as having fun is identical to learning activities that 
involve play.  When teachers endeavor to make learning fun, they are generally 
attempting to get and hold their students’ interest.  Fun learning is understood as any 
classroom activity that is exciting and interesting.  As such, fun learning is often 
presented as hands-on, experiential activities that compel students to discover or make 
something.  However, just because some learning activities are fun, does not mean that 
students are engaging in Wittgenstein’s practice of play. 
Dewey suggests that the natural condition of children is to be playful; activity is 
the nature of their being.  As with their concepts of knowing, Dewey and Wittgenstein’s 
concepts of play converge at the level of activity (i.e., movement). Like Wittgenstein, 
Dewey maintains that play is an “activity which is not performed for the sake of any 
result beyond itself.”  Unlike work, play is not a means to an end.  However, Dewey 
presents play as the natural precursor to work.  He states: “Play passes into work when 
fairly remote results of a definite character are foreseen and enlist persistent efforts for 
                                                 
29Stanten, 156, maintains that Wittgenstein’s playful practice bares a kinship to deconstruction’s 
“fictive possibilities.”   Similarly, both language-games and deconstruction appear to be attempting to 
disrupt (“rupture”), in Jacques Derrida’s words, in Writing and Difference, translated and introduced by 
Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 278, “the organizing principle of the 
structure [that] would limit what we might call the play of the structure.” 
30William E. Doll, “Play and Mastery: A Structuralist View,” in Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, 
1979: 209-226. 
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their accomplishment.”31 Thus, for Dewey, the natural activities of a child are 
transformed into the practical activities of the adult when spontaneous acts of play are 
organized, controlled, and made purposeful through education.  In other words, 
although the activity of play is the natural condition of being a child, play becomes work 
by applying its activity to specific ends or purposes.  Interestingly, Dewey’s belief that 
play is the preparatory stage for work carries echoes of Ramus’s dialectical stages in 
which the “art of dialectic” transforms “natural dialectic” into an “exercise” of practical 
reasoning through classroom teaching.32 
Although Wittgenstein uses the analogy of tools to describe the various ways in 
which language-games employ words, by using the “simile of a game” with language, 
he keeps his playful practice of seeing-as more non-utilitarian than Dewey’s concept of 
play.  Through the simile of games, Wittgenstein is not presenting language as a 
means, like some communicative or representational tool, working towards a utilitarian 
end, but as a synoptic activity (i.e., meaning-in-use) that, like playing a game, is an end 
onto itself.  As such, Wittgenstein’s language play is not simply a precursor to work.  As 
Wittgenstein’s use of the term “tools” suggests, the concept of playing sometimes 
carries with it meanings that resemble the way the term “work” is generally employed.  
Hence, while work is a means to some end (as in achieving a goal or objective—an 
                                                 
31Dewey, Democracy and Education, 204. This view of play as an activity that children engage in 
preparatory to becoming adults is a concept of play that Dewey brought forward into the twentieth century 
from the ancient Greeks.  See also, Doll, "Play as Mastery," 210-211. 
32See Doll, “Play and Mastery,” 214-220, who suggests that similar to Dewey, both Jean Piaget 
and Jerome Bruner present the relationship between play and work as a preparatory one that is 
fundamental to the learning process. Furthermore, the similarity between Ramus’s dialectical stages 
(Chapter Two, above) and the movement from a natural stage of playful activity to a more practical stage 
of work through the systematic ordering brought about by teaching is just as apparent in Piaget and 
Bruner’s educational views on play.  Whitehead’s, 17-18, concept of “romance” presented in “The Rhythm 
of Education,” in Aims of Education, suggests a notion of play.  Not unlike Dewey’s notion of play as 
preparation to work, Whitehead’s “romance” is a preparation for his concept of “precision.” 
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activity organized around achieving some managed end), Wittgenstein’s language play 
is not a means to anything but itself.   
Genova suggests that by disassociating the use of language from its assumed 
representational or communicative ends, one is better able to see language's dynamic 
nature.33  In other words, because using language is an important aspect of the 
dynamic, social relationships in which humans engage, even when an activity or 
practice, like those occurring in a classroom, is directed toward some specific purpose 
or goal, the potential for play never disappears, but remains ever present in our 
everyday language-games.  (Thus, any discourse has the potential of being transformed 
into a farce.) 
For Wittgenstein all forms of play are acts of pretending, and pretending is 
intimately related to seeing synoptically.  For example, he states:  
Here is a game played by children: they say that a chest, for example, is a 
house; and thereupon it is interpreted as a house in every detail.  A piece of 
fancy is worked into it. 
And does the child now see the chest as a house? 
"He quite forgets that it is a chest; for him it actually is a house." 
 
And if you knew how to play this game, and, given a particular situation, you 
exclaimed with special expression "Now it's a house!"—you would be giving 
expression to the dawning of an aspect [seeing-as].34 
 
As this example of seeing-as shows, when children engage in play, they are exploring 
the possible relationship between using language and meaning by acting out the use 
words in an imaginative context staged by an activity.  In other words, pretending that a 
chest is a house is related to a conceptual relationship between the chest and the 
                                                 
33Genova, 117, further states that in this situation, “’Game’ here does the same work as it does 
for Gadamer and Derrida.”  This is closer to the Ancient Greek notion of play that is related to the indirect 
use of language in the form of the farce.  See Doll, “Play as Mastery,” 210. 
34Philosophical Investigations, II, 206. 
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utterance: "Now it's a house!”  By uttering the words, "Now it's a house,” the 
conventional way that one sees a chest is disrupted.  As such, Wittgenstein is showing 
us that the playful practice of seeing-as is activated through the use of language, 
thereby enabling a person to explore the metaphorical relationships between words, 
concepts, and the world.  Genova asserts that when engaging in a new language-game 
we do not merely say things that have already been said.  Instead, we are staging the 
utterances related to the activities and practices of a new form of life, thereby presenting 
to our selves the dynamic relationships found in a particular linguistic situation for the 
first time.35  By exploring the multiple possibilities between concepts and the use of 
words, we are liberating meaning from its conventional usages, which enables us to 
explore further the frontiers of our understandings of the world.  Thus, unless students 
are given the opportunity to explore their use language by playfully seeing-the-
curriculum-as, they are missing out on the whole concept of play.      
On the other hand, new meanings are not explored simply by students not 
following correctly a rule or technique when learning an ideal (i.e., logical) language-
game.  Such alterations in the game could be passed off merely as some categorical 
mistake when trying to apply the logic of the canon (e.g. someone is just not following 
the rules).36  In this situation, the broader practices related to students’ use of words 
would not be altered because the conventional use of language in which the rules are 
embedded maintains its dominance.  If some form of language-play, though, is applied 
to the context of the mistake (whether explicitly or implicitly), a new language-game 
                                                 
35Genova, 123-124. 
36See Gombrich’s discussion of how any alterations in medieval art were considered to be 
canonical mistakes, in Chapter Two, above, note 28.   Furthermore, this is the concept of “playing-at” that 
Fleener and associates are suggesting in Chapter Four, above. 
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begins to be explored and new meanings begin to emerge.  As a new language-game 
emerges, new practices also emerge—a new form of life. 
Wittgenstein’s use of the simile of a game to better depict the relationship 
between learning and language suggests a dialectical relationship that cannot be 
attributable to the reasoning practices provided by either praxis (i.e., doing) or poiesis 
(i.e., making).  Nor is it a function of the analytical practices required for theoretical 
speculation (i.e., theoria) or philosophical wisdom.  One might consider that 
Wittgenstein’s use of play, rather than being simply a return to Ramus’s “natural 
dialectic,” suggests a third dialectical relationship.  Instead of following Aristotle's 
philosophical categories of "the practical" (doing) and "an art" (making—techne), 
Wittgensteinian play is a dialectic of the impractical and non-technical, engaging in 
open-ended, generative activities related to the unrefined induction presented by his 
synoptic way of seeing-as—an inexact, pragmatic, momentary, and contextualized 
holistic way of understanding that questions modern philosophical and pedagogical 
practices.   
Jerome Bruner (1975) suggests that play offers students the kinds of non-
directed activities they can quickly generalize that are crucial to their ability to transfer 
learning beyond specific classroom activities.37  This view of play’s pedagogical role, 
similar to Wittgenstein’s, echoes the kind of knowing expressed in Ramus’s assertion 
that young children first learn from particulars (understood here as learning by doing) 
that moves them quickly to generalize about the world “like eagles soaring to the sun.”38  
                                                 
37Jerome Bruner, “On Coping and Defending,” in Toward a Theory of Instruction (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press, 1975), 136.  For Bruner language remains a representational and communicative system. 
38See Chapter Three, above, 80.  Similar to the important role played by Ramism in modernity’s 
quest for method, this understanding of Ramus's thought as presenting a method of learning by doing has 
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Such an untrammeled and immediate way of understanding the world, presented by 
Wittgenstein’s playful practice, suggests a new kind of aesthetic, one that is not 
scientific, mechanistic, nor historical or progressive.39 
Wittgenstein’s practice of play cannot be methodized.  Nor can a theory of play 
be established because a theory must carry with it a set of practices that serves the 
purpose of demonstrating correctness or incorrectness.  Yet, like the Greek concept of 
dialectic, Wittgenstein’s use of play has no specific content.  (To the extent that play is 
related to content, it begins to approach our concept of work).  With no content, play has 
no form.  With no form, play requires no specific technique.  Such a dialectic of play 
cannot be quantified, and, therefore, it would have nothing that can be accounted for.  
With nothing to account for, it cannot be effectively demonstrated (i.e., applied with a 
degree of certainty), analyzed (i.e., reduced to its essential nature), or tested (i.e., 
replicated procedurally).  As such, a dialectic of play cannot be taught because it cannot 
be systematically planned for or implemented.  No one can teach what good playing is, 
nor explain what playing badly might consist of.  However, one can and does learn to 
play.  Furthermore, the practices one learns when playing are used to learn other 
things.   
Pedagogically, a Wittgensteinian dialectic of play may not, at first, lead to the use 
of any teaching-learning activities that are fundamentally different from those already 
attributed to hands-on or experiential learning strategies. Over time, thought, a dialectic 
of play would free teaching-learning activities from being sequentially ordered and 
                                                                                                                                                             
been lost in the history education.  Learning by doing, as an empirical-inductive method of education, is 
typically thought to begin with Francis Bacon.  However, this issue should be reconsidered in light of 
Ramism’s influence on schoolmasters throughout Northern Europe. 
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geared to a method of assessment.  Thus, new pedagogical questions and insights 
might well emerge.  Former question, such as, How does one teach a student such and 
such, or How do I know that a student is learning what is being taught?, would be 
replaced by What learning is at play in the activity being perused?   Pre-determined 
learning outcomes and objectives, while possibly directing students to appropriate 
answers, limit the language (and thoughts) used to present the curriculum, thereby 
limiting students and teachers’ abilities to explore and understand the various meanings 
that emerge from a broader use of language.  Within the current school curriculum, 
bound by pre-determined and standardized objectives and assessments, it will be 
difficult for teachers and students to engage in Wittgenstein’s practice of play.  Yet, such 
engagement is important for it brings into view the important pedagogical and ethical 
question: What unintended outcomes are students learning from an activity, those not 
related to a lesson’s stated objectives?40 
Implications for Pedagogical Practice: 
Curriculum as Synoptic Language-Play  
 
By investigating the synoptic and playful aspects of our everyday use of 
language, rather than trying to unravel languages methodological, communicational, 
and representational processes, Wittgenstein’s language-games offer curriculum 
theorists a way to enhance the reconceptualization of curriculum's theoretical and 
pedagogical practices.  Furthermore, reconceiving curriculum as an act of synoptic 
                                                                                                                                                             
39See the new aesthetic for knowing and thinking that Wittgenstein presents in his Lectures on 
Aesthetics.    
40The pedagogical question of what else is learned by an activity is similar to Bruner’s fourth 
principle in his theory of play, in Jerome S. Bruner, Alison Jolly, Kathy Sylva, Play—Its Roles in 
Development and Evolution (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 15, in which he suggests that play offers the 
opportunity to explore other possibilities inherent in a student’s learning experiences.  In addition, play 
offers teachers the freedom to notice details in a students learning activity that seem irrelevant to the 
defined purpose of the activity. 
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language-play helps curriculum theorists answer the criticism that reconceptualized 
perspectives provide little that is new to educational practices, little which has not 
already been suggested by progressive educators in the past.41 
Reconceiving curriculum as a practice of synoptic language-play allows students 
to imagine how they might use a new language-game.  We do not “see” these imagined 
contexts with the senses.  Nor is an imagined situation constructed by or for one alone.  
Instead, they are socially composed and situated by and within the context of our 
everyday language-games.42  When imagining some new context, we are using our 
language-games to describe what could be possible.  Thus, when students imagine a 
new situation, they are using the newly acknowledged language-game to see new 
aspects of an emerging form of life.   
While the traditional school curriculum is typically presented as two opposing 
methods of instruction with experiential learning on one side and didactic teaching 
practices on the other, by using Wittgenstein’s synoptic approach of seeing-as these 
different methods of teaching begin converging at the level of language.  Curricularists 
need to recognize that teachers and students use of words to describe, both to each 
other and to themselves what they are learning and doing, plays an important role in 
experiential learning activities.  Furthermore, learning subject area knowledge is closely 
related to experiential learning activities through the use of language.  Because it is 
                                                 
41See, for example, William Wraga, in “’Extracting Sun-Beams out of Cucumbers’: The Retreat 
from Practice in Reconceptualized Curriculum Studies,” in Educational Researcher 28, no. 1,  
(1999): 4-13. 
42Richard Evans and Thomas Barnet Lamb, “GDC 2002: Social Activities: Implementing 
Wittgenstein,” in Game Developers Conference 2002 Proceedings (San Jose, CA: Internet, 2002) 
http//www.gamasutra.com/features/20020424/evans_01.htm.  The authors suggest that using 
Wittgenstein’s concept of language-games to construct activity-oriented structures could be the best way 
to improve the social practices of human-like agents in simulation games. 
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through language that students begin to understand the conceptual relationships that 
exist between the subject disciplines and their experiential learning activities, synoptic 
language-play begins conflating the differences educators and theorists have accepted 
as existing between these two practices. 
Going back then to the metaphor of the knot in the first chapter, we may see a 
knot, identify it correctly as a knot and then move on.  This might be the approach 
encouraged by a Tylerian curriculum.  However, from Wittgenstein’s perspective, to do 
so interrupts our looking for new conceptual possibilities by seeing, discussing, and 
listening to the multiple contextual relationships—the messiness, the entanglements, 
and the fibers—that constitute the Gordian twists left transparent by a Tylerian 
approach.  As it relates to studying history, what the school curriculum says is “history,” 
the understanding that “history” is the story of our past.  We do not perhaps understand 
that this past has been (re)constructed (reformed) from progressivism's, or some other 
'ism's, particular perspective.  When presenting our past as the “history,” we do not, 
perhaps appreciate the great variety of fibers that constitutes the thread that becomes 
the single-voice narrative that could be told as multiple stories, parodies, or allegories—
and then, it is still not my history. 
As Wittgenstein’s own teaching experiences show, teaching practices that 
involve a dynamic use of language-play to help students experience the world 
synoptically, rather than analytically, provide students an opportunity to build and create 
their own learning “technologies,” thereby offering teachers “effective“ educational 
strategies that are, at the same time, "efficient."  It is the varied use of language, rather 
than knowledge structures, that enables students to participate in the various forms of 
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life that give them a context to more broadly understand the multiple language-games 
used in the larger world about which they read, write, and calculate.  As such, one might 
suggest that it is a student’s ability to apply multiple language-games in a variety of 
constantly changing contexts and not some ideal or meta-discourse that is fundamental 
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